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From Marxist-Leninism to Market-Liberalism? The Varied Adaptation of Latin America's Leftist Parties

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From Marxist-Leninism to Market-Liberalism?
The Varied Adaptation of Latin America's Leftist Parties

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À memória da minha mãe,
Nadia Nogueira:
"pão e rosas para todos."

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From Marxist-Leninism to Market-Liberalism?
The Varied Adaptation of Latin America's Leftist Parties

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The University of Texas at Austin, 2013

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There has been tremendous variation in the development trajectories of Latin America's leftist parties. Whereas some have successfully entrenched roots in society, built their party organization, and become relevant national parties, other leftist parties have languished organizationally, suffered debilitating internecine rivalries, and witnessed a mass defection of followers, at times despite substantial initial electoral success. For instance, Brazil's Workers' Party (PT) abandoned socialism, moderated its program, and built itself up into one of Brazil's two main parties. Venezuela's Radical Cause (LCR) and Peru's United Left (IU), however, did not. While they had similar origins to the PT, both failed to adapt: LCR and IU fractured and became electorally irrelevant, having been unable to adapt to external challenges.

What accounts for this puzzling empirical variation in otherwise similar parties in relatively similar contexts? More broadly, this dissertation seeks to answer *under what conditions do leftist parties in Latin American democracies transform from undemocratic, radical, weakly institutionalized parties into democratic, moderate, professional parties*? Conversely, under what conditions do they fail to adapt, experience organizational stagnation, and succumb to irrelevance?

It argues that the political context in which each of these leftist parties emerged had an indelible effect on the parties' later ability to adapt institutionally and ideologically to future endogenous and exogenous shocks. First, where authoritarian repression dismantled preexisting leftist parties, a political vacuum on the left emerged that created the incentive for the rise of a new type of leftist party that intrinsically valued democracy. Second, the implementation of legal requirements by outgoing authoritarian regimes during a party's formative years encouraged parties to institutionalize, ensuring the development of a disciplined, majoritarian party organization. Finally, obstinance on the part of the military's move to extricate itself from politics encouraged leftist parties to participate in democratization and, thus, widen their electoral appeals.

Those leftist parties that were formed under such regimes were induced to take certain actions and adopt certain institutions that made them adaptable in the long run. Those that formed afterwards or never experienced life under authoritarian rule had little incentive to change and, thus, proved unable to respond to external challenges down the line that demanded institutional professionalization and ideological moderation.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

The convocation of democratic elections in the 1980s following the decline of many of Latin America's authoritarian regimes was expected to bring about a clear and uniform political shift to the left (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, pp 57-64), as the region's severe economic poverty and social inequality were regarded as ideal conditions for the success of left-wing parties in post-democratic-transition Latin America (cf. Cleary 2006; Acemoglu and Robinson 2001). Yet left-wing parties were, by and large, not up to the challenge. Indeed, the right or center-right retained power until the late 1990s—almost two decades after the initial wave of founding elections.

The late 1990s brought about the so-called "pink tide," beginning with Venezuela's election of Hugo Chávez (1998-2013); however, this phenomenon was characterized mainly by the election of populist leaders and movements, not necessarily leftist parties. Nonetheless, the "pink tide" generated another wave of scholarly attention (cf. Castañeda and Navia 2007; Arnson and Perales 2007; Castañeda and Morales 2008; Baker and Greene 2011; Roberts forthcoming). From Guatemala down to Chile, leftist presidents came to power, prompting scholars and commentators alike to proclaim the new hegemony of leftist politics in the region (Cleary 2006; *Economist* 2006; Castañeda 2006), despite the fact that Latin America's so-called "left turn" was not accompanied by any discernible leftward shift in terms of citizens' ideological self-placement (Seligson 2007; Arnold and Samuels 2011).

It should be little surprise that leftists, like rightists, win elections, whether they be anti-system extremists who exercise populist anti-American rhetoric or centrist moderates who espouse sound macroeconomic measures alongside poverty-fighting

social programs (cf. Petkoff 2005; Madrid 2010); electoral results are not the best way of categorizing or measuring sweeping change.[1] Success at the polls is arguably just as much a reflection of contingent, system-specific factors as it is of region-wide trends: the 2000 election of Ricardo Lagos of Chile's Socialist Party (*Partido Socialista*, PS), for instance, had more to do with coalition politics and the continued appeal of the anti-Pinochet alliance than with any fundamental change in the Chilean electorate (Garretón 2000).

Furthermore, those leftist leaders who rose to power at the expense of traditional parties—relying instead on top-down movements or personal electoral vehicles, such as Chávez—may make headlines with their incendiary rhetoric, yet their inability to institutionalize their political practices (through a political party, for instance) may well undermine any legacy they hope to have. While individual political leaders may hold outsized influence while in power, their legacies fail in comparison to the long-term influence held by established political parties. In this way, a focus on electoral results and leftist leaders distracts attention away from the broader—and more significant—institutional changes occurring on the left.

This author argues that the more enduring and consequential phenomenon occurring on the left side of Latin America's political spectrum[2] has not been this wavering wave of *leftist governments*, but the varied rise and consolidation of democratically loyal, professional, moderate *leftist parties* in some countries (cf. Levitsky and Roberts 2011a). This project focuses on the rise of democratic, professional,

[1] Indeed, leftist leader Rafael Correa won the second round of Ecuador's 2006 presidential election after placing second in the first round with under 23 percent of the vote. Daniel Ortega of the leftist Sandinista National Liberation Front (*Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional,* FSLN) won Nicaragua's 2006 presidential election with little over 38 percent of the vote, having avoided a second round runoff by receiving more than a 5 percent margin victory over the second place finisher (Political Database of the Americas: PDBA). Both presidents have been in power since 2007.

[2] This paper borrows its definition of the left from Levitsky and Roberts (2011b, p 5; 2011a): i.e., political actors seeking to protect individuals from market failures, reduce socio-economic inequality, and strengthen underprivileged sectors.

moderate parties in some countries, alongside the persistence of nondemocratic, weakly institutionalized, radical parties in others. Defined more in depth later in the chapter, party adaptation, the project's dependent variable, entails commitment to democracy, institutional professionalization (i.e., the gradual construction of a flexible, complex, autonomous, and coherent party apparatus), and ideological moderation (i.e., the gradual moderation of a party platform).

Indeed, there has been significant empirical variation in the level of *democratic commitment* on the part of Latin America's leftist parties: whereas some have recognized the intrinsic value of democracy and agreed to the procedural rules of the democratic game, others have failed, having been unable to distance themselves from their earlier support of non-legal routes to political power and to accept democratic elections as the sole means of ratifying power relations: compare Uruguay's successful Broad Front (*Frente Amplio*, FA) to Venezuela's Radical Cause (*La Causa Radical*, LCR), for instance (cf. Luna 2007; López Maya 1995).

Similarly, there has been significant empirical variation in the *institutional professionalization* of Latin America's leftist parties: whereas some have successfully entrenched roots in society, built their party organization, and become relevant national parties, other parties have languished organizationally, suffered debilitating internecine rivalries, and witnessed a mass defection of followers, at times despite substantial initial electoral success: compare the strong organization and structure of Brazil's Workers' Party (*Partido dos Trabalhadores*, PT) to the ephemeral institution that was Peru's United Left (*Izquierda Unida*, IU), for example (cf. Tanaka 1998; Hunter 2010).

Finally, there has been significant empirical variation in the degree of *ideological moderation* of such formerly radical parties: whereas some parties have successfully abandoned orthodox economic positions and opted to follow public opinion instead of try

to shape it, other parties have languished or even collapsed, unable to adapt to the changing nature of the electorate: compare Mexico's Party of the Democratic Revolution (*Partido de la Revolución Democrática*, PRD) to Colombia's 19th of April Movement (*Movimiento 19 de Abril*, M-19), for example (c. Borjas Benavente 2003; Carrigan 2009).

This thesis analyzes the empirical variation among once broadly similar Latin American leftist parties and offers a new theory to explain their varied ideological[3] and institutional transformation over time. In doing so, it sheds light on the real sea change occurring on the Latin American left: the rise and consolidation of professional, moderate, democratic leftist parties in certain countries, alongside the failure to moderate, professionalize, and accept democracy of leftist parties in others. This chapter first presents the empirical puzzle to be explained. It then summarizes the theory explaining leftist party adaptation. Subsequently, it makes a case for the significance of this research question to the discipline and the importance of leftist party adaptation to the future of democracy in Latin America. Then, it comments on the theoretical implications of the theory. Following that, it has two small sections on research design and scope and organization, followed by a brief conclusion.

THE PUZZLE: THE VARIED ADAPTATION OF LATIN AMERICA'S LEFTIST PARTIES

Given the fact that the region's relative economic poverty and stark social inequality are often assumed to be the ideal structural basis for the growth and development of left-wing parties (cf. Debs and Helmke 2008; Cleary 2006; Castañeda 1993), why do we not see a higher frequency of success of such parties throughout Latin America? What accounts for the empirical variation in the developmental trajectories of

[3] Ideological transformation is used to signify both strategic moderation (i.e., commitment to a democratic regime) as well as policy moderation (i.e., softening one's party platform to be more in line with the policy demands of society at large).

parties with relatively similar origins and confronted by the same political and economic transitions?

Latin America's leftist parties have not had it easy. In the 1980's, democratization, the collapse of communism, the rise of market economics, and the Latin American political spectrum's subsequent spatial shift to the right in the 1990s[4] reinforced democratic preferences, reshaped societal demands, and re-calibrated leftist partisan priorities (Baker 2003; Stallings 1992). Lest they risk irrelevance, Latin America's leftist parties were induced to reinterpret democracy as having more than just instrumental value, revisit the belief in the state as the prime lever for economic change, and reconsider the notion that power is obtained through the seizure (and destruction) of the state by the proletariat (Burgess and Levitsky 2003; Madrid 2010).

In addition to these broad ideological changes, Latin America's leftist parties also witnessed an institutional transformation following the "subproletariat-ization" of the working class and the undermining of its political organization (Roberts 2002; Portes and Hoffman 2003); the professionalization of politics and a changing role for parties (Katz and Mair 1995); as well as the "media-ization" of political campaigns, such as the use of opinion polling (Tanaka 1998; Levitsky and Cameron 2003; Dalton and Wattenberg 2000). Its leftist parties were likewise induced to reinterpret their role within society (particularly, their historical reluctance to engage the broader electorate), rethink the nature of party-organization linkages (i.e., relying less on routine mobilization through party-affiliated social organizations), and embrace the usage of *marqueteros* (i.e., marketing firms and pollsters) and increasingly sophisticated polling-based strategies aimed at tapping into public opinion and capturing the median voter (Handlin and Collier 2011; Coppedge 2001).

[4] These so-called "external" explanations happened conjuncturally; many reinforced each other, but they are not the same, nor did they happen simultaneously.

Given the changing political and economic landscape, one would expect leftist parties to adapt to this new environment. To be sure, some parties abandoned their Marxist-Leninist revolutionary programs and orthodox economic determinism in favor of democracy and market capitalism, and professionalized their institutions in the process. Indeed, looking back at the past thirty years, José Eduardo Dutra, former president of Brazil's PT, argued that "the PT changed because the world changed, and because Brazil changed, too; but *we* had the capacity to change without changing sides" (*Folha de S.Paulo* 2010; emphasis added)[5]. However, not all parties adapted ideologically and institutionally (and, furthermore, not all parties were capable of effecting change without "changing sides").

While the diffusion of ideas about economic and political liberalization was relatively uniform throughout Latin America, its consequences on the region's leftist parties were decidedly not. There has been significant empirical variation in the development trajectories of Latin America's leftist parties. Brazil's PT on the one hand, and Peru's IU and Venezuela's LCR on the other—this project's three case studies—are paradigmatic cases of the two different paths taken by Latin American leftist parties. The PT and IU were both born in 1980 as radical, weakly institutionalized parties with ambivalent views toward representative democracy (Azevedo 1995; Tanaka 2008). Venezuela's LCR was born as a political organization in 1978[6] and shared broadly similar qualities (López Maya, 1995). However, shortly thereafter, these parties' trajectories diverged.

The PT adapted institutionally and ideologically. It quickly recognized the intrinsic value of democracy, slowly consolidated its party organization and structure, and eventually moderated its policy stance. Today it has entrenched roots in society; is one of

[5] All translations in this dissertation were done by the author.

[6] From roughly 1973-1978, LCR was a social movement, composed of loosely connected social groups.

Brazil's largest, most institutionalized parties; has helped consolidate the country's democracy; and has responsibly governed the country since 2003 (Hunter 2010; Ribeiro 2008; Amaral 2003, 2010).[7]

However, while IU's and LCR's origins bore striking similarities to those of the PT, their developmental trajectory was markedly different. LCR failed to adapt either institutionally or ideologically (López Maya 1995): throughout the 1990s, a sizable minority of its national directorate—including the party's secretary general—was actively seeking to overthrow the democratic regime (cf. Medina 1999). Similarly, IU, a coalition of small leftist parties, was unwilling ever to accept democratic elections as the sole means of ratifying power relations, broaden and deepen its political appeals, or professionalize its organization (Tanaka 1998; CVR 2003, III.2.4). Indeed, throughout the 1980s Peru's IU continued to defend in its party statutes and through public statements violence as a revolutionary principle and legitimate means of struggle, and its ultra-radical wing openly sought (an ill-defined) socialist revolution as late as 1989 (CVR 2003; Lynch 1999). Internecine rivalries and ideological inconsistencies led to debilitating schism and party collapse for both LCR and IU (Salamanca 2004; Tanaka 2008).

What, then, accounts for this variation in the developmental trajectories of parties with relatively similar origins confronting the same external challenges? Why did once-similar leftist parties confronting broadly similar obstacles—namely, the transitions to democracy (where it was not already present) and market economics,[8] and the "media-ization" of politics—make such vastly disparate strategic choices? What effect did these

[7] Uruguay's FA followed much the same trajectory (Luna 2007). While not one of this project's case studies, the FA will be referenced throughout to provide further support to certain points.

[8] To be sure, in Latin America, the "dual transition" occurred within the same world historical period, but not necessarily simultaneously: for the most part, the political transition occurred in the 1980s while the economic transition occurred in the 1990s. Furthermore, the two often entered into conflict with one another (see, for example, Stokes 2001).

choices have on the parties' subsequent electoral fortunes? More broadly, the dissertation answer the question: under what conditions do leftist parties in Latin American democracies transform from undemocratic, radical, weakly institutionalized parties into democratic, moderate, professional ones? Conversely, under what conditions do they fail to adapt, remaining confined to their ideological ghettoes and stagnating organizationally?

Despite the weight of this project's research questions, however, existing arguments do not adequately explain why leftist parties with similar origins have pursued dissimilar ideological and institutional trajectories. A new explanation is thus needed to address this lacuna. In the following section the author tackles this issue by showing how the political context of and external challenges faced during the formative years of a party help determine that party's ability to adapt institutionally and ideologically down the line.

Adaptation is not necessarily normatively preferable; however, for the purposes of this thesis, this author contends that such ideational and institutional changes are necessary for sustained electoral and political relevance, as adaptation allows for long-term party growth and development and thus positions parties for future electoral success (cf. Kitschelt 1994). Leftist parties *can* and *do* experience electoral success without adapting—elections are, after all, unpredictable and democracy is inherently uncertain (cf. Przeworski 1991); however, lack of adaptation all but ensures that such success is fleeting. More importantly, it is *adaptability* that is key: parties that are either *unable* or *unwilling* to adapt, despite the strong incentive to do so, will face arguably insurmountable obstacles to remain electorally relevant in the medium and long term.

THE ARGUMENT IN BRIEF: NO PAIN, NO GAIN

It is widely held that the particular circumstances under which a party develops has indelible effects upon that party's growth and development (Panebianco 1988; Collier and Collier 1991; Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Non-democratic regimes, it follows, create particular incentives and constraints upon the institutional and ideological developmental trajectory of leftist parties. This author argues that both the nature and severity of challenges faced by a leftist party at its very inception—as well as the institutional setting in which its formative moments took place—create particular incentives for and constraints upon that party's long-term ideological and institutional path.

Parties that emerged under adverse conditions tended to accept democracy, centralize power, and broaden and deepen their political appeals; this facilitated ideological moderation and institutional professionalization down the line. Alternatively, parties that came about in more permitting contexts had little incentive or need to change; since they were never forced to adopt certain mechanisms and policies in their early years, such parties had difficulty adapting later on. In this way, the type of regime under which a party develops helps determine that party's future ability to adapt successfully to external stimuli. Thus, the early *pain* inflicted upon such parties' predecessors by repressive regimes led to later *gain*, as parties were better prepared to respond quickly to external challenges—namely, the political and economic transitions, mentioned earlier—and to engage in successful party adaptation than parties that were never confronted by challenges in their past.

This dissertation argues that 1) the levels of repression suffered by the left under earlier authoritarian rule (prior to party formation), 2) variations in the design and implementation of electoral and partisan rules used by outgoing authoritarian regimes, and 3) the timeframe with which the authoritarian regime agreed to a complete turnover

of power, help determine the success of future leftist party adaptation. Those leftist parties that arose under regimes that had repressed the left, sought to restrain nascent leftist parties, and prolonged their own extrication from power were induced to adopt certain policies and mechanisms that favored future adaptation.

It claims that, far from *preventing* change, a party's historical legacy—i.e., the "weight of the past"—can also, paradoxically, lead to the adoption of institutions that allow for sweeping change down the line. Along the lines of revisionist historical institutionalism, which understands institutions as dynamic entities (cf. Streeck and Thelen 2005; Mahoney and Thelen 2010) this dissertation's theory explicates how institutional features initially adopted by leftist parties in the face of repression, legal challenges, and authoritarian obstinance have unintended, albeit positive, consequences: they pave the way for ideological and institutional transformations in the long run by making parties more adaptable. This project thus engages the debate between the competing "critical juncture" à la Katznelson (2003) and "gradual change" à la Pierson (2004) frameworks for conceptualizing institutional change. Rather than understanding them as competing visions, however, it contends that, by integrating the two arguments, an "unorthodox" critical juncture argument can account for later, gradual change.

This project's argument also challenges the prevailing view that, when faced with repression, parties will necessarily radicalize. Repression is thought to keep a radical party out of step with the average voter: in response to repression, the old guard should "hunker down" and block the ideological moderation desired by younger militants who never suffered under the old regime (cf. Greene 2007; Hellman 2011). However, this theory shows that, when leftist parties develop under a repressive but *impermanent* authoritarian regime, they end up professionalizing and moderating their strategy and policies in the medium and long run. The parties more likely to remain undemocratic,

radical, and weakly institutionalized are those that develop within *non*-repressive contexts, be they democracies or soft authoritarian regimes. The reason is that parties with centralized control are more adaptable than those with a less developed party structure and organization (Share 1999).[9]

THE SIGNIFICANCE: WHY LEFTIST PARTY ADAPTATION MATTERS

An answer to this project's research question is pertinent to the literature on the consolidation and quality of democracy, as well as to the nascent field of institutional change. Indeed, democracy without political parties is unthinkable (cf. Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Aldrich 1995; Schattschneider 1942; Dalton and Wattenberg 2000). Parties matter for democracy because, in an ideal system, they aggregate interests, direct grievances through legitimate channels, and facilitate governability (Ware 1996; Hagopian 1998). Cohesive parties address collective action and responsibility problems that arise in the campaigning and governing process, limit the self-interest of individual legislators to facilitate the delivery of national policy needs, provide structure to democratic politics in the electoral arena and the legislature, and generate predictability in how political actors behave (Aldrich 1995; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Mainwaring and Scully 2008).

My conceptualization of the causes of party adaptation has practical as well as scholarly implications. Explaining the variation in leftist parties' adaptation is important for our understanding of the efficacy of democratic institutions and the future of democratic representation in the region (see Stokes 1999). This is particularly the case today, given Latin America's all-too-recent history of military intervention to ward off the

[9] This meshes with Levitsky's (2003) findings in his study on the origins of the adaptability of Argentina's Peronist Party (*Partido Justicialista*, PJ): leadership renovation, leadership autonomy, and structural pliability enabled the Peronists to adapt to changing times. See also Burgess and Levitsky (2003).

real or perceived threat of revolutionary leftist radicalism (cf. Stepan 1978a; Valenzuela 1990).[10]

Moderated leftist parties have proven fundamental in helping democratize the societies in which they operate: by conforming to and embracing established democratic institutions, such parties channel societal discontent from radical options into democratic norms, strategies, and goals. Leftist party adaptation institutionalizes these non-violent channels with which the remaining radical leftists can then air grievances and effect change *democratically*, helping moderate the left over time. In turn, the de-radicalization of these sectors undermines the self-purported rationale behind the radical right's claims that, in order to protect democracy, one must destroy it: the objective of sustained military intervention in Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s was to ward off the (real or perceived) threat of revolutionary leftist radicalism (cf. Stepan 1978a; Valenzuela 1990).

Consequences of No Party Adaptation: Anti-System Outsiders

Leftist party adaptation is important not only for the leftist parties in question, but for the stability of the party system as a whole and the very legitimacy of the democratic regime. Thanks in large part to the undemocratic theoretical texts upon which they have based their ideology (but also in part due to the Latin American right's historical disregard for the intrinsic value of democracy, to be sure), Latin America's leftists historically valued democracy only for its instrumental value (cf. Castañeda 1993). Channeling leftist grievances, sentiment, and political participation into the electoral arena and political institutions of representative democracy is, arguably, a prerequisite for the stability of democratic governance. It is no coincidence that in countries in which

[10] Indeed, comprehending the transformation of Uruguay's FA from urban guerrilla group to semi-loyal opposition to governing party sheds light on how democracy becomes, in Linz and Stepan's (1996) words, the "only game in town."

leftist parties have not engaged in moderation and professionalization leftist sentiment has turned to anti-system, (arguably) non-democratic options.

As the absence of a legal leftist option can harm a democratic regime's legitimacy and encourage the electorate to opt for anti-system candidates, an explanation for the variation in leftist party adaptation is important for analyzing the resilience of democratic regimes over time. For instance, understanding how and why IU failed to adapt and take advantage of the opportune political opening created by the decay of Peru's traditional parties helps explain why the left threw their support behind the anti-system, autocratic Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000), who was elected president in 1990 (Lynch 2000). Much the same can be said for the failure of Venezuela's LCR to adapt: the subsequent political vacuum on Venezuela's left served the populist Hugo Chávez well in the late 1990s (Salamanca 2004). The next two sub-sections look at the immediate results of IU and LCR's failed party adaptations: the elections of Fujimori and Chávez and the subsequent declines of Peru's and Venezuela's lefts, respectively.

IU's Collapse Helps Fujimori Rise

The failure of IU to engage in successful party adaptation explains, in part, the 1990 election of Alberto Fujimori, an anti-system outsider who trampled over Peru's democratic institutions and set back the country's process of democratic consolidation. Despite the radical changes occurring throughout Latin America and the world, from the political and economic transitions, to the collapse of the Soviet Union (USSR), the IU remained radical, seemingly unable to adapt to changes in the Peruvian electorate by engaging in moderation and modernization. According to Zapata (2009), Peru's

> lefts did not understand the shift in common sentiment. The people stopped believing in the State as the solution, instead identifying it more with the root of the problem. Liberalism was triumphing and the lefts repeated a statist discourse...Lastly, we [leftists] remained associated with the State and the armed struggle.

By the late 1980s, every single Peruvian social group favored a democratic political regime to a revolutionary socialist one (cf. McClintock 1989, pp 139-142), yet the IU was unable to adapt to changing political realities and thus quickly became radically out-of-step with the mindset of the general populace. IU could have forestalled its voter exodus, if only its party structure did not prevent it from moderating ideologically (Seawright 2012).

IU's lack of institutional professionalization hampered its ability to sideline the more radical individuals and component parties of the party-front, which had never moderated strategically by committing to democracy. This prevented de-facto party leader Alfonso Barrantes and his allies from shifting programmatic agendas and broadening alliances, which would have helped IU cope with the changing political context (cf. Kitschelt 1994). Instead, the party's power configuration (every component-party leader had veto power), which was not supportive of change, ensured that little ideological or institutional transformation would occur (Harmel and Tan 2003); indeed, IU's pragmatic faction was forced out of the party, not vice-versa.

IU had almost been poised to take power in the 1990 election, but given its inability to adapt, it squandered its chance and opened up a political vacuum. In 1988, Barrantes had been the election's favorite, projected to win a landslide victory in an inevitable second round run-off, but slipped shortly thereafter, once IU's internecine fighting between pragmatists and ideologues began to intensify; nonetheless, he remained in second place until a mere two months before the election (Schmidt 1996, p 329; Taylor

1990).[11] However, in large part thanks to IU's split, Barrantes finished a depressing fourth place, with less than seven percent of the vote, and IU's Henry Pease in fifth, with barely over four percent (Political Database of the Americas, PDBA). According to Pedráglio (2011), the collapse of IU was:

> one of the principal reasons for the birth of Fujimorismo. In what social space was Fujimorismo born? In the space that had been the left's. [IU] was responsible not only for supporting Fujimori over the alternative, [Mario] Vargas Llosa, but also because it divided; the people were tired of all the [left's] infighting.

Fujimori, the little-known underdog who had placed second in the first round, ended up handily defeating Vargas Llosa in the second round, thanks to the support of IU's politicians and sympathizers. Indeed, while Fujimori governed from the right, he was elected on a center-left platform; much of the Peruvian left threw their support behind him in the second round of the election (Conaghan 2005).

In his decade in power, Fujimori dismantled Peru's democratic institutions, violated democratic rights and freedoms, and unconstitutionally consolidated power in the name of efficiency and necessity, culminating (but not ending) in a temporary "self-coup" on April 5, 1992. He attacked constitutional checks and balances and paid mere lip service to civil rights and liberties.

Fujimori intervened regularly in the judicial branch and the attorney general's office; temporarily deactivated the Constitutional Court (*Tribunal Constitucional*) and dismissed three of its seven members; packed the National Panel of Elections *(Jurado Nacional de Elecciones*, JNE) with loyal *Fujimoristas* (i.e., followers of Fujimori); curbed the power of the National Council of the Magistrates (*Consejo Nacional de la*

[11] "In January of 1989 Alfonso Barrantes led the presidential election polls, but in December of 1990 all that was left of the legal left was ruins and ashes....total collapse" (León Moya 2012).

Magistratura); and limited the power of electoral bodies that dared to declare his re-reelection candidacy illegal (Tanaka 2005, Degregori 2003). Additionally, under his power, the Ministry of the Presidency (*Ministerio de la Presidencia*) usurped functions of the legislature and the courts and concentrated power in the hands of the Executive. Furthermore, Fujimori used public spending on social services and the mobilization of public employees to shore up support in key districts, while conversely withholding state goods and services in other regions to undermine the popularity of opposition politicians (Conaghan 2005).

In addition to undermining the separation of powers, Fujimori also violated the civil rights and liberties of Peruvians. Opposition politicians were subjected to police surveillance, harassment, and often served with concocted tax fraud charges. Worse yet, numerous human rights abuses were committed by Fujimori's government.[12] The truth was hard to come by, however, because Vladimiro Montesinos, the de facto leader of Peru's National Intelligence Service (*Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional*, SIN), had established a vast web of pressure and corruption to intimidate the press and co-opt them into only reporting stories favorable to the government; opposition media moguls, such as Channel 2 (*Canal 2*) owner Baruch Ivcher, were harassed by the government.[13]

Fujimori used his "politics of antipolitics" to reverse much of the limited progress the country had made toward democratic consolidation and governance (Degregori 2003). He succeeded in taking on dictatorial powers, first overtly and later through less obvious ways, in what Catherine Conaghan (2005) termed a "labyrinthine construct" that

[12] In 2009, Fujimori was charged with crimes against humanity for 15 extrajudicial executions in Barrios Altos in 1991, as well as the kidnapping and later killing of ten people in 1992 by the paramilitary Colina Group (Tanaka 2009; Amnesty International 2005).

[13] Ivcher was the target of trumped up tax evasion charges. He wound up losing his adopted Peruvian citizenship, as well as control of his station, and was forced to flee to the United States (Conaghan 2005).

assured him unchecked powers and untold opportunities.[14] In this way Fujimori adeptly took advantage of Peru's power vacuum, critical situation, and implosion of the left to advance his personal interests, disregarding his country's interests and the future of its democratic governance.

LCR's Loss is Chávez's Gain

Similarly, the electoral appeal and subsequent rise to power of Chávez can be explained, in part, on LCR's failure to capitalize on Venezuela's crisis of representation, the collapse of its traditional parties, and desire for change.[15] In the mid-1990s, LCR seemed poised to assume the presidency. The party had been growing exponentially since the late 1980s, it had made a name for itself as an advocate of good governance, and had a candidate capable of appealing to a broad swath of the Venezuelan electorate. Yet, given ideological incoherence and internal inconsistencies, LCR was unable to sell itself as the solution to its country's woes.[16] LCR's failure to engage in party adaptation meant that it could not fill the vacuum on the left side of the political spectrum, of which Chávez ultimately took advantage.

Chávez and other subversive military members had long set their eyes on gaining political power (explained in Chapter 5); however, the original plan (concocted in the early 1980s) had never been for *direct* military rule. Indeed, the Bolivarian Republic Movement 200[17] (*Movimiento Bolivariano Republicano 200*, MBR-200) never conceived of its leaders—neither Chávez nor Francisco Arias Cárdenas—as politicians capable of

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14 According to Tanaka (2005), "Peru had a government with important political support, capable of winning elections, but functioning as an authoritarian regime, given the lack of autonomous institutions and effective mechanisms of checks and balances" (p 277).

15 To be fair, LCR was a failed *remedy*, not the disease.

16 Had LCR in fact won in 1992, it most likely would not have been able to govern effectively: the party was, indeed, plagued by debilitating intra-party issues.

17 The group was founded in 1983, on the 200th anniversary of the birth of Simón Bolívar.

winning democratic elections and governing outright (Sánchez Urribarri 2008). However, the failure of LCR opened up the possibility of the group governing directly: the failed adaptation of the legal left meant that there was a recently vacated space in which Chávez could emerge.

LCR's breakaway group threw its support behind Chávez and helped get him elected in 1998. In power, he drew support from numerous former *causaerristas* (i.e., LCR members) to fill high-level positions within his governing coalition: General Arias Cárdenas, Aristóbulo Istúriz, Alí Rodríguez, Ana Elisa Osorio, María Cristina Iglesias, Farruco Sesto, David Paravisini, Mario Isea, Eduardo Manuitt, and Roger Capella. Chávez very well may have run and won the presidency without the support of the defeated LCR and the electoral backing of former *causaerristas* members and sympathizers; however, he would have had a much more difficult time winning—and governing—had the party not split in two.

Whether or not Chávez was a boon or bane for democracy is up for debate, depending on who one asks and one's definition of democracy. Those who focus on political inclusion and redistributive policies (cf. Ellner 2011, Buxton 2003) have been kinder to Chávez, while those focusing on political rights and democratic institutions (cf. Corrales and Penfold 2011, McCoy 2000) have been harsher. Chávez himself claimed to have been reviving Venezuela's democracy via participatory institutions and the incorporation of long-excluded sectors into society. He often argued that representative democracy has failed in Latin America, and that it was "necessary to promote…a democracy that ceases being representative, although it preserves levels of representation, but is one that promotes participation, and that moves towards [popular] decision-making" (quoted in Lander 2005, p 31).

However, Chávez did so at the expense of democratic institutions: his 1999 Constitution heightened presidential power at the expense of the legislature, reduced civilian control over the military, and ended subsidies to political parties (McCoy 2000, pp 68-69). He systematically broke down institutional channels of representative democracy, eroded horizontal and vertical accountability, and constructed participatory institutions in the name of greater citizen involvement but with the end result of centralizing power in his own hands (Corrales and Penfold 2011, p 8). Autonomous democratic institutions, that had previously served as democratic checks and balances, were either dismantled or colonized by *Chavistas* (i.e., followers of Chávez), while numerous direct democracy mechanisms were established between society and the state, surpassing previously established channels (McCoy 2004, 284-95).

What is most worrisome in terms of Venezuela's long-term stability in the post-Chávez era, however, is the legacy of Chávez's politics of "rage, race, and revenge," in the words of Moisés Naim (2004). True, Venezuela's former Punto Fijo regime collapsed because economic decline reenergized social conflict, given its inability to link new political demands to the policy process (Ellner and Hellinger 2004); indeed, Chávez rode to power on a wave of popular discontent for a regime based on elite settlements and the political sidelining of the country's underbelly. However, far from working to overcome the country's polarization, Chávez used it to his own benefit by stoking class resentments rather than developing cross-class alliances (McCoy 2004, p 294). His promotion of class antagonism, exacerbation of societal tensions, and nurturing of political polarization for his own personal benefit was a zero-sum game; the entire country has suffered (Petkoff 2010).[18]

[18] Not to mention the country's economy; see Arenas (2010) and even Ellner (2010).

THE BIGGER PICTURE: CRITICAL JUNCTURES VS. GRADUAL CHANGE

Besides its substantive relevance, an answer to this project's research question also speaks to the growing field of research on institutional change (cf. Greif and Laitin 2004). As is, the historical institutionalism has proven particularly well suited to explain institutional continuity and stability—indeed, institutions are seen as *constraining* human beliefs, values, and interests (Katznelson and Weingast 2005) and, at least, partially resistant to change; however, the paradigm has had more difficulties in explaining institutional change. In response, an emerging body of historical institutionalist literature (e.g., Streeck and Thelen 2005; Mahoney and Thelen 2010) has been revising the discipline's understanding of institutions as "frozen" residues, or "crystallization" of previous conflicts, characterized by considerable autonomy and the inertial strength to resist shifts in the broader socio-political environment (cf. Lipset and Rokkan 1967).

The project conducted contributes to this innovative, revisionary paradigm by showing how incremental institutional change can nonetheless result in transformative consequences over time (cf. Streeck and Thelen 2005). This author looks at moments of institutional change to demonstrate how broad, external forces made formerly dormant party institutions more salient with time, and how internal balance-of-power shifts put old partisan institutions to new use.

More significantly, this author shows how a party's historical origins, which have usually been stressed as an anchor of stability and a cause of status-quo bias (cf. Hagopian 1990), can also paradoxically serve as the mechanism for sweeping *change* down the line; in this way, a "critical juncture" can also account for gradual change. This theory explicates how institutional features initially adopted by leftist parties in the face of repression, legal challenges, and authoritarian obstinance have unintended, albeit positive, consequences: they pave the way for later ideological and organizational

transformations, following the establishment of democracy (i.e., the *opposite* of institutional inertia). Indeed, a lack of foresight and omniscience on the part of institutional engineers means that particular institutional designs can offer opportunities for unforeseen venues of political contestation and unpredicted political outcomes.

Political challenges during a party's formative years and the institutional responses they engendered help shape its long-term developmental trajectory down the line. But the "weight" of one's past is not necessarily burdensome, as traditional HI would have one believe; it can also be grounding and positive. The past does not necessarily make one resilient to change (since certain party structures and policies technically remained in place past their original purpose); rather, this author argues that institutional legacies, paradoxically, ensured that leftist parties became adaptable and thus were able to adapt successfully into democratic, professional, moderate parties.

RESEARCH DESIGN

The primary analytical component of this comparative-historical research project is a structured comparative analysis. To address the problem of having too few comparable cases but too many variables, the project relies upon the multivariate Millian Method of Difference (cf. Lijphart 1971). Such a method compares instances in which a phenomenon did occur with instances, in most other respects comparable, in which it did not in order to determine which other variables caused the difference in the dependent variable. This minimizes the number of operative variables by "controlling for" common systemic characteristics, thus allowing the researcher to assess the causal impact of the remaining intersystemic differences, which are then viewed as the explanatory variables (Przeworski and Teune 1970; Gerring 2007).

However, given the limitations of controlled comparisons for making causal inferences, the small-n comparative case design will be complemented by process tracing to elucidate the causal pathways connecting the variables[19] (George and Bennett 2005; Bennett 2008). The outcome to be explained is the success or failure to adapt into a democratic, moderate, professional leftist party.

The project's party adaptation variable takes on three ordinal values: low, medium, and high. Its maximum value is adaptation from an undemocratic, radical, unprofessional party to a democratic, moderate, professional party. The variable entails three distinct, albeit related, aspects: regime commitment, institutional professionalization, ideological moderation (see below). In operationalizing the concept this author uses Collier and Mahon's (1993) non-classical conceptual category of family resemblance. While commonalities are present, there is no single attribute that all members of a category share; rather, the level of party adaptation is analytically constructed through the aggregation of eight, dichotomously valued categories.[20]

Regime commitment entails the strategic moderation of a party such that it adheres to liberal democratic norms and accepts the general principles of market-based economics. The former involves i.) the acceptance of pluralism and the alternation of power, and ii.) the renouncement political violence and denouncing attempts to overthrow the prevailing regime. The latter involves iii.) acceptance of the central tenets of the free market (broadly defined), and iv.) the renouncement of infringements upon private property.

Institutional professionalization entails the gradual construction of a v.) flexible, vi.) complex, vii.) autonomous, viii.) coherent party apparatus. Flexibility is the ability to

[19] To be sure, quantitative analysis alone cannot shed light on the specific causal mechanisms that explain outcomes (cf. Ragin 1987; Rueschemeyer and Stephens 1997; Mahoney 2003).

[20] Goertz's (2006) idea of family resemblance defines concepts based on sufficiency conditions (i.e., using the logical operator "OR"), or substitutable characteristics (see ch 2).

confront head-on and adjust, accordingly, to changes (the opposite being an overly rigid party). Complexity is the organizational capacity—professionalized staff, etc—to address new tasks as they may arise (the opposite being a personal electoral vehicle). Autonomy is the freedom from outside control (the opposite being a party beholden to external agents). Organizational coherence is the existence of few ideological discrepancies between the different party levels and leaders (the opposite being a party that does not act like a team).[21]

Ideological moderation entails the gradual moderation of the party's platform such that the party ix.) no longer embraces extremist policy choices, as defined by the local political context, and x.) seeks to follow public opinion, not guide it à la a vanguard party.

To ensure maximal variation, and thus guard against spurious conclusions and biased inferences that can arise when variation on the dependent variable is truncated (cf. Geddes 1990; Achen and Snidal 1989; King, Keohane, and Verba 1994), this author chose cases of parties that represent (virtually) complete versus no/limited adaptation: Brazil's PT versus Peru's IU and Venezuela's LCR, respectively. The focus is on the primary leftist party of comparable cases from the sub-region of South America—thus holding constant the relative influence of the United States[22]—to ensure homogeneity of causal relationships and avoid conceptual stretching; given broadly similar settings, one can safely assume that causal factors are likely to have the same type of effect across cases.

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21 This definition of institutional professionalization is adapted from Huntington (1968) and borrows heavily from Salamanca (2004).

22 The United States played an outsized role in the internal politics of Central American and Spanish Caribbean countries during the Cold War. For a particularly compelling analysis of this history, see Grandin (2004).

The universe of cases is limited to Latin America to control for contextual factors: the region's numerous historical and structural commonalities make it easier to assess the causal impact of the remaining differences on the political processes and outcomes of this particular type of party (Lijphart 1971; but see Rustow 1968). Likewise, causal factors are likely to have the same type of effect in similar, comparable settings (Ragin 1987). The rationale behind particular case selection[23] was thus to select parties from countries as similar as possible, with respect to as many features as possible, to minimize the number of potential variables. In this way, the theoretically significant differences found among otherwise similar systems can help explain the variation in political outcomes.

In terms of specific case selection, Brazil's, Venezuela's, and Peru's lefts were chosen because of the countries' many common background factors and objective similarities, be they social, cultural, historical, or political. The three countries are, in many ways, ideal cases for the most similar systems design: besides their broader Latin similarities—Iberian colonization, Catholic heritage, presidential systems—they are all relatively large countries, have strong urban labor contingents, are characterized by relatively little U.S. influence, and possess no politically efficacious, ethnically based latent cleavages.

Additionally, PT, IU, and LCR have quite similar roots: they are, by and large, externally mobilized parties (Shefter 1993) that arose in the late 1970s/early 1980s from social movements—in particular, new unionists (*nuevos sindicalistas*), students, and intellectuals disillusioned with the dogmatic and bureaucratic nature of traditional leftist parties—fighting for political representation in their respective countries' formal political arena. All three were born in the same world historical moment (1978-1980), thus

[23] King, Keohane, and Verba (1994) argue that random selection is not appropriate for small-N research, so long as one's selection represents the full range of values on the dependent variable. See also Brady and Collier (2004) and Mahoney and Goertz (2004).

controlling for the foreign influence of the relative weight of international socialism and the USSR. The PT arose in 1980, in the waning days of Brazil's then tottering authoritarian regime, which had repressed the country's left, sought to impede the PT's birth and growth, and remained obstinate in giving up its role in governing the country. IU was likewise born in 1980, shortly after Peru's soft authoritarian regime, which had coddled the left for much of its duration, turned power over to civilian leaders. LCR's birth as a political organization was in 1978, the heyday of Venezuela's Fourth Republic (1958-1998), a 40-year period of relative democratic stability.

In addition to the vastly divergent trajectories and developments of the three parties, as seen in the values of their dependent variables, Brazil and Venezuela stand as proxies for the consequential outcomes of successful vs. failed leftist party adaptation: Brazil currently enjoys economic stability and a stable multi-party political system,[24] while Venezuela is characterized by gross economic mismanagement, the curtailment of pluralism, and, according to some pessimists, near regime-collapse (cf. Corrales 2006). Peru is somewhere in between: it has been characterized as a democracy without parties (Levitsky and Cameron 2003) in the past, but, nonetheless, in the last few years the country has been moving in the direction of democratic and macroeconomic stability—albeit still without political parties. Most importantly, the failure of IU and LCR to adapt into modern, professional parties helped paved the way for the ascent of Fujimori and Chávez's personalistic, anti-party form of radical populism in which power was concentrated in the hands of the president and civil rights and political liberties were curtailed.

[24] Mainwaring and Scully (1995) argued, in the mid 1990s, that Brazil's party system was inchoate. However, the past 17 years have seen remarkable political development: presidential politics has turned into a two-party affair between the PT and the centrist Party of the Brazilian Social Democracy (*Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira*, PSDB). These two parties' coalitions have garnered anywhere from 70 to 90 percent of the first round votes in the last five federal elections (1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, and 2010).

The analysis draws primarily upon two types of data: over 100 semi-structured interviews with politicians and high-level party bureaucrats and archival research of historical documents. In this way, the findings are corroborated with more than one research method to account and control partially for the drawbacks inherent in any and all approaches. Reliance upon elite interviews as a source of information is crucial in Latin America, given the region's deficiency in historical documentation and prevalence of informal decision processes, as well as the fact that many of these interlocutors are the very participants who had made the political decisions in question. However, given the fallibility of human memory, objectivity, and truthfulness, whenever possible, facts gleaned from interviews were double-checked alongside historical documents.

SCOPE AND ORGANIZATION

The research's scope is limited to the universe of major Latin American leftist parties with historical antecedents in socialist and communist political parties of the 1960s and 1970s. Such delineation deliberately excludes leftist leaders who rose to power without the institutional backing of established parties (such as Chávez); the unit of analysis is leftist *party*, not leftist leader. For the sake of feasibility, it focuses solely on the single most important leftist party in any country. Additionally, given the dynamics of multi-party politics and the zero-sum nature of the electoral spectrum (i.e., a vote for one party is a loss for all others), the theory proposed has limited consequences beyond more than one leftist party.

The rationale behind a focus on leftist over rightist parties lies in the surprising variation of the left's electoral fortunes in the region, especially given that many scholars assume that the relatively uniform poverty and inequality have supplied a political

environment conducive to blanket leftist success (cf. Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Cleary 2006; Castañeda 2006). The parties of interest are externally mobilized parties, parties that are "established by leaders who do not occupy positions of power in the prevailing regime and who seek to bludgeon their way into the political system by mobilizing and organizing a mass constituency" (Shefter 1993, p 5). Given Latin America's recent history of rightist military dictatorships, externally mobilized parties happen to be, more often than not, on the left side of the political spectrum. As such, the proposed research's structure is designed along the multiple case-study "building block" procedures (cf. George and Bennett 2005, p 76), one component part of a broader theory on party growth, development, and change in Latin America. This is done through the lens of party organization, composition, development, and party politics.

The thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 both positions this project's argument within the broader literature on parties and party change in Latin America and elsewhere, and also presents in detail the theory of leftist party adaptation. Chapter 3 provides an analytical comparison of the PT, IU, and LCR to explain how authoritarian repression "chastened" the left and encouraged a more pluralistic approach to politics and economics. Chapter 4 expands upon this comparison in detailing how early challenges encouraged party building and the critical adoption of majoritarian decision-making. Chapter 5 concludes the comparison, explaining how the struggle for democratization served to prime parties for their role in the political-institutional realm and helped broaden and deepen leftist parties' political appeals. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the thesis, broadening the scope to the rest of Latin America's leftist parties and expanding upon the theoretical contribution of the argument to the nascent literature on institutional change.

CONCLUSION: LEFTIST PARTIES IN LATIN AMERICA

Understanding leftist parties is important for understanding the state of democracy in Latin America. This project's new explanation of the varied development trajectory and differential success of Latin America's leftist parties speaks to debates on the quality of democracy and nature of democratic representation. It ties together the disparate literatures on the consolidation and quality of democracy by connecting the actual moment of transition with the ensuing regime type. In particular, it argues that the decisions made and actions taken during the formative years of these parties have important developmental consequences down the line.

Such parties have profound effects beyond their own actions and decisions; after adapting, they also helped alter the very rules of the game and may help reverse the region's harrowing trend of decreasing trust in government institutions and officials (see Mainwaring 2006). The existence of leftist parties helps ensure that party systems garner popular legitimacy and, ideally, are protected from collapse (Dietz and Myers 2007). Finally, inclusion of the left into the legally-represented ideological spectrum increases regime support and helps ensure that democracy remains the only game in town, even in the face of severe political and economic crises (Linz and Stepan 1996b). The democratic orientation of leftist parties also garners regime stability (cf. Roberts 1998), especially in a region with a recent historical legacy of non-democratic leftist movements that engendered non-democratic rightist responses. The valorization of democracy by the left and its rejection of purely tactical and instrumentalist notions of democratic participation have strengthened Latin America's democratic systems in many countries, in stark contrast to those countries in which the left failed to adapt.

Additionally, the presence of consolidated leftist parties seems to promote and ensure stable party systems as well. Party systems matter for democracy in two principal

ways: they are the chief vehicles for representation and they affect governability, especially in the legislative arena (Coppedge 2001). Indeed, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay —the three countries in South America that also happen to have democratic, professional, moderate leftist parties—are notable for their increasingly stable party systems (Levitsky and Roberts 2011a). Brazil's last four presidential elections have been largely two-way contests between the same two parties: the leftist PT and the centrist PSDB. Likewise, Chile's party system consists of a stable, two-way contest between the leftist Concert of Parties for Democracy (*Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia*)—which governed from 1990 to 2010—and the (now-defunct) rightist Alliance for Chile (*Alianza por Chile*) (Roberts 1998, pp 82-85). Uruguay has a stable multiparty system; the centrist Colored Party (*Partido Colorado*) and the rightist National Party (*Partido Nacional*) both regularly contest elections with the leftist FA (Cason 2002).

The same cannot be said for Venezuela, an increasingly authoritarian state (Corrales 2006), or Peru, a democracy without parties (Levitsky and Cameron 2003). Indeed, it is no surprise that the most radical expressions of the left in contemporary Latin America—the IU and then Shining Path (*Sendero Luminoso*) in Peru and Chávez in Venezuela—have emerged in countries in which the left was neither severely repressed by exclusionary authoritarian rule nor played a crucial role in democratization. While the PT, FA, and PS adapted as a result of participation in their struggle for democracy, the IU and LCR did not, having battled economically illiberal and anti-popular democracies and thus never gaining the incentive to adopt the mechanisms needed to be able to adapt ideologically and institutionally.

Chapter 2: A Theory of Party Adaptation

While the transitions to democracy and market economics, as well as the "media-ization" of politics, affected the entire region of Latin America, the consequences of these external stimuli upon leftist parties were varied. Indeed, to the extent that they focused on winning elections, the logical response from all such parties would be ideological moderation and institutional professionalization in order to be better able to garner votes and to compete in the new electoral arena; yet while many parties did exactly that, others were *unable* to do so. The objective of this chapter is to explain why.

This chapter provides the overall theoretical framework for the thesis. It first shows how and why existing theories on party organization and adaptation are ill-equipped to answer the research question at hand by analyzing the extant comparative literature on leftist party adaptation on a global scale. Next, it details in depth this project's theory of party adaptation, which explains under what conditions leftist parties transform from undemocratic, radical, weakly institutionalized parties into democratic, moderate, professional ones, and, conversely, under what conditions they fail to adapt, and become politically irrelevant. Finally, it situates the argument within the broader paradigm of historical institutionalism, alongside a growing body of literature seeking to revise how the paradigm seeks to understand and explain the phenomenon of institutional dynamism.

EXTANT APPROACHES TO PARTY ADAPTATION

The existing literature does not adequately explain why similar externally mobilized, ideologically rooted leftist parties have followed dissimilar trajectories. Moreover, there are no Latin America-specific theories that explain this empirical variation in both ideological moderation and institutional professionalization.[25] However, general theories that explain the adaptation of parties do exist (or can be easily deduced, from the fundamentals that underpin a paradigmatic approach). They posit that party adaptation is due to socio-structural factors, strategic choices, or formal political institutions. However, when we extend the theories to the specific, Latin American leftist party context, the suppositions fail to hold.

Socio-Structural Theories

Theories focusing on *system-level trends* predict leftist party adaptation as the internal response to external structural pressures, such as an increase in suffrage or the mobilization and organization of the working class—allegedly the left's natural constituency (cf. Przeworski and Sprague 1986; Kitschelt 1994; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992; Bartolini 2000). Such theories are informed by the structuralist paradigm, which argues that structures, not choices, produce political outcomes; they determine individual preferences, beliefs, and actions. Structuralists see structures as simultaneously constraining and empowering individuals; as such, they study the cage, not the prisoner (Lichbach 2003, pp 99-111).

[25] Most arguments are system-specific case-studies; a notable exception is Roberts (1998). Burgess and Levitsky (2003) look at ideological moderation but not institutional professionalization.

Such arguments fail to explain the variation in adaptation seen among Latin America's leftist parties. For instance, Przeworski (1985) argues that the establishment of democratic political systems based on universal male suffrage led to the adaptation of radical, non-professional socialists in Europe. As direct confrontation on the streets was replaced with indirect confrontation through political institutions (with the goal of legislating society into socialism), leftist parties professionalized so that they could operate within the new political framework. Likewise, as electoral pressures demanded an abandonment of revolutionary goals in favor of incremental reform within the existing capitalist framework, leftist parties moderated so that they could win elections. Such an argument could plausibly explain the PT's efforts to widen its political appeals and pursue public office, and thus moderate and professionalize, from the late 1980s onward: Brazil extended suffrage to illiterates in 1985. However, Peru also extended suffrage to illiterates in 1979, yet IU did not engage in adaptation. Furthermore, universal suffrage was established in Venezuela in the Constitution of 1947, yet LCR emerged over 30 years later as an undemocratic, radical, weakly institutionalized party.

An alternative explanation could suggest that the pragmatic nature of labor leaders and unions, a significant segment of the PT's (initial) leadership, could explain the party's adaptation, as well as explain why the IU, a party composed of more leftist militants than union members, did not adapt. However, this argument no longer works when one looks at LCR. Both the PT *and* LCR had strong, organic party-union linkages and both benefited from new unionism, particularly in the states of São Paulo and Bolívar, respectively (Meneguello 1989; Yépez Salas 1993). Unlike the PT (cf. Keck

1992), however, LCR proved unable to take advantage of this naturally predisposed and increasingly electorally available constituency—it had difficulty expanding into unionized labor's ranks outside of its home state. The catch-all Democratic Action (*Acción Democrática*, AD) kept a virtual stranglehold over organized labor, thanks to its privileged position within the corporatist structure constructed by the Punto Fijo pact.

Even so, the percentage of labor leaders in the upper echelons of the PT's party structure declined precipitously in the 1980s (Singer 2001), *before* the party began to adapt wholeheartedly. While approximately 60 percent of the PT's founders were somehow tied to New Unionism, the relative clout of unionists began declining from the start. Meneguello (1989) argues that the National Executive Committee (*Comissão Executiva Nacional*, CEN) of 1981 already showed a profound shift in the party's balance-of-power from unionists to intellectuals, partisan leftists, parliamentarians, and those with backgrounds in social movements (p 70). According to Rodrigues (1991),

> The PT effectively has a union base, but that is only one of three pillars sustaining the party. Were the party run basically by labor leaders and were its social base of support constituted in the majority by manual laborers and by the lower classes of Brazilian society, the PT would have already become social democratic...But the PT's social base is not [just] workers. The PT is fundamentally a party of the medium and upper classes...If it was predominantly a party of manual laborers, for sure the [internal] discussions would be more concrete, and costly and long meetings reserved for debating theoretical questions would not take place.

And furthermore, IU was no stranger to labor: it enjoyed much success organizing the labor sectors that the previous, leftist authoritarian regime had mobilized but never organized: see, for example, the General Confederation of Peruvian Workers (*Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú*, CGTP), which became dominated by

the Communists (Samanez 1982, p 52). Yet, nonetheless, IU's median position shifted to the *left* as the 1980s progressed (CVR 2003, III.2.4) and its organization never professionalized into a modern party.

The problem with such an approach is that it generally *under*-predicts change over time; structural arguments are better at explaining commonalities within a population than they are at variation. Indeed, much of the literature on Latin America's "New Left" suffers from this pitfall: severe economic inequality is generally assumed to offer the left a natural support base that encompasses a vast majority of Latin American populations (cf. Cleary 2006),[26] yet the left does not win uniformly in the region.[27]

Strategic Choice Theories

Theories of political learning, a subset of choice, focus instead on the strategic responses to specific endogenous or exogenous contingencies, such as a sudden change in party leadership or an important electoral defeat, in predicting leftist party adaptation (cf. Wilson 1994). Such theories are informed by the strategic paradigm: as rational actors, voters will opt for an optimal response to the incentives and constraints of their environment and the behavior of other actors in order to maximize their chances of achieving their instrumental goals: winning elections (Geddes 1995).

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[26] Debs and Helmke (2008) make a similar, albeit more nuanced, argument: inequality has a non-monotonic effect on the likelihood of leftist electoral success. The left is most likely to win office if inequality is not too high (lest the rich have too much to lose and thwart the left) and not too low (lest the poor have relatively too little to gain in electing the left), and, since region-wide levels of inequality have converged toward the middle in the past decade, leftist leaders have swept into power (see also Acemoglu and Robinson 2005).

[27] More generally, the literature on Latin America's "New Left" (cf. Baker and Greene 2011; Stokes 2008; Arnold and Samuels 2008; Murillo, Oliveros, and Vaishnav 2009) deals with a different dependent variable: electoral success. As such, its usefulness to this project's research question is limited.

Such arguments have been used to explain the PT's party adaptation. For instance, David Samuels (2004) and Claudio Couto (1995) argue that an endogenous event—the piecemeal rise of pragmatists within the PT's rank-and-file—combined with the party's internally democratic institutions led to party moderation and, therefore, electoral success.[28] This rise of pragmatists, according to Samuels, was a consequence of both the election of moderate *petistas* into the halls of city government, which strengthened the pragmatists' hand in intra-party debates, as well as the need of those elected officials to demonstrate results once in office.[29] Similarly, Wendy Hunter (2010) argues that an exogenous event—the resounding success of the Real Plan (*Plano Real*) and the subsequent election of centrist Fernando Henrique Cardoso in the first round of the 1994 presidential election (the PT's Luiz Inácio "Lula" da Silva suffered an unexpected and resounding defeat)—forced party leaders to engage in self-critical reassessment and moderate their radical views and goals.

However, such strategic arguments would also falsely predict both IU and LCR adaptation. Alfonso Barrantes' much-lauded term as mayor of Lima (1983-1986), followed by his defeat in the 1985 presidential election, were comparable endogenous and exogenous events, respectively, that should have led to political learning in IU, but did not. Likewise, LCR had internally democratic structures and mechanisms, ample

[28] Clovis Bueno de Azevedo, chief of staff of the secretary of administration under the PT's São Paulo mayoral administrations of both Luiza Erundina (1989-1992) and Marta Suplicy (2001-2004), challenges the accuracy of Samuels' and Couto's argument for the case of the PT. According to Azevedo, little institutional learning—if any—took place within the PT in response to Erundina's term in office. Furthermore, Erundina, the cage-rattler from Brazil's distant Northeast region, was far more radical than the party, whose leadership had unsuccessfully thrown its support behind another *petista* in the internal primary for PT candidate: the centrist Plínio de Arruda Sampaio, who hailed from one of São Paulo's most important families. Author interviews with Azevedo (23 July 2010) and PT founder and three-term federal deputy Plínio de Arruda Sampaio (29 November 2010).

[29] Juan Pablo Luna (2007) makes a similar argument in explaining the adaptation of Uruguay's FA, emphasizing the moderating effects of having governed Montevideo, the Uruguayan capital.

municipal- and state-level administrative experience (cf. López Maya 2004), and narrowly lost the 1993 presidential election in a (possibly fraudulent) near four-way tie. But rather than moderating in response, important segments of the party radicalized during the early 1990s.

The problem with such an approach is that it generally *over*-predicts change; the strategic framework often presumes that actors are willing and able to respond quickly and effectively to changes to their environment in order to get ahead. However, many members of these parties in question are ideologically driven and do not necessarily unify behind a singular party goal of winning elections; indeed, such parties are oftentimes not unified at all (see Kitschelt 1994; Tsebelis 1990). Latin American politicians often rank economic goals higher than political ones (Weyland 2002); imputing purely instrumental political goals to the politicians within these parties is not straightforward and cannot just be taken as given (cf. Grindle 2000). Externally mobilized parties, such as the PT or the FA, cannot—nor do they necessarily *want* to—update strategies at a whim and adapt rapidly to voter shifts by changing policy platforms: they have other goals in mind besides winning elections (cf. Müller and Strøm 1999).

Indeed, the PT did not embrace market economic principles until 2002—in the form of the "Letter to the Brazilian people" (*Carta ao Povo Brasileiro*) from presidential candidate Lula. This was years after the electorate had warmed to the idea of market economics, and thus sought candidates with similar views; and even then, it was the result of market, not electoral, pressure, and was never really fully embraced by the party (cf. Hunter 2010). Likewise, despite the fact that, among those with an opinion on the

issue, a majority of Brazilians have supported free trade for a while now (cf. Baker 2003), the PT has remained notoriously wary of the issue. In fact, the party helped derail the Doha Development Round of the World Trade Organization (WTO) talks and any hope of passage of a Free Trade Area of the Americas by its obstinacy in the face of US and European Union (EU) demands.

Strategic, Formal Institutional Theories

Finally, theories focusing on formal political institutions would predict leftist party adaptation as a direct consequence of institutional reforms. Such theories are informed by the rational choice institutional framework: formal organizations and informal rules and procedures impose constrains on political behavior by changing the choices that actors chose from in order to maximize their self interest (cf. Shepsle 1989).

Such an approach has been used to argue that constitutional reforms instituting presidential run-offs encourage radical parties both to move to the ideological center and to professionalize their organization, since parties can only win by appealing to, and then reaching, a majority of voters. For instance, Cason (2000) claims that Uruguay's 1996 constitutional reform,[30] instituting a run-off for presidential elections in which no candidate achieved an absolute majority, forced EP-FA[31] towards the center, since to win, it could no longer rely on its core supporters alone (p 92): in order to win, FA could not merely eke out a plurality, as Salvador Allende of Chile's PS had so memorably and consequentially done in 1970.

[30] The rationale behind this referendum has been widely understood as an effort by the traditional Colored (*Colorado*) and White (*Blanco*) parties to head off a victory by the left in 1999 (cf. Cason 2000).

[31] From 1994 to 2005, FA contested elections together with Progressive Encounter (*Encuentro Progresista*, EP), a breakaway group from the two traditional parties, as well as the FA itself. The EP, along with New Majority (*Nueva Mayoría*), merged with the FA in 2005.

While this could plausibly explain the PT's successful adaptation, since Brazil introduced two-round presidential elections in the 1988 Constitution, it cannot explain IU's trajectory. Peru implemented a presidential run-off system in 1979, but, as mentioned earlier, IU neither moved to the center nor professionalized (cf. CVR 2003, III.2.4). One could argue that the coalitional nature of IU prevented the party from responding to these incentives to moderate, as its more radical component-parties and the tenuous nature of coalitions could have derailed adaptation; however, FA was also a coalition of leftist component-parties, and it was nonetheless able to adapt. Furthermore, as explained in Chapter 4, IU's inability to unify is, in fact, a *consequence*, not a cause, of the phenomenon in question.

Alternatively, another plausible formal institutional argument is that specific electoral laws encouraged the political unification of leftist parties with center-left and centrist parties such that they moderated and professionalized in the process of collaborating with more established, mainstream parties. Valenzuela and Scully (1997) argue that certain electoral laws,[32] instated by the outgoing Pinochet regime to engineer the creation of a two-party system, allowed for the PS simultaneously to retain many of its leftist credentials *in theory* through official party policy while moderate and professionalize *in practice* through its alliance-of-necessity with the centrist Christian Democratic Party (*Partido Demócrata Cristiano*, PDC). Given the system-specificity of this argument (i.e., it cannot travel to any other case), however, it does not allow for generalized inferences that could apply to the entire set of Latin America's leftist parties

[32] See Angell and Pollack (1990) for a discussion of Chile's formal electoral laws and Engel and Navia (1996) for a discussion on the partisan consequences of these laws.

While such rational choice institutional arguments shed substantial light upon the relevant variables at play—i.e., the overall political context, formal institutional arrangements, and the dynamics of electoral competition, they do not take us far enough in terms of understanding the variation seen in leftist party adaptation. Instead, as the dependent variable is institutional change over time, the *historical institutionalism* paradigm is far more suited to account for the variation in party adaptation across space and time. Historical institutionalism sees institutions as structuring political interactions and, thus, affecting political outcomes by shaping and constraining the political strategies and behaviors open to actors (Thelen and Steinmo 1992). A new, historical institutional theory is needed to explain adequately under what conditions leftist parties succeed or fail to adapt in Latin American democracies.

THE IMPORTANCE OF REGIME CONTEXT: A THEORY OF PARTY ADAPTATION

I argue that a party's ability to adapt institutionally and ideologically is determined in large part by the external challenges faced during its formative years. The specific difficulties parties experience when emerging under repressive, but transient, authoritarianism encourage them to adopt certain mechanisms and policies that facilitate adaptation down the line, if and when the external environment demands it (for example, following the transitions to democracy and the market in the 1980s and 1990s). In a sense, the roots for adaptability are sunk early, allowing for future adaptation in the event that a party needs to update its ideology or institutions to compete better in changing environs. Where those challenges are not present, parties lack the incentives to institute these mechanisms, which then limit their adaptability and thus complicate efforts at

institutional professionalization and ideological moderation if and when environmental conditions reward party adaptation. Put simply: no early pain, no later gain.

The type of regime under which a party develops—particularly during its formative years—has lasting effects upon that party's developmental path (Panebianco 1998; Collier and Collier 1991). Those that develop under repressive, non-democratic regimes, for instance, are subject to particular challenges that affect the long-term growth and development of externally mobilized parties. Conversely, those parties that were not confronted by authoritarian challenges during their formative years subsequently followed different developmental trajectories. This author argues that this latter set of parties—those that emerged either under democracy or soft authoritarianism—are less able to adapt ideologically and institutionally down the line for this very reason: those initial challenges suffered by their brethren parties elsewhere in the region brought about changes that strengthened adaptability and thus facilitated adaptation in the long run. Instead of preventing much-needed adaptation, this author thus argues that the weight of the past ended up *helping* leftist parties adapt in the long-term. The *early pain* inflicted upon such parties by authoritarian regimes led to *later gain*, as they were better prepared to respond effectively to external challenges and engage in party adaptation.

More specifically, this theory contends that the 1) levels of repression suffered by the left under earlier authoritarian rule, 2) variations in the arbitrariness and unreasonableness of rules and regulations employed by the outgoing authoritarian regime, and 3) the timeframe in which the authoritarian regime completed the turnover of power (i.e., whether the left was compelled to get involved to ensure the successful completion of the handover), determine the adaptability of leftist parties and, thus, the success of leftist party adaptation.

In this way, a legacy of repression, being subjected to unfair rules and regulations, and fighting against tottering non-democratic regimes ultimately led to leftist party adaptation by creating the incentive and capacity to see democracy as more than just one of multiple paths to obtain power, develop a disciplined, majoritarian party structure, and broaden and deepen political appeals. Once democracy was reestablished, these factors eventually allowed for party adaptation: a commitment to democratic politics, the professionalization of the party organization, and the moderation of party ideology.



Figure 2.1: Causal Relationship

Those leftist parties that emerged under such regimes were induced to act, while those that formed afterwards or never experienced life under repressive authoritarianism had little incentive to do so. As such, they engaged in limited to no adaptation, given the high upfront costs of engaging in ideological and institutional change (Shefter 1993). In this way, the interest articulation, interest aggregation, and political socialization and recruitment needed for leftist parties to transform into modern, electoral-professional parties committed to democracy came about in large part due to the type of regime in

power at the time of their foundation. The political context in which they emerged ensured that such parties developed organizational mechanisms and political strategies that increased adaptability and thus enabled ideologically and institutionally adaptation once the external environment demanded it. Table 2.1 demonstrates the consequences of this phenomenon on a regional scale: those parties that emerged under democracy or soft authoritarian regimes were least able to engage in adaptation.

Leftist Parties in South America	Regime Commitment (i. - iv.)				Institutional Professionalization (v. - viii.)				Ideological Moderation (ix. - x.)		*Sum 0 – 10*	Level of Party Adapta-tion
	Plural-istic	Anti political violence	Accepts market econ.	Accepts private property	Flexible	Com plex	Au-tono-mous	Co-herent	Non-extreme	Follows public opinion		
IU, Peru	**0**[33]	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**Low**
LCR, Venezuela	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	Low
M-19, Colombia	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	Low
MIR,[34] Bolivia	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	6	Medium
ID, Ecuador	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	6	Medium
FREPASO Argentina	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	6	Medium
FA, Uruguay	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	10	High
PS-PPD, Chile	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	10	High
PT, Brazil	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**10**	**High**

Table 2.1: Operationalization of Leftist Party Adaptation

[33] All cases were scored by the author, based on primary and secondary research.

[34] MIR: Movement of the Revolutionary Left (*Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria*). ID: Democratic Left (*Izquierda Democrática*). FREPASO: Front for a Country in Solidarity (*Frente por un País Solidario*).

The next three sections detail the main independent variables' three causal mechanisms: authoritarian repression, bureaucratic hurdles, and obstinacy leaving power.

Authoritarian Repression Encourages the Acceptance of Democracy

One of the external challenges faced by some leftist parties during their formative years was authoritarian repression; this challenge ended up creating the incentive for leftist parties to accept democracy as the "only game in town." This is consequential, as Latin America's left had historically tended to ignore the intrinsic merits of democracy, supporting instead only its value in leading to political power (Castañeda 1993).

In many Latin American countries, authoritarian regimes had targeted the left in the name of the Cold War struggle against communism. State terror successfully destroyed preexisting leftist parties and organizations. Furthermore, the assassination of hard-liners, coupled with the ideological moderation that tended to occur among exiles, led to a fundamental challenge of the left's orthodox Marxist stance. This was later exacerbated by the influx of relatively non-ideological individuals, who filled the ranks of the new parties that were created in the post-dictatorship political vacuum. Because the political arena had been closed off, leftists who survived repression were temporarily forced into the social realm, where relatively apolitical social actors who valorized social concerns and basic political rights over ideological battles ended up diluting much of the left's remaining radicalism.

The result of this process was the growth of new leftist parties characterized by loose ties to the orthodox left, diverse societal linkages, and a chastened view of the relationship between power and government: a party characterized and controlled more by pragmatists than ideologues (cf. Weffort 1984, p 76). Such a shift in a party's internal

balance-of-power ensured that it understood that there are limits to popular sovereignty: winning elections does not entail a "take-over" of the state, whereby one can then impose one's utopian goals upon society. Rather, political change comes about through a pluralistic strategy of appealing to voters in order to win elections.

Over time, this process induced the leftist antagonists of such politically exclusionary regimes to adopt the mantle of protector of political rights and individual freedoms. Indeed, embracing and advocating pluralism was the only way in which the left would be able to rejoin the political arena; likewise, constitutionally protected rights were the only security against continued persecution at the hands of the state. In this way it became in the self interest of these new leftist parties to democratize the political system, so that they could participate in the political arena. Such parties thus adopted a newfound respect for liberal safeguards and an intrinsic valuation of democracy:

> *H1: Leftist parties whose antecedents suffered from authoritarian repression are more likely to accept democracy's intrinsic value than those parties whose direct predecessors were not subject to state terror.*

Once the tables had turned and leftist parties were allowed to compete for political power without fear of retribution, the lasting memory of repression ensured that they would not resort back to advocating for their earlier, utopian ends (i.e., socio-economic equality), which would require undemocratic means to be achieved (i.e., a dictatorship of the proletariat). In the words of Francisco Weffort (1984), "those who had dedicated themselves yesterday to armed actions against the military regime today participate in the struggle for democracy" (p 80). The left was confronted with a strong incentive to refrain from excusing any suspension of democratic practices and any violation of human rights, regardless of its ideological motivations. Indeed, the hypocrisy

of advocating one (arguably) non-democratic political goal—i.e. socialism—whilst fighting against another, equally non-democratic one—i.e., military authoritarianism—is hard to defend logically: "Nothing is worse for someone who fought against a dictatorship for years than be accused of using procedures similar to their adversaries" (Weffort 1984, p 84). Of course, leftists with a radical attitudinal orientation still existed; however, given the horrors of repression, their numbers and intellectual clout diminished greatly. This helped give the upper hand to pragmatists, who would then more likely lead the party toward a logic of party competition (cf. Kitschelt 1989).

Furthermore, having assumed publicly the responsibility of promoter-of-democracy under military dictatorships, leftist parties were then hemmed into abiding by democratic norms and procedures down the line. This ensured that leftist parties continued to play by democratic rules—a prerequisite for successful party adaptation—once democracy had been re-established and the threat of repression had passed. It also helped stem internecine battles over possible political strategies and goals by rendering illegitimate the more radical leftist options, facilitating future moderation campaigns; this further played into the hands of party pragmatists, who then used such arguments to sideline ideologues and gain power within the party.

Repression thus led to a chastened view of power and political change, with this new left adopting a more pluralistic, conciliatory view of power as the long-term strategy of constructing political hegemony by appealing to the electorate (i.e., responding to public opinion shifts, instead of trying to guide public opinion), occupying positions of power, and effecting change legitimately through the levers of democratic institutions. In short, it paved the way for future ideological moderation and thus party adaptation.

Bureaucratic Hurdles Encourage Party Building

Another one of the external challenges faced by some leftist parties during their formative years was bureaucratic hurdles. This challenge ended up creating the incentive to "party build." Developing one's organizational capacity, bureaucratic structure, and disciplined decision-making mechanisms is an ultimately worthwhile, albeit politically and electorally costly, endeavor that nascent parties would not normally pursue unless *forced* to do so (Shefter 1993). Building institutions is time-consuming and costly; it is only natural for nascent parties to put off such actions unless they are absolutely necessary (Harmel and Janda 1994). However, the implementation of hurdles by authoritarian regimes changed the cost-benefit ratio of this process, and ended up encouraging institutionalization; institutionalization, in turn, increased party adaptability.

These arbitrary and unreasonable rules and regulations—from erecting onerous bureaucratic hurdles to party registration, to limiting public funds available to such parties—were put in place by outgoing authoritarian regimes in order to block the growth of the left. Such legal requirements were particularly efficacious because they were implemented during parties' formative years, when institutions are inchoate and thus highly malleable. However, the desired effect—i.e., hampering the left—was not necessarily accomplished; instead, parties went into defensive mode and sought to build up their organization and structure in order to ensure their continued existence. Much as Christian Democratic parties formed in Europe in spite of, not because of, the Church's intentions and actions (cf. Kalyvas 1996), so too was the institutional development of some leftist parties unintended and unanticipated, not because of the intentions and actions of political elites.

Such a focus on institutional survival ended up fundamentally altering the interests and strategies of these parties, creating strong, majoritarian parties: bureaucratic

hurdles inadvertently encouraged leftists to sink roots in society, institutionalize, and develop their organization and structure. These short-term considerations had long-term repercussions: parties forced upon this organization-building trajectory strengthened their adaptability. In this way they were more likely to adapt successfully down the line, once democracy was re-established, given the nature of the organizational structures and decision-making mechanisms adopted in response to the challenges:

> *H2: Leftist parties that had to cope with bureaucratic hurdles during their formative years are more likely to develop a majoritarian structure and effective decision-making mechanisms than those that were not forced to fulfill difficult bureaucratic requirements.*

Furthermore, because they developed under duress, leftist parties were forced to establish greater organizational coherence and focus on institutional survival over ideological positioning—the latter would have risked the unity (and thus strength) of the party at siege. The presence of an "external enemy" helped parties put aside internal squabbles for the sake of their collective wellbeing: not to do so would amount to suicide. For instance, Trotskyists and Maoists had to put aside their ideological differences and focus their efforts on protecting their shared party from dissolution. In this way, such challenges forced parties to adopt a more majoritarian structure, and streamline the decision-making and decision-enforcing mechanisms that could later be used to help effect top-down change should the need arise. These parties did not have the privilege of deliberative democracy that those leftist parties situated within the relative safety of democratic contexts enjoyed; they were forced to adopt more majoritarian organizational mechanisms to survive the legal challenges imposed upon them by the outgoing authoritarian regimes. Like declaring martial law during times of war, leftist parties

subject to threats to their legal existence abandoned a certain degree of organizational freedom in exchange for short-term survival.

This organizational coherence and streamlined decision-making enabled leftist parties to avoid the factionalist gridlock and tendency to split that often plagues leftists parties, in which leadership is compelled to consult grass roots allies on every single decision and seek a mandate for every single initiative (cf. Castañeda 1993, pp 360-362). While perhaps theoretically and ideologically desirable to leftists, unanimity behind party decisions is realistically unworkable as diffuse leadership is anathema to adaptation. Indeed, internal democracy rarely, if ever, leads to adaptation—radical change is the province of strong leadership and majoritarian decision-making, not diffused power and pluralism (cf. Ware 1987; Burgess and Levitsky 2003; Grzymala-Busse 2002). For example, Share (1999) shows how the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (*Partido Socialista Obrero Español,* PSOE) emerged more centralized, majoritarian, and disciplined from the country's democratic transition (in which it was subject to numerous challenges by the outgoing military regime), enabling it to moderate and adapt to the restored democratic regime.

Democratization Encourages the Widening of Political Appeals

Finally, the third external challenge faced by leftist parties during their formative years was authoritarian obstinance in leaving power; this challenge ended up creating the incentive for leftist parties to widen their political appeals and, thus, strengthen their adaptability. All else equal, politicians are not inclined to give up power: like all political actors, they are interested in maximizing their own self interest.[35] As such, outgoing

[35] For an important rebuttal, see Grindle (2000).

repressive authoritarian regimes that were in the position to do so[36] dragged their feet in extricating themselves from power and opted to prolong the transition as long as possible. In those countries in which it appeared that the regime was unnecessarily prolonging the transition process, leftist parties felt compelled to mobilize society into acting in order to ensure a timely end to authoritarian rule.

Participation in the struggle for democratization helped prepare parties for their newfound role within the formal political sphere. Spearheading plebiscites and organizing strikes helped parties hone their ability to mobilize supporters while also building up legions of activists. Party members with natural leadership tendencies, but perhaps lacking in philosophical and ideological clout, were needed—and subsequently rewarded —for their mobilizational skills. In particular, a common enemy, coupled with the continued risk of legal harassment, created a sense of camaraderie amongst party cadres and early supporters that went above and beyond the support typical of a militant or voter for her political party.

This phenomenon helped attract a committed base of well-trained members willing to dedicate their time and efforts to helping the party survive and grow. Such steadfast, almost-blind support is exactly what is needed to ensure that supporters do not abandon their party *en masse* if and when it opts to shift away from an emphasis on the pursuit of ideological goals (cf. Kitschelt 1994). Indeed, such a change often risks disillusioning activists, weakening organizational unity, and destroying one's political reputation (cf. Przeworski and Sprague 1986, pp 57-73); a committed party base—one with battle scars and a shared history of struggle—minimizes the costs of adaptation.

[36] In certain situations, the outgoing regime, having been delegitimized for whatever reason, was in no position to dictate the terms and timetable of the transition. This was particularly true in Argentina, where the armed forces were smarting over their embarrassing rout by Great Britain.

Participation encouraged parties to commit their efforts to the political-institutional realm, helping wrest control out of the hands of social organizations and squarely into the party bureaucracy and hierarchy, as they were compelled to battle the regime through legal channels. Indeed, by this time, many democratic institutions had already been put in place, international rights organizations and newly liberated media outlets were watching. Also, there was a need for the parties to distinguish themselves from the undemocratic *ancien régime* against which they were battling.

Being obliged by a regime's intransigence to participate actively in the process of democratization ended up having important repercussions for these parties' long-term institutional and ideological development, too (cf. Przeworski 1985). With increased visibility from the democratization struggle—as well as the newfound responsibility to represent an expanding support base—came these parties' need, both during and after the eventual regime change, to submit to the political needs and wants of their ever-increasing, heterogeneous segment of society. These developments led to a fundamental shift within such parties, encouraging them to listen more to their supporters and the electorate at large than was normal for leftist parties at the time. In this way it encouraged parties to broaden and deepen their political appeals, as they felt the need to retain their diverse pro-democratic ally base and transform it into an electoral support base: thus arose the need to expand one's political appeal beyond narrow and radical ideologically-based prescriptions and begin following public opinion instead of trying to lead it:

> *H3: Leftist parties that fought against tottering authoritarian regimes in the historical struggle for democracy widen their political appeals more and faster than those leftist parties that developed under democratic regimes*.

Those parties that participated in the struggle for democracy were also compelled to distance themselves from their earlier ideological and partisan dogmatism for the sake of the broader goal of regime change. This goal encouraged leftist parties to negotiate, compromise, and politick with diverse parties and organizations and, in particular, collaborate with other leftist and centrist parties—a feat oftentimes more difficult than working with the right, given the ever-present tension between "revolutionary" and "reformist" lefts—and create broad alliances in the name of the greater struggle: my enemies' enemies are my friends. As such, leftist parties were encouraged to broaden their bases and engage in sustained dialogue and cooperation with other groups (cf. Schönwälder 2002). This embrace of democratic accountability—as opposed to holding out for utopian goals—led to increased pragmatism, an emphasis on compromise over strident ideology, and a respect for the will of the electorate. Again, this further strengthened the hand of party pragmatists vis-à-vis party ideologues.

Serving as protagonists in the struggle for democratization thus led to the widening of appeals, as parties remained obliged to represent their newly diverse electoral base. Such a broad-based group, with likely diverse political interests and demands, necessitated that these parties renegotiate their strict adherence to ideological norms and focus more on ensuring that they represent their supporters: extremist views needed to be moderated so as not to estrange followers. In this way, these parties became more moderate in the aggregate, focused more on building political hegemony through winning and retaining supporters than on engineering top-down a utopian society. This served as the basis for future adaptation: such parties had already conducted "test runs" of the broad-scale ideological moderation that external events made electorally desirable in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Participation channeled leftist party discontent into democratic norms, strategies, and goals. This theory suggests that Latin America's leftist parties parallel the historical trajectory of social democratic parties in Western Europe. Witness the differential historical trajectories of leftist parties in Sweden and Germany—where social democratic parties were the principal participants in democratization—with that of the United States (Przeworski 1985). Serving as a protagonist in the process of democratization prepares parties for participating democratically in the ensuing political regime: parties help change—and, in the process, are *changed by*—politics.

"No Pain, No Gain"

Given the high upfront costs of embarking upon ideological and institutional change, party building and the broadening and deepening of political appeals should only happen if and when it is necessary (Shefter 1993, pp 32-33). Therefore paradoxically, the challenges of arising within the context of earlier repression, unfair rules and regulations, and an intransigent regime looking to lengthen its extrication from power ended up *helping* leftist parties in the long run. They helped parties see democracy's intrinsic value, develop a disciplined party structure, and broaden and deepen their political appeals. Down the line, once democracy was reestablished, these factors facilitated institutional professionalization and ideological moderation.

Conversely, those parties that formed under regimes that had not repressed the left, did not discriminate legally against leftist parties, and returned to the barracks in a timely fashion (i.e., parties that developed either under democracy or soft authoritarianism) had little incentive or need to engage in those actions that would strengthen adaptability and thus facilitate party adaptation down the line. Their birth and

formative years were "too easy," in a sense: as there was no need to engage in these costly, albeit worthwhile, endeavors early on, they never did so.

Where the left was not constrained by authoritarian repression, and, therefore, there were no repercussions to retaining their radical ideologies, it remained ambivalent toward democracy: radical ideologues with veto power made it difficult to accept the altered rules of the game down the line. Where leftist parties were not subject to legal requirements, there was no need to institutionalize and build up an organized, structured party with disciplined decision-making in the short-run:[37] their unstructured nature made them immune to top-down change. Where leftist parties were not compelled to fight for the sake of ensuring regime change by developing a broad, pro-democratic base, they remained closed-off, factionalized entities with little incentive or pressure to pursue more pragmatic methods and policies: lack of experience collaborating with diverse groups made it difficult for these parties to compromise their earlier positions down the line.

As such, they were not adaptable: these parties were not prepared to respond to broad exogenous changes and engage in ideological and institutional adaptation. This explains the varied success of leftist party adaptation in Latin America:

> *H4: Leftist parties that emerged under repressive authoritarian regimes are more adaptable and thus tend to adapt better to changes in their external environment than those leftist parties that developed under democratic or soft authoritarian rule.*

Where leftist parties were unconstrained by serious challenges during their founding moments, they had little incentive to adopt such policies and strategies; thus they

[37] As parties diversify their strategies and pursue a broader electorate, they become impelled to institutionalize (cf. Müller and Strøm 1999); however, the *pace* in which this happens varies substantially from party to party. Parties that did not confront external challenges during their formative years very well can (and most likely will) build up their organization and structure; however, given the large up-front costs of the process, this author contends that they will put this off for as long as possible.

struggled to adapt to external pressures demanding adaptation in the medium and long run. As there was no pressing need to build a strong party organization, none was built. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 trace the process whereby the presence of repressive authoritarianism induced parties, such as Brazil's PT (or Uruguay's FA), to adopt the necessary prerequisites for adaptation, while the absence of repressive authoritarianism meant that others, such as Venezuela's LCR and Peru's IU, had little reason to change, and thus, remained unable to adapt when the political context rewarded adaptation.

To be sure, however, not all leftist parties theorized to adapt ended up adapting. As mentioned earlier, necessity encourages change; however, it does not necessarily bring change about (cf. Thelen 2003). Especially when dealing with externally mobilized parties controlled by ideologically driven individuals, responding in kind to external challenges should not be taken as a necessary given. In demonstrating the successful case of party adaptation for Brazil's PT, the next three chapters will systematically address the various cases of non-adaptation within the same context.

Historically, the strength of leftist parties has often originated in their founding struggles (cf. Huntington 1970, p 14). Analyzing the communist parties in Russia and China, Selznick (1952) develops the idea of *party as organizational weapon*, durably built to survive their early years of full-blown class warfare and, therefore, also able to withstand powerful challenges in the future. Benjamin Smith (2005) builds upon this idea to argue that single-party rule is more durable in situations in which the party experienced serious organized opposition and fiscal scarcity during its early, formative years. In the Weberian words of Martin Shefter (1993), "the party organization leaders construct to meet early challenges to their rule will be on hand to meet the problems they subsequently confront in governing the regime they now control" (p 13). As such, it is helpful for such parties to experience difficulties during their early, formative years so

that they are prepared to respond to whatever external challenges they may face in the future. Inversely, no pain no gain: if parties do not experience such difficulties early on, they have little need to focus their time and efforts on party program and organization and, thus, will be less able to adapt successfully later on. Such parties stagnate because the seeds for adaptability were never sown to begin with.

In this way, leftist parties confronted by authoritarian repression adapted *better* than those which came about within the context of democracy, as the former were forced to withstand greater challenges and, by doing so, sowed the adaptability seeds for future party growth and development.[38] Such a proposition is counterintuitive: growing up under an authoritarian regime would *seem* to radicalize leftist parties and encourage them to take up armed struggle (cf. Greene 2007). The reason for this surprising result is that, in the rest of Latin America, repression took place in the *shadow of democratization*: it was widely acknowledged at the time by leftists that these tottering authoritarian regimes were on their way out. It was possession of this particular knowledge that encouraged moderation over repression: these leftist parties knew they would soon be participating in the electoral arena.

THE BIGGER PICTURE: HI, THE WEIGHT OF THE PAST, AND INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMISM

As mentioned earlier, historical institutionalism is the most adequate paradigm with which to approach the research question. Historical institutionalism, which holds that institutions constrain and shape human beliefs, values, interests, and the way in which these are deployed to shape outcomes (Katznelson and Weingast 2005), holds that

[38] The argument is thus both genetic and generational. The enduring organizational effects of a party's founding moment matter, but so does the impact of specific historical experiences. In this way, the fact that the PT and FA was born under authoritarian rule matters, but so the fact that Chile's pre-existing PS was fundamentally transformed by their experiences under authoritarian rule.

change can occur in one of two mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive ways. The first way is during critical junctures—unsettled moments of great transformation and institutional flux, in which change can take one of several "paths" made available by the specific institutional context (Katznelson and Weingast 2005). Once introduced, the course of action taken during these moments can be difficult to reverse,[39] and institutional stasis returns. The other option is to conceptualize change as gradual and incremental, albeit tempered by change-averse institutions (cf. Thelen and Steinmo 1992). Such a conceptualization sees change as generational, hampered by the way things way.

For both schools of thought, the founding moments and formative years of institutions are causally important to the nature and direction of long-term growth and development. In this way, the context and circumstances under which regimes are born sharply influence their present and future character (cf. Moore 1966; Linz and Stepan 1996a; Hagopian 1990); much the same is true for the moments in which parties are born (Duverger 1954; Lipset and Rokkan 1967).

However, classical historical institutionalism holds that the weight of a party's past impedes its ability to compete in a (new) different system, since its structure, policies, and *esprit de corps* were created during a different (earlier) era (cf. Greene 2007, ch 6; Hunter 2010, ch 2). Since institutions hold a status-quo bias, actors are hesitant to change, even if it is in their (imputed) best interest to do so. Change may happen, but it is mediated by tradition: for example, the PT was unable to accept legal donations from businessmen because of the obstinance of orthodox views of party extremists, forcing the party instead to seek illegal, under-the-table kickbacks as a source of funding to deal with previously unforeseen political challenges (Hunter 2007).

[39] For a discussion on path dependency, see Pierson (2000).

In this way, institutions gain considerable autonomy and inertial strength to withstand shifts in the broader political and socio-economic environment. Structural constraints, a status-quo bias, and continuity thus may tend to predict institutional *resilience*, not change. This is a problem for someone looking to explain the variation in party adaptation. However, a revisionist strand of historical institutionalism (e.g., Mahoney and Thelen 2010) has been addressing this very issue.

This dissertation's argument parallels Streeck and Thelen's (2005) understanding of institutional dynamism in rejecting the classic assumption that the weight of the past necessarily "holds back" institutions; instead, institutions created in earlier times can also be "converted," or adapted to serve new goals or fit the interests of new actors. Such a redirection is the result of changes within the contextual environment, such as regime change, or through changes in power relations, as actors not involved in the original design of an institution may take it over and turn it to new ends (p 26). This project shows how structures and mechanisms adopted by leftist parties under authoritarian regimes had unintended consequences that prepared these parties for adaptation (i.e., the *opposite* of institutional resilience), following the re-establishment of democracy.

Authoritarian challenges prior to a party's birth and during its formative years, and the institutional responses they engendered, helped shape that party's long-term developmental trajectory in the future. In this way, the weight of one's past does not necessarily drag it down; it can also help lead to adaptation by liberating a party from its more rigid ideological and institutional origins. This theory thus argues that, rather than prevent much-needed change (since certain party structures and policies technically remained in place past their original purpose), institutional resilience ensured that leftist parties transformed successfully into democratic, moderate, professional parties through the incremental but transformative process of institutional dynamism.

When leftist parties were repressed by tottering authoritarian regimes during their formative years, subjected to bureaucratic hurdles, and forced to fight for democracy (the three combined to create a "regime change" critical juncture), they were encouraged to accept the intrinsic value of democracy, build up a strong organizational structure and disciplined decision-making mechanisms, and begin representing a diverse electoral constituency. These short term responses were later converted into use for different purposes; the consequence of this incremental change was adaptability and, when society rewarded it, transformative party adaptation.

These leftist parties were forced to regroup and re-develop within the confines of democratic reformism: this ended up forcing them to accept democracy and offering them a legitimate excuse to sideline radical, non-democratic leftist elements from their ranks who would prevent future adaptation. These leftist parties were induced to build a solid party organization to confront the various bureaucratic hurdles placed in their way; this ended up creating an effective party apparatus and fostering disciplined decision-making mechanisms, allowing for top-down change to occur. These leftist parties were forced to compromise and collaborate with outside groups and parties; this ended up broadening and deepening the electoral appeals of these parties, making them less dogmatic and sectarian and more focused on building political hegemony democratically.

It was the weight of the past that liberated Latin America's leftist parties from their history of ideological radicalism and weakly institutionalization and enabled them to adapt successfully to the profound exogenous forces that shook the region in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The next three chapters—Chapters 3, 4, and 5—test this theory on three of Latin America's leftist parties, one that engaged in high adaptation and two that engaged in low adaptation; they systematically demonstrate the three causal mechanisms at play.

Chapter 3: "Chastening" the Left: Curtailing the Spectrum of Legitimate Political Options

Authoritarian repression of the left paradoxically offered a propitious incentive for the formation of leftist parties capable of adapting, should the incentive to adapt arise. This became important following Latin America's political shift to the right, a result of the "neoliberal" policy dictates put in place following the region's debt crisis, and its related transformation to professionalism, a result of the "media-ization" of politics (cf. Mainwaring, and Zoco 2007). New leftist parties that emerged after the repression of a more dogmatic, radical left, such as Brazil's PT (and Uruguay's FA[40]), formed and developed in a manner different from those that arose in the context of no repression—be it under soft authoritarianism or democracy, such as Peru's IU and LCR, respectively. Those in the former group were induced to moderate strategically and accept the intrinsic value of democracy, which increased their adaptability and thus allowed for later adaptation in the form of policy moderation. Those in the latter group were not and, thus, had difficulties adapting if and when the electorate rewarded party adaptation.

This chapter explains the causal mechanisms at play whereby prior authoritarian repression of the left led to the emergence of new leftist parties with strategically moderated views on democracy and, thus, heightened adaptability capabilities. It first goes into more detail on the theory, introduced in Chapter 2, that explains how and why

[40] While the FA arose two years before the military seized power in Uruguay in 1973, by the year of its founding (1971) a state of emergency had been in effect for over three years, alongside brutal policing and interrogation techniques.

repression ultimately lays the groundwork for future party adaptation, despite the often held assumption that the opposite is true. Next, it demonstrates how this surprising twist played out for Brazil's PT, a paradigmatic example of leftist party adaptation. Then, it demonstrates how the absence of this key factor led the opposite to occur for both Peru's IU and Venezuela's LCR, this project's two cases of failed party adaptation. The chapter ends with a brief conclusion on the importance that accepting the intrinsic value of democracy has on leftist party adaptation.

THE ROLE OF REPRESSION IN PARTY ADAPTATION

Historically, Latin America's left tended to disregard the intrinsic merits of democracy (Castañeda 1993, p 328). Strongly influenced by Marxism-Leninism, albeit to varying degrees of orthodoxy, many Latin American leftist parties sought to overthrow or overhaul the region's admittedly imperfect democratic regimes and instill some radical form of direct democracy or socialism, be it through peaceful popular uprising, guerrilla warfare, or the election booth. This ideological radicalism was tempered for those leftists who were subject to repression under authoritarian rule; as victims of repression, they learned to value democracy and the basic protections it brings more than they ever had in the past (cf. Wickham 2004). Conversely, those lefts that never witnessed such an experience continued to discount democracy, with all its imperfections. Repression was thus fundamental in forcing leftists to accept democracy not only for its instrumental purpose, but for its intrinsic value as well; this development, in turn, facilitated the future ideological moderation, and thus adaptation, of leftist parties.

Thanks in no small part to real Cold War tensions in the region and elsewhere, both Latin America's left and right extremes radicalized in the 1960's. Leftist extremists

organized armed militias in Brazil, bombed buildings in Uruguay, and waged urban guerrilla warfare in Argentina. Rightist extremists labeled anyone holding leftist sympathies traitors and engaged in brutal repression to silence the supposed specter of communism. In response to the alleged threat of communist subversion, the armed forces deposed democratic presidents and installed themselves in power in several countries throughout the region. These authoritarian regimes then proceeded to repress the left in the hopes of destroying systematically the organizational structure and mobilization capacity of the region's leftist parties and thus their ability to divulge their message and effect political change at the ballot box or elsewhere (Castañeda 2006, p 35).

For instance, during Argentina's "Dirty War" thousands of leftists were tortured at the hands of the state. It is estimated that up to 30,000 Argentines were subjected to forced disappearances (cf. González 1980; Andersen 1993; Sabato 1984).[41] Much the same took place in neighboring Chile: the Valech Report cites over 40,000 direct victims of state terror under Chile's military dictatorship (Comisión Valech 2011). While the number of disappearances in Uruguay was relatively low, the institutionalized repression was no less severe than that of its neighbors: the Uruguayan armed forces relied upon psychological and novel forms of physical repression to destroy the willpower and sanity of political detainees (cf. Piuma 1988). In Brazil, disappearances were also relatively low; however, tens of thousands of cases of torture have been documented (see Arns 1985).

The medium- and long-term result of such targeted repression was moderation at the individual and group leevl: radical leftists were killed off or chastened by their time in

[41] One particularly chilling form of terror was the process of abducting the newborns of pregnant political detainees and adopting them out to military families; it took decades for many of these children to find out their true familial origins. Jorge Rafael Videla, Argentina's authoritarian leader from 1976 to 1981, was condemned to 50 years of prison for his role in masterminding the systematic kidnapping of what the Grandmothers of the May Square (*Abuelas de la Plaza de Mayo*) estimate was 500 children between 1976 and 1983 (Peregil 2012).

exile, creating a more moderate leftist group at the individual and group level. Also, that democracy was rolled back throughout the region as a result of increasing ideological polarization was not lost upon such parties; in one sense they learned their historical lesson about the dangers of internal ideological radicalism and tactical bickering.[42]

In short, the authoritarian regimes of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay terrorized the left. In fact, they unleashed so much state terror that a new term was coined to define the alleged subversives whom the state apparatus abducted, tortured, killed, and/or disposed of, so that the state could deny any knowledge of the victims' whereabouts and status: *los desaparecidos*, or, "the disappeared" (cf. Arditti 1999). In fact, the military regimes of these countries went so far as to combine their efforts to ensure maximal effect of their political repression; this cross-country collaboration was termed Operation Condor (cf. Calloni 1999; McSherry 2005).

The result of this brutal repression was the decimation of leftist militants and sympathizers, as well as the destruction of preexisting leftist parties. Targeted assassinations, the trauma of torture, and temporary exile thinned the ranks of the left; the ensuing political vacuum did not exist for long, however. While the political realm had been closed off, the social realm still offered the possibility for indirect forms of political contestation. Regimes left leeway for social groups—student groups, neighborhood organizations, soup kitchens, workers' unions, Catholic base communities, and the like—to operate and flourish (cf. Eckstein 2001). It was here, in civil society, that new, democratic leftists emerged.

The remaining old leftists joined forces with these new leftist groups, but on decidedly new leftist terms: being forced into nominally non-political endeavors ended

[42] Outside of Latin America, Wickham (2004) details this very process of ideological moderation—a result of democratic learning in the face of state repression—by Egypt's Islamic Wasat party and its subsequent shift from a Weberian politics of principle to a politics of responsibility.

up weakening the remaining left's undemocratic, orthodox Marxist holdouts in two principal ways. First, confronting real bread-and-butter challenges and discovering the efficacy of utilizing democratic channels with which to air grievances and effect political change helped leftist militants see the benefits of small, incremental institutional-political change (i.e., reform over revolution). Second, once the political arena had reopened and leftist parties were able to reemerge, the voices of militants were diluted by the advent of less-ideological social actors who valorized basic political rights and social concerns over ideological, sectarian debates.

It was through this process that leftist parties began to see the intrinsic benefits of democracy. Long before the collapse of the Berlin Wall, leftist parties in those Latin American countries in which the left had been repressed were emerging with fundamentally democratic credentials and beliefs. These new leftist parties were tethered no longer to orthodox Marxist ideology, but instead to the pragmatic pursuit of addressing everyday concerns over basic political rights and social issues.

This experience also altered the political strategies and goals of leftist parties. Leftist antagonists of repressive regimes were induced to drop their role as purveyor of inflexible ideological goals and adopt the role of protector of political rights and individual freedoms instead. As pluralism seemed the best way for the left to rejoin the political arena and constitutional rights seemed the best protection against continued state victimization, leftists were encouraged to embrace the democratic process; similarly, it became increasingly untenable to excuse one non-democratic political goal—i.e., socialism—whilst simultaneously denouncing and battling another, equally non-democratic, one—i.e., authoritarianism. Furthermore, the traumatic memory of prior repression no doubt had scared and scarred the left into avoiding any policies or actions that would be seen as “too radical.” As such, leftist parties refrained from excusing any

suspension of democratic practices, regardless of its ideological motivations (for example, a dictatorship of the proletariat), and staked a claim in the emerging democratic regime.

This acceptance of the electoral route to power and of liberal-democratic limits to unchecked popular sovereignty curtailed the future spectrum of possible routes such parties could then take; it committed them to democratic goals and strategies and strengthened pragmatists at the expense of radicals. In a sense, the left had to suffer the consequences of living under non-democratic rule to accept democracy as the least intolerable form of government; as terrible as it sounds, the data suggest that, the left moderated strategically only if it had been repressed.

The assumption that repression necessarily leads to radicalization (or, at the very least, continued dogmatism) does not hold true for Latin America's leftist parties principally because most of the region's authoritarian regimes were seen as *transient*. Opposition parties that emerged within dominant party authoritarian regimes, such as the 70-plus-year "perfect dictatorship" (in the words of what Mario Vargas Llosa) of Mexico's Institutional Revolutionary Party (*Partido Revolucionario Institucional*, PRI), may have been initially constrained by their origins as fringe, challenger parties, rendering them unable to transform from niche to catchall parties and thus draw in broader support once new opportunities for expansion arose down the line (cf. Greene 2007). However, Latin America's military dictatorships were decidedly more provisional and thus widely perceived as more impermanent than Mexico's unusually stable and all-powerful authoritarian regime.

Latin America's left knew that democracy was on the horizon and thus that they would have the opportunity to compete in the electoral arena in the future on relatively equal footing. Chile's 1980 Constitution, for example, was widely seen as transitional.

General Pinochet's project was decidedly transient: the military's continued control was put to the vote every eight years. For this reason, the process whereby Mexico's leftist PRD and rightist National Action Party (*Partido Acción Nacional*, PAN) remained out of step with the average voter in the face of repression (and resource disadvantages), argued in Greene (2007), does not hold universally. Furthermore, the extent to which the PRD itself even remained "out of step" is debatable: indeed, in 2006 it won approximately 30 percent of the legislative vote, and lost the presidential election by a mere 0.5 percent of the national vote. The PRD—a party whose predecessors were repressed, which was confronted by legal restrictions, and which was forced to fight for democracy—is another case of successful leftist adaptation; the party will be taken up in Chapter 6.

The rest of Latin America's left faced different incentives and constraints, as they were operating within different contexts from those faced by the PAN and, to a lesser extent, the PRD; whereas Mexico's PRI was a dominant party that institutionalized itself in power,[43] the rest of the region's authoritarian regimes were run by either rotating military leaders or ad-hoc juntas of them. Most of Latin America's military dictatorships were seen as transient in nature (cf. Lamounier 1990). While they may have tried, these authoritarian regimes proved unable to gain support for a more long-term political project; authoritarianism was never seen as more than an interlude, with the inevitable democratization never that far off. In the Americas, the armed forces were not able to gain enough legitimacy to establish anything approaching permanent, institutionalized authoritarian rule (Linz 1976; O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, p 15).

[43] The PAN was founded in 1939, at the height of Mexico's "perfect dictatorship;" the PRD arose in 1988, after endogenous and exogenous forces had challenged the PRI's one-party dominance. In this way the PRD arose in a context of authoritarian repression that was far more transient (and thus similar to the rest of the Latin American context) and thus did not remain dogmatic and "out of step" of the average voter in the way the PAN had decades earlier.

As such, leftist parties were initially forbidden from contesting elections, and, following democratization, operated at less of an incumbency disadvantage than was the case for the rightist PAN (which had been going up against single-party dominance for much of its existence). However, while perceived as temporary, these authoritarian regimes were decidedly not competitive:[44] there existed few political arenas of contestation through which opposition forces could challenge and defeat autocratic incumbents[45] (Mainwaring, Brinks, and Pérez-Liñán 2001). As the left in these countries knew that obtaining power in the near future was not a pipe dream, and as they were never obliged to compete on hopelessly unequal terms, their desperation resulting from repression led not to radicalization, but *moderation*.

In this way, leftist parties whose predecessors had suffered authoritarian repression during their formative years intrinsically valued democracy more than those that were not subject to state terror; they were thus better able to moderate ideologically should the need arise, given their prior distancing from radical Marxism (cf. Levitsky and Roberts, 2011b). The next section traces the process whereby prior repression of Brazil's left helped convince the PT of the intrinsic value of democracy.

THE PT: ACCEPTING DEMOCRACY AS THE "ONLY GAME IN TOWN"

In Brazil, where the left had been victimized by state repression, successor leftist parties learned to value democracy intrinsically and embrace the basic protections it

[44] Levitsky and Way (2002) describe competitive authoritarian regimes as one type of post-Cold War hybrid regime that is not quite a democracy (it fails to meet the minimalist procedural definition) yet not quite an authoritarian regime (incumbents manipulate formal democratic rules but do not eliminate them outright).

[45] Likewise, what strategies may have brought about liberalizing electoral outcomes in such contexts—grand coalitions among all opposition parties and candidates, whose sole shared characteristic is a desire for a change in leadership (cf. Howard and Roessler 2006)—would most likely not work in many of these countries. This *was* the case, however, for Chile, where General Augusto Pinochet submitted to a general plebiscite on whether to extend his rule to another 8-year term.

entails. Such strategic moderation had important long-term consequences that ended up strengthening parties' ability to adapt, should the need arise. This section demonstrates how the trauma of terror ensured that Brazil's PT did not continue to discount democracy and, thus, would be well placed to adapt down the line, once external factors (namely, the transitions to the market economy and democratic rule) necessitated policy moderation. Indeed, a lack of consensus around democratic goals and strategies precludes the possibility of adaptation, as the starting negotiation positions between party radicals and moderates are so far apart that any effort to moderate ideologically would inevitably lead to internecine fighting and party schism.

The Dismantling of the Left

In 1964, Brazil's armed forces deposed President João Goulart (1961-1964),[46] installed an authoritarian regime, suppressed individual liberties and political rights, and sought to destroy the leftist opposition by force. To this end, the regime began a systematic campaign of state repression to neutralize the purported communist threat, the Cold War having colored fundamentally the region's political debates.[47] Institutional Act No. 1 (*Ato Institucional Nº1* AI-1) suspended constitutional guarantees, forced various political leaders into exile, created the nefarious National Information Service (*Serviço Nacional de Informações*, SNI), and "legitimized" the regime's systematic assault on labor leaders and the left (Gaspari 2002a, pp 153-174).

46 "Jango," as he was popularly known, held strong ties to the Brazilian Communist Party (*Partido Comunista Brasileiro*, PCB) and was never well liked by the military. Furthermore, he was never elected as president, but rather, as Vice-President, assumed power after President Jānio Quadros (1961-1961) renounced the presidency. In power, he pressed for agrarian reform, sought the legalization of the PCB, encouraged the arming and mobilization of peasant leagues (*ligas camponesas*) and workers, and sanctioned the pardoning of sailors and marines who had mutinied.

47 The extent to which the left could be considered an actual *threat* is debatable. What is not debatable, however, is the radicalness of much of Brazil's left: at the time, leftists were looking not to Scandinavia for inspiration, but to (then totalitarian) Cuba and China. Author interview with former leftist intellectual Bolívar Lamounier (11 August 2010).

While the military remained in power for 21 years, until 1985, the vast majority of state repression was conducted during the "lead years" (*anos de chumbo*) of the authoritarian regime. This period began in 1968 with the decree of Institutional Act No. 5 (*Ato Institucional Nº5*, AI-5)—which instituted, amongst other things, partial censorship of the arts, the suspension of habeas corpus for politically motivated cases, and the revoking of the right to assembly (cf. Alves 1993, pp 169-174)—and ended with the rise to power of General Ernesto Geisel (1974-1979), a military soft-liner (Alves 1996). Overall, more than 17,000 cases of torture have been documented during the entire period (Arns 1985); the number of disappearances is in the mid 300s.[48] Both numbers are likely to rise once the newly installed truth commission finishes its work in May 2014; signed into law on 18 November 2011 by Brazil's current President Dilma Rousseff (2011-), this commission will investigate further those killed and disappeared during the military regime. A former leftist militant with the Palmares Armed Revolutionary Vanguard (*Vanguarda Armada Revolucionária Palmares*, VAR Palmares) who has since become a *petista* (i.e., a member of the PT), Rousseff herself was a victim of repression: she was tortured during her time in prison, between 1970 and 1972.[49]

Regardless of the exact numbers, repression took its toll on the left. The dictatorship's repressive tools included assassination, disappearances, and, especially torture (Iasi 2004; Alves 1986). The latter involved beatings, electric shocks to the tongue and genitals, stranglings, and simulated drownings; female prisoners were additionally subjected to rape and all sorts of perverse and demeaning sexual violations.[50]

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48 Torture Never More (*Tortura Nunca Mais*) lists 384 persons (Eloysa 1987), while the official Right to Memory and Truth (*Direito à Memória e à Verdad*), written by Brazil's Human Rights Secretariat (*Secretaria de Direitos Humanos*), counts 339.

49 In May of 2012 she was compensated 20,000 Brazilian *reais* from the State of Rio de Janeiro as retribution (*Estado de S.Paulo*, 2007).

50 Interview with guerrilla Ângelo Pezzutti, cited in Truskier (1969). See also Guerra et al (2012).

Repression led to a definite, albeit short-lived radicalization among Brazil's leftists: small groups of leftist militants took up arms and engaged in kidnappings, bank robberies, and guerrilla warfare. As these insurgent activities were quickly defeated, however, the left quickly realized that armed struggle would not work: the Brazilian military would not be defeated on the battlefield. Indeed, the most promising group was the result of a Communist Party of Brazil- (*Partido Comunista do Brasil*; PC do B) backed attempt to train a guerrilla army along the Araguaia river, in a rural area straddling the states of Goiás, Maranhão, and Pará; the guerrillas sought to foment a popular uprising among the local peasants, who would then eventually overthrow the authoritarian regime.[51] Once the Brazilian military discovered its whereabouts, however, it massacred the group: over 60 of a total of 80 PC do B militants were killed in the raid, or disappeared shortly thereafter (Gaspari 2002b, pp 399-464). The failure of this effort generated much soul searching among Brazil's leftists as the insurgency was terribly ill-prepared for warfare: it was composed mainly of young students who had difficulties firing guns, let alone surviving in the Northern countryside (most were from the city of São Paulo, over 2,000 kilometers away and a world apart).[52]

By 1973, Brazil's "radical left had been crushed, its principal organizations eliminated, and the majority of its fighters put out of combat—dead, imprisoned, or exiled" (Sader and Silverstein 1991, p 14). According to a high-ranking PT militant, Valter Pomar,

> The repression practiced by the military dictatorship [in Brazil] destroyed the organizations of the leftist groups that had preceded the PT, which, to a certain

[51] For a definitive analysis of the Araguaia guerrilla group, see Studart (2006) and Pomar (1980).

[52] Author interview with former member of the Central Committee of the PC do B Augusto Buonicore (12 May 2011). See also Coelho (2007, pp 24-25, 441).

> degree, made it so that, when the PT formed, it could attract a large number of leftist cadres lacking organizations (or with very weak organizations).[53]

Margaret Keck (1991) argues that, thanks to a variety of concerted efforts that rendered extinct former parties, the military regime in Brazil disorganized partisan loyalties far more so than elsewhere in Latin America (pp 49-50). Censorship and repression had bred distrust, turning leftist against leftist and ensuring that there was never an organized, unified resistance to authoritarian rule.[54]

With so many leftists assassinated, tortured, exiled, or otherwise persecuted, Brazil's leftist parties imploded.[55] Indeed, both the PCB and PC do B were severely weakened by state repression and, as a consequence, suffered from numerous strategy- and ideology-based battles that led to debilitating schisms (Paraná 2006); the PCB was a "political cadaver" in the words of PT founder Valério Arcary.[56] Much the same happened to the rest of Brazil's smaller leftist parties and organizations: "the left was liquidated, turned to dust."[57]

In his treatise on Brazil's political parties and factions, Antonio Da Silva (1987) documents the extent to which the organizational and mobilizational capacity of leftist parties was devastated by the repression of Brazil's authoritarian regime.[58] National Liberation Action (*Ação Libertadora Nacional*, ALN), for instance, was an urban guerrilla group that emerged from the PCB: "the ALN disintegrated not because of its

53 Author interview with (11 July 2010).

54 Author interview with PT intellectual Candido Mendes de Almeida (13 April 2011). See also Paraná 2006 (pp 69-70).

55 Brazil's old leftist parties experienced setback after setback until eventually imploding. Hesitant to attach themselves to these practically defunct parties, neither the former guerrillas nor the rising social actors (from new unionism, for example) wanted to associate with them; they bid their time waiting for a promising alternative. Author interview with Carlos Eduardo de Carvalho, coordinator of Lula's 1989 Government Program (10 August 2010).

56 Author interview (20 August 2010).

57 Author interview with PC do B Secretary of International Relations Ricardo Abreu (26 May 2011).

58 Brazil's intelligence community conducted *extensive* research on the various active guerrilla groups. Intelligence analysts adroitly infiltrated most of these groups (cf. Secretaria de Segurança Publica do Rio Grande do Sul 1968 and Departamento de Ordem Política e Social 1967).

errors, but principally because of the systematic and violent repression committed by [State] repressive organs" (p 106). The Maoist group Popular Action (*Ação Popular*, AP) suffered brutally at the hands of the state: its organization collapsed and was almost completely destroyed in late 1973 when most of its leaders were disappeared, the result of a former leader cracking under torture and denouncing his colleagues.[59]

Much the same happened to the Revolutionary Brazilian Communist Party (*Partido Comunista Brasileiro Revolucionário*, PCBR), another breakaway party of the PCB: "...a large part of the PCBR's Central Committee (*Comitê Central*, CC), all of its National Secretariat (*Secretariado Nacional*), and leader cadres from the Northeast and Southeast fell to the talons of repression." Then, after just barely surviving this first bout of repression,

> ...the PCBR suffered a second rough blow from the forces of repression which almost completely dismantled the party. Nonetheless, it was able to reorganize a third CC, with three members. However, the repression continued: the three CC members, along with other leaders and militants, were then exterminated in torture chambers (p 108).[60]

On the micro-level, repression had terrible repercussions on individual leftists, as well. Radicals—such as Carlos Marighella, the author of the *Mini Manual of the Urban Guerrilla* (*Minimanual do Guerrilheiro Urbano* 1969), and Carlos Lamarca, a military captain who defected and went on to establish a guerrilla-training camp—were targeted for assassination (MR-8, undated); less radical subversives were more likely to survive and, thus, effect a de facto shift toward the center (Gaspari 2002b, pp 141-157). Torture

[59] Author interview with former Popular Action (*Ação Popular*, AP) guerrilla and PT founder Ricardo de Azevedo (3 February 2011).

[60] For information on the downfall of the Revolutionary Movement – October 8 (*Movimento Revolucionário 8 de Outubro,* MR-8) at the hands of repression, see pp 110-111. For information on the fate of Red Wing (*Ala Vermelha*), see p 133. For the National Liberation Command (*Comando de Libertação Nacional*, COLINA), see p 114.

left indelible marks on its victims that set them apart from their brethren: José Genoino, a PC do B guerrilla tortured by the regime (and survivor from the Araguaia guerrilla camp), became one of the PT's first and most adamant advocates for ideological moderation in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Coelho 2007; Paraná 2006).[61] The vast majority of former guerrillas who returned to politics ended up joining the PT.[62] Another paradigmatic case was José Dirceu, a radical leftist student leader imprisoned and tortured in the 1960s. Dirceu went on to help found the PT, where he became an influential and highly pragmatic figure who continually pushed for ideological moderation and institutional professionalization.[63] The suffering of such torture victims not only helped them win sympathy among other leftists, but also helped them retain legitimacy in the face of their seeming "sell-out" of traditional leftist principles.

Bolívar Lamounier, a leftist intellectual who was forced into self-exile, returned to Brazil with decidedly moderate political beliefs. Such a political transformation was in no way an anomaly: he claims that many fellow exiled leftists returned home with a newfound appreciation of the intrinsic value of democracy.[64] Indeed, after a brief foray into armed struggle, which ended almost as soon as it had started (Gaspari 2002b)**,** many leftists became cognizant of two facts: 1) armed struggle would not work against the Brazilian state,[65] and 2) while normatively less desirable than socialism, democracy would at least guarantee protection against more repression (Azevedo 1995, pp 17-18).

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61 Author interview with PT founder and former party president José Genoino (2 February 2011) and interview with José Genoino by Marcelo Ridenti (6 January 1986).

62 Author interview with Carlos de Carvalho, coordinator of Lula's 1989 Presidential Government Program (10 August 2010). 80-90 percent of AP survivors flocked to PT; author interview with Ricardo Azevedo (3 February 2011). Those numbers were even higher for Dilma Rousseff's VAR-Palmares, which had likewise been completely destroyed by repression, although Dilma herself joined the Democratic Labor Party (*Partido Democrático Trabalhista*, PDT); author interview with PT founder and former PT president Rui Falcão (17 February 2011).

63 Author interview with PT founder José Álvaro Moisés (17 August 2010).

64 Author interview (11 August 2010).

65 For an indelible first-hand account of the political learning taking place among Brazil's left in the face of defeat, see Gabeira (1979).

Democracy as a Means of Survival

In this way, Brazil's leftists began seeing rights-based struggles—democratically protected political and human rights—as the best method to safeguard their *lives*. Indeed, according to PT founder and former secretary-general Francisco Weffort, "democracy planted itself in Brazil because of the dictatorship."[66] Part and parcel of this political learning was the fact that the political realm became effectively closed off to the radical opposition.[67] Chastised by repression, some of Brazil's leftists moderated strategically and participated clandestinely in the government-sanctioned, centrist opposition party, the Brazilian Democratic Movement[68] (*Movimento Democrático Brasileiro*, MDB).[69] Others, seeing the growing prominence and success of civil society organizations, jumped on board and regrouped within the social realm. Various social movements—from student groups to workers' unions to the Catholic church—had mobilized to oppose indirectly the regime by fighting for improved living conditions (Alves 1993).

As labor groups, neighborhood associations, and student movements were not subject to the same constraints as nominally political organizations, they flourished.

66 Author interview (15 July 2010).

67 Institutional Act No 2 (*Ato Institucional No 2*, AI-2) had dissolved all political parties and replaced them with a pro-regime party, the National Renewal Alliance Party (*Aliança Renovadora Nacional,* ARENA), and a legal, albeit highly curtailed, opposition party. AI-2 was promulgated after the opposition swept state elections in Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais.

68 Many of those leftists who went on to form the PT had chosen to boycott the MDB, arguing that participation in the authoritarian regime's legal opposition party was tantamount to legitimizing the authoritarian regime. For them, whereas ARENA was considered the "party of yes," the MDB was termed, tongue-in-cheekily, the "party of yes, sir" ("*o partido do sim, senhor*"). Author interview with former MDB state deputy, PT founder, and secretary-general Irma Passoni (21 February 2011). The PCB, however, opted to embrace the MDB during the 1970s and early 1980s: "We Communists believe that the strengthening of the MDB...and the fight for its unity is a basic presupposition of the electoral defeat of the [authoritarian] regime....every vote attributed to the MDB is a vote of opposition" (PCB 1978, pp 4-5).

69 Later, many leftists then participated in the Popular Front (*Frente Popular*) movement. With the reestablishment of democratic politics and the reemergence of parties out of clandestinity, not all leftists joined the PT; many joined the PDT and PC do B as well. Author interview with PMDB founder Almino Affonso (30 November 2010).

Leftists eventually flocked to such groups as New Unionism labor organizations, the Movement against Famine (*Movimento contra a Carestia*), and the Cost-of-Living Movement (*Movimento do Custo de Vida*), to name a few. Both phenomena served as chastening experiences. The former meant collaboration with centrist political groups, the latter meant working within largely non-political groups and learning to valorize the reformist struggle for more egalitarian social rights over the revolutionary struggle for equal political rights (i.e. socialism). Down the line, the presence of non-ideological leftists, such as factory workers, community organizers, clergymen,[70] and social workers, within the newly founded PT diluted the party's ideological bent in favor of direct action with tangible results.[71]

An ideological sea change occurred within the Brazilian left between the 1960s and 1980s: Marxist approaches, which had come to have a hegemonic dominance over the left in the late 1960s, were replaced by more pluralistic visions of politics (Packenham 1986). Repression made Brazil's left accept democracy as the "only game in town:" much of Brazil's left reformed in the late 1970's and came out as distinctly democratic players (cf. Weffort 1984b, pp 74-84).[72] The PT's foundation in the late 1970's and early 1980's was marked by heated discussions over whether the party was socialist (Azevedo 1995). Nonetheless, the party's representative democratic credentials were undebatable: the PT was *not* tied to the left's sacred, non-democratic texts (Singer 1980).

Moreover, at the party's founding meeting, PT leader and future Brazilian President Luiz Inácio "Lula" da Silva (2003-2010) made clear that, "it's time to finish

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70 Base communities played a critical role in the formation and construction of the PT, particularly in the poorest neighborhoods, where formal labor had no presence. There was an overlap of personnel, ideas, and resources between Brazil's labor movement and its CEB network. The Church had supported workers' strikes before public opinion had come around. Author interview with PT founder and CEB activist Geraldo Cruz (5 May 2011).

71 Author interviews with PT intellectual Candido Mendes de Almeida (13 April 2011) and PT founder and former president José Genoino (2 February 2011).

72 Author interview with PT founder and former high-ranking official Valério Arcary (20 August 2010).

with ideological mustiness and self-indulgence of those who sit at home reading Marx and Lenin" (Sader and Silverstein 1991, p 50). The PT's 1979 *Charter of Principles* (*Carta de Princípios*), published before the party was formally launched, reaffirmed the PT's "commitment with full democracy, exercised directly by the masses; indeed, socialism does not exist without democracy, and neither does democracy exist without socialism." Socialism, however, was mentioned neither in the PT's *Manifesto* nor in its 1982 party platform (although the nationalization of banks and large companies was). It *was* mentioned in the party's 1981 National Convention (*Convenção Nacional*). Nonetheless, it was explicitly conceived as a new form of democratic socialism, not imported from Russia but constructed in Brazil from the bottom-up, based on the needs and wants of Brazil's working class (Gushiken 1990, p 23).

Repression may have briefly radicalized Brazil's left;[73] but, in the medium- and long-run, it did the opposite.[74] The reason is because Brazil's authoritarian regime, like those of its neighbors, was perceived as *transient*: according to former guerrilla and PT founder Markus Sokol, "in the late 1970s people could feel the fragility of the regime, and this made them more pragmatic."[75] In recognition of this, noted authoritarianism scholar Juan Linz (1976) characterizes the 21 years of military rule in Brazil as an "authoritarian situation," not an "authoritarian regime." According to PT founder and former high-ranking official Valério Arcary, since the PT's very founding its members:

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73 Following the government crackdown in 1968, armed struggle groups expanded tremendously: these organizations received so many new recruits that "we didn't know what to do with all the people who wanted to join us and begin to fight." Interview with MR-8 guerrilla Fernando Gabeira (cited in Truskier 1969).

74 Weffort (1984b) downplays the radicalism of Brazil's left in the 1960s and 1970s. Nonetheless, he offers the same conclusions: the left emerged out of military rule more committed to democracy than it had been before. According to PT founder and leftist intellectual José Moisés, "repression is what moderated the [Brazilian] left. Those most directly involved with the armed struggle understood more than most that the left *had* to reform." Author interview (17 August 2010).

75 Author interview (12 August 2010).

> knew that the military regime was on its way out. It was widely understood that the Brazilian military was looking to follow the Spanish example [and extricate itself from politics as soon as possible]....It was common knowledge that [General João] Figueiredo [(1979-1985)] would be the last military president.[76]

For the first two years, President Castelo Branco (1964-1967) insisted that the military's intervention in politics would be short lived, and planned to see the country through direct elections for a new, civilian president in 1966. Regime hard liners, who held a decidedly more long-term strategic vision of the "Redemptive Revolution" (*Revolução Redentora*) and sought to remain in power until the alleged communist threat was completely abated, gained the upper hand in 1966, with the ascension to power of General Artur da Costa e Silva (1967-1969) and, later, General Emílio Médici (1969-1974). Nonetheless, by 1974, the armed forces had begun their protracted process of extrication from politics, with incoming President General Ernesto Geisel's declaration of *distensão* (the slow, safe, and gradual "relaxation" of authoritarian rule), followed in 1979 by President João Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo's (1979-1985) declaration of *abertura* (literally, "opening") and general amnesty (Gaspari 2003; Gaspari 2004).

Hence, for the majority of the authoritarian regime's 21 years in power[77]—1964-1967, then 1974-1985—the regime was actually on its way out, slowly but surely. "From 1964 to 1967 President Castelo Branco sought to exercise a temporary dictatorship....From 1974 to 1979...[the armed forces] began its exit" (Gaspari 2002a, p 129). The regime was seen as transient by much of Brazilian society;[78] however, it proved reluctant to leave power. Because of this, Brazil's leftist opposition did not think it impossible to compete on a level playing field in the near future; much of it thus embraced democracy as the best route to power—the armed forces just needed a little

[76] Author interview (20 August 2010).

[77] Some even, questionably, claim that the dictatorship ended in 1979 (cf. Boix 2003).

[78] Author interview with Davi Schmidt, advisor at the Secretariat for Political and Institutional Studies of the Presidency (17 September 2010).

push to give up their last vestiges of power in the mid-1980s.[79] By 1980, when the PT was founded, it was "widely understood that the authoritarian regime was seeking to leave power," given the incremental convening of democratic elections that covered more and more government positions.[80] External events created the incentive for the PT to moderate strategically, and it did so; however, in order for this incentive to lead to action a party has to at least be amenable to change.

The PT was presented with a choice. It was faced with an external challenge and decided to institutionalize in order to best respond to the ensuing constraints. However, the need to do something does not necessarily mean that said something will get done. A precondition for such action is a malleable ideological outlook: in order to respond logically to incentives and constraints a party has to be, at least, amenable to the possibility of change.

Brazil's PC do B and PCB are examples of parties that did not respond readily to such incentives for action. The PC do B, which was composed primarily of ultra-radical students, remained obstinate in the face of severe repression and military defeat. Whereas most leftists agreed that PC do B's Araguaia guerrilla war of the early 1970s ended in total defeat, some *pecedobistas* (i.e., members of the PC do B) exalted the experience into the early 1980s, claiming that the guerrillas had just needed a bit more time to win over the populace and thus be able to transform the *foco* into a true people's war (Coelho 2007, pp 253-255). While those defending the war slowly lost support within the PC do B's CC to those who saw the guerrilla for what it really was (i.e., a terrible defeat),[81] the damage was already done: the party remained sidelined and was not allowed to legalize under the new partisan rules of 1979 (Buonicore unpublished). Similarly, the PCB remained

79 For the Brazilian left's role in ensuring that the military return to the barracks, see Chapter 5.

80 Author interview with PT founder and former high-ranking militant Valério Arcary (20 August 2010).

81 For more information on the competing visions of how to interpret the Araguaia guerrilla military "defeat," see Arroyo (1979) and Pomar (1979).

wracked by internal divisions over who should run the party and how the party should respond to global setbacks to Marxism (Pandolfi 1995).

Accepting democracy as the only game in town was a prerequisite for the PT's adaptation because, otherwise, the party would not limit its actions to the institutional-political arena or seek to follow public opinion instead of lead it. Indeed, leftist parties that emerged in countries in which the left had been repressed by authoritarian regimes, such as Brazil's PT (or Uruguay's FA), quickly engaged in strategic moderation and accepted democracy as more than just a mere instrument to power. However, not all leftist parties in Brazil accepted the intrinsic value of democracy: just because the need is there, it does not deterministically mean that the party respond accordingly. The precondition for the theory to work is that people respond to external challenges and constraints.

Sister parties in countries in which the left was not repressed—be it because the country's history was democratic or marked by soft authoritarian rule—took far longer to accept the intrinsic value of democracy than the PT. Because of this, such parties were then less able to adapt ideologically than those parties with antecedents in the repressed left. The next two sections demonstrate how this manifested itself in the cases of Peru's IU and Venezuela's LCR, respectively.

IU: The Persistence of Disloyal Democrats

Unlike the case of the PT, IU's immediate leftist predecessors were barely repressed.[82] Small, leftist guerrilla forces were swiftly defeated by Peru's armed forces in

[82] To be sure, in the 1960s Peru's two minor guerrilla groups—The Movement of the Revolutionary Left (*Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria*, MIR), and the Army of National Liberation (*Ejército de Liberación Nacional*, ELN)—were targeted and destroyed by the Peruvian state. There is a qualitative difference, however, between a state defending its national sovereignty from a violent insurgency—what happened in Peru, and Venezuela—and one targeting leftists just for being leftists—as had happened in Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela, for example (bar a few exceptions, such as Araguaia).

1965, mere months after they came about. From 1968 to 1980, Peru was led by an authoritarian regime, but a *soft* authoritarian regime; again, this involved little repression. Indeed, Peru's "revolutionary leftist" regime sought to *appease* and *harness* the left, not suppress them. Because of this, IU, like Venezuela's LCR (which will be discussed later in the chapter), was never forced to reassess its aversion to democracy and, therefore, remained largely unadaptable. This lack of strategic moderation hampered party adaptation and eventually led to the party's dissolution.

Authoritarianism with Low Repression

In 1968, Peru's armed forces began their top-down leftist revolution by deposing the democratically elected president, Fernando Belaúnde (1963-1968), and establishing an institutionalized military regime under General Juan Velasco (1968-1975).[83] However, Peru's authoritarian regime was qualitatively different from the repressive dictatorships elsewhere in Latin America. While the national security doctrine of the Southern Cone had concluded that Marxist guerrillas and mobilized popular masses were the main threat to political stability, Peru's national security doctrine, developed and disseminated by the Center of High Military Studies (*Centro de Altos Estudios Militares*), had reasoned instead that subversion would come about from internal socioeconomic underdevelopment (Kruijt 1996; Villanueva 1969).[84]

The Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces (*Gobierno Revolucionario de las Fuerzas Armadas*) believed that stability was predicated upon the destruction of the anti-liberal economic elites. This was to be done through a number of different

[83] The reasons for the military coup included revelations of political corruption, rising economic problems, and, in particular, President Belaúnde's mishandling of royalty negotiations with the International Petroleum Company (a subsidiary of Standard Oil) over subsoil ownership.

[84] See Stepan (1973) for an in-depth comparison of the military regimes of Peru and Brazil.

actions: the nationalization of oil holdings, the broadening of the political arena through the participatory inclusion of Peru's indigenous peasants (*campesinos*) and urban underbelly (Villanueva 1972),[85] and land expropriations of haciendas—the profundity of which rivaled Fidel Castro's revolutionary agrarian program in Cuba (Chernick 2007). Indeed, prior to Velasco's land reform, Peru had had the most unequal landholding structure within Latin America, a region infamous for its landowning inequality (cf. Reid 1985, p 37); given a 300,000-peasant-strong uprising in the 1960s, the military was particularly concerned that the unrest in the hinterlands would brew into subversion.

In this vein, the authoritarian regime sought to increase the role of the state in the economy, dismantle the oligarchy, modernize rural society, and integrate the marginalized masses into national society and the political arena through its so-called "revolutionary third way" (cf. Lowenthal 1975; McClintock and Lowenthal 1983). Subversion was thus to be combated preemptively through social development, not state terror: the structural causes of popular insurgency were targeted through inclusionary corporatist policies and redistributive reforms (Krujit 1989).

With such an ideological outlook, Peru's military regime saw no need to repress the left:[86] given the regime's particular understanding of subversion, leftists were not considered enemies of the state. Especially during the first seven years of the dictatorship, the government relied not on repression but co-optation, not exclusion but rather inclusion. Instead, in order to undermine the power of the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (*Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana*, APRA), the

[85] The Civil Code of 1977 reduced the voting age from 21 to 18; during the time of the dictatorship, Peru's electoral population increased from 2.3 million to just under 5 million (Bernales 1980, p 13).

[86] Again, there had been a round of repression before: the state used military force to squash the country's two small guerrilla movements in 1965. For example, Hugo Blanco was given 25 years in prison (only to be amnestied by Velasco after eight), then deported on three separate occasions. Author interview (10 August 2011). That being said, the movements were small, far out in the countryside—and thus exerting limited influence on leftists in Lima, and quickly destroyed.

Peruvian military's archenemy,[87] Velasco worked closely with the Communist Party (*Partido Comunista Peruano*, PCP) and assisted in its usurpation of the leadership within the labor movement through the CGTP (Sanborn 1991; Samanez 1982). While there was bitter disagreement within the armed forces over the appropriate stance to take with labor and the left in general, Velasco and his ruling partners had strategically decided that the wisest option would be to encourage popular mobilization and political participation, and then attempt to channel it into pro-government organizations (cf. Stokes 1995; Dietz 1980).

This official policy was challenged, but not scrapped, with the fall of Velasco and the internal coup of 1975 that brought the relatively more hardline General Francisco Morales Bermúdez (1975-1980) to power.[88] Overnight, the regime's stance towards the popular sectors soured significantly; nonetheless, this did *not* trigger the beginning of state terror against the Peruvian left. Rather, it signified a cooling-off of the regime's support of popular organization, mobilization, and inclusion. In 1976, following the unrest generated by economic turmoil, Morales Bermúdez declared a national state of emergency—the military regime's first since coming to power in 1968—and instituted various nominally repressive policies, such as the prohibition of strikes and demonstrations, closures of press outlets, and mass firings (see Pease 1979), which were aimed at demobilizing the popular sectors. Even when confronted by violent popular unrest, though, Peru's military chose retreat, not repression.

[87] Decades earlier, APRA militants and supporters had engaged in a rebellion that killed 60 soldiers in Trujillo, an APRA stronghold and APRA founder Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre's birthplace. In retaliation, the armed forces killed over 1,000 rebels and sympathizers through heavy military repression, setting the stage for decades of antagonistic APRA-military relations (cf. Cotler 1995, pp 327-328). Author interview with Carlos Indacochea, Peruvian military expert and son of General Carlos Indacochea Ballón (6 September 2011).

[88] Steep increases in the price of oil following the 1973 oil crisis, coupled with the parallel decline in the price of key commodities, led to a balance-of-payments crisis, spiraling inflation, and economic decline. This, along with Velasco's sudden debilitating illness, led to a dramatic shift in the balance-of-power within the armed forces between soft- and hard-liners (cf. Stepan 1973; McClintock and Lowenthal 1983).

Whether or not it may have wanted to, the military regime of the "second phase" proved unwilling to follow the path of neighboring regimes and smash popular organizations: when confronted with increasingly violent and uncontrollable popular unrest, it opted not to fight, but instead announced its extrication from power through the convocation of constituent assembly elections (Huber Stephens 1983, p 58). Morales Bermúdez was even lax about which groups were permitted to participate in this contest, to be held in 1978: any and all political groups, *regardless of ideology*, were permitted to participate, so long as they could collect at least 40,000 signatures of eligible voters and open at least 14 local party committees (Sanborn 1991, p 137; Bernales 1980). While there were individual cases of repression targeting them, for the most part, Peru's leftists were, on the whole, left alone.

Peru's military did not look to repress the left, as was being done elsewhere in the region for the purposes of popular demobilization and pacification. According to Peruvian intellectual specialist José Luis Rénique, "the [Peruvian] left was not persecuted. There were no real conditions for repression, no confrontation head-on between the left and the government."[89] Peru's left was not diminished by the military, as had occurred in Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay. Thus, save a scant few forced exiles and minor persecution under Morales Bermúdez—such as the firing of striking employees at the state-owned Pesca Peru, the installation of curfews in Lima, and the temporary detention of labor leaders (Bernales 1980, p 23; Roberts 1998, p 224)[90]—Peru's traditional left was not destroyed by the military regime; in fact, it flourished.

[89] Author interview (1 September 2011).
[90] Author interview with Peruvian military specialist Carlos Indacochea (6 September 2011).

Radicalism, Unencumbered

With no external challenge creating the incentive for change, Peru's traditional, orthodox leftist parties were able to survive the military dictatorship intact as small, sectarian, dogmatic, vanguard-style parties.[91] This meant that the next generation of leftists were inculcated in radical, leftist ideology. Given a lack of fear of being repressed by the government or being excluded from the political arena, Peru's leftists were able to continue to advocate ultra-radical, undemocratic, revolutionary positions; they had little incentive to moderate strategically. In this way, the "permissive" nature of Peru's soft authoritarian regime offered the same context that Venezuela's democratic regime (explained in the next section) would provide: a safe space in which leftist parties were able to remain only partially committed to democracy without fear of retribution. Such radical stances would have led (and *did* lead) to brutal military repression in Brazil. Without a pressing need among Peru's left to engage in strategic moderation, no moderation took place: the radical status-quo remained.

In this way there was no rise of a chastened left that respected and embraced democratic institutions. Peru's two minuscule guerrilla movements, the MIR and the ELN, had been quickly destroyed in 1965[92] (cf. Letts 1981 pp 49-54; Samanez 1982), and the decision by the third New Left (*Nueva Izquierda*) group, Revolutionary Vanguard (*Vanguardia Revolucionaria*, VR),[93] to "delay" the armed struggle in order to allow for the accumulation of forces, did not signify the rise of a democratically loyal left in its

[91] Author interview with former member of IU's CDN Santiago Pedráglio (13 July 2011). For a definitive analysis of Peru's many leftist parties, see Letts (1981).

[92] Although some guerrillas survived and went on to pursue revolutionary change just the same. Hugo Blanco, for example, reemerged from the guerrilla movement unmoderated.

[93] For a thorough analysis of VR, see Caro (1998). Many VR members went on to found the radical Mariateguist Unified Party (*Partido Unificado Mariateguista*, PUM)—one of IU's component parties—with former members of the MIR and a breakaway group of the PCR, in 1983. A broader analysis of the intellectual heritage of the New Left and biographies of its key members can be found in Osmar González (1999).

place (cf. Rubio 1982; Pásara 1990).[94] Peru's leftist military regime had enabled the country's leftist parties to remain radical without fear of violent repercussions: there was no incentive, in the form of state terror, to moderate their actions or ideologies.

In fact, the opposite held true: there was actually an *incentive* to radicalize (cf. Hinojosa 1998). Indeed, according to Enrique Bernales (1980), three-time IU senator and former secretary-general of the PSR, "The reformism of the Velasco government contributed to the "ideologicalization" of society, in effect accentuating the drivers of social mobilization that the government did not want to stimulate, but could not control" (p 71). Given the fact that the military had pursued traditionally leftist goals by implementing a reformist strategy—e.g., land reform, nationalizations of industries, political inclusion, significant portions of the agenda for which the Peruvian left had historically advocated (Tanaka 2008)—it was only rational for leftist parties to find the need to *differentiate* themselves[95] from the *Velasquistas* (i.e., followers of Velasco) by promoting a revolutionary strategy, instead. Combined with Velasco's encouragement of independent popular organizations, this facilitated the growth of more radical leftist political groups (Sanborn 1991, p 87).

This was particularly the case with the National Support System for Social Mobilization (*Sistema Nacional de Apoyo a la Movilización Social*, SINAMOS). While SINAMOS was designed to depoliticize popular organizations and bring them into the government's fold, leftist parties—and even many SINAMOS employees, who were often

94 Murrugarra (2003) details the numerous historical failures of the Peruvian left to embrace democracy and condemn political violence; a prime example was in the aftermath of the defeat of the leftist guerrilla movements in the late 1960s.

95 Author interview with the principal researcher of leftist parties for Peru's Truth and Reconciliation commission Ricardo Caro (4 July 2011). Most of Peru's leftist parties opposed the military regime, in particular, Velasco's corporatist methods of popular organization and his destruction, in the name of modernity, of peasant communities (*comunidades campesinos*) earned him the title of "fascist" (Lynch 1990). Many of those individual leftists who had supported him went on to form the Revolutionary Socialist Party (*Partido Socialista Revolucionario*, PSR); others opted to boycott IU because of the partisan left's continued anti-*Velasquismo*. Interview with former guerrilla and leftist intellectual Héctor Béjar (25 July 2011).

young leftists advancing ideas far more radical than the government had anticipated (McClintock 1989, p 139)[96]—had succeeded in radicalizing the terms of the debate. Through its control of public teachers' unions, the largest miners' organization, and the Peasant Confederation of Peru (*Confederación Campesina del Perú*, CCP), for instance, the partisan left raised the political stakes by legitimizing radical demands for redistributive justice by Peru's previously marginalized social classes and ethnic groups.

When the time came to embrace democracy in the late 1970s, the Peruvian left was not up to the task.[97] While leftist parties were widely credited for organizing a general strike in 1977, the *gran paro* (discussed in depth in Chapter 5), and for pressuring the military to return to the barracks,[98] pushing for a transition from military rule is *not* the same as pushing for a transition to democratic rule:[99] the rallying cry of the protestors was not a pro-democratic chant, but rather, "out with the military" ("*fuera los militares*")[100] Peru's left was not advocating for democracy; it was seeking a socialist revolution. For example, Hugo Blanco, former guerrilla leader and 1980 leftist presidential candidate, claims that he was seeking a form of radical, participatory

96 This radicalism also came from above: General Leonidas Rodríguez, the leader of SINAMOS, was widely regarded as being a pro-Castro Marxist. Author interview with Peruvian military expert Carlos Indacochea (6 September 2011).

97 To be fair, a major reason for the Peruvian left's reluctance to embrace democracy was the fact that they had taken from the historical experience of neighboring Chile that the conservative establishment would not recognize an electoral win by a Marxist: the democratically elected president Salvador Allende (1970-1973) had been overthrown a few years earlier. Author interview with former IU Senator and member of IU's National Directive Committee (*Comité Directivo Nacional*, CDN) Rolando Ames (14 July 2011).

98 Besides the *gran paro*, other reasons for the Peruvian military's quick extrication from power include: 1) the economic crisis; isolation, discrediting, and unpopularity of the military regime; and the external pressure from U.S. President Jimmy Carter (1977-1981) to reestablish democratic regimes in Latin America; 2) the incapacity of Morales Bermúdez to propose an alternative political project; and 3) the tensions and contradictions within the Peruvian armed forces, especially thanks to Morales Bermúdez's mass firings of *Velasquistas* (Bernales 1980, chapter 1).

99 Author interview with Peruvian leftist specialist Cynthia Sanborn (12 July 2011). It was the centrist APRA and Popular Action (*Acción Popular*, AP) that collaborated with the military in pushing for immediate political change and the holding of democratic elections. Author interview with Ricardo Caro, principal researcher of leftist parties for Peru's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (4 July 2011).

100 Author interviews with Aldo Panfichi, Press Secretary for Alfonso Barrantes' Mayoral Campaign Committee in 1983 (15 July 2011) and Henry Pease, former IU senator and high-ranking IU official (13 July 2011).

democracy, similar to that found in the rebel-controlled territory of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (*Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional*, EZLN) in Chiapas, Mexico.[101] From the beginning, a majority of the Marxist left rejected Morales Bermúdez's overture at extricating the military from politics via a democratically elected Constituent Assembly, only to participate in the end, but on decidedly non-democratic terms; they were hedging their bets on the prospects of a genuine revolution from below (Nieto 1983).[102]

Despite wanting the military out of power, much of the left was wary of participating in the "bourgeois" 1978 elections. According to former VR militant Carmen Balbi, "all of the left at this point saw democracy as a mere instrument." Furthermore, the Constituent Assembly was seen as "anti-democratic;" however, it nonetheless was a political arena in which the left could seek power.[103] The Communist Party of Peru—Red Fatherland (*Partido Comunista del Perú–Patria Roja*), a Maoist splinter of the PCP which would join IU in 1980, was convinced that electoral mobilization would only distract it from its principal task of mobilizing direct political action and, for this, opted to boycott the elections.[104] While the "reformist" PCP and PSR participated earnestly, looking to win Assembly seats so as to institutionalize within the new constitution the Velasco-era reforms that were under threat both by Morales Bermúdez and the Marxist left, the Popular Democratic Unity (*Unidad Democrático Popular*, UDP) and the Worker, Peasant, Student, and Popular Front (*Frente Obrero Campesino Estudiantil y Popular,* FOCEP) had purely disruptive and revolutionary intentions in mind (Tuesta 1980).

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101 Author interview (10 August 2011).

102 To be sure, the PCP and the pro-Velasco PSR, however, *did* support the elections from the beginning.

103 Author interview (13 July 2011).

104 The Communist Party of Peru—Shining Path (*Partido Comunista del Perú—Sendero Luminoso*), at the time an elusive and insignificant splinter party, also boycotted these, as we as all subsequent, elections. More will be said about Shining Path later in the chapter (as well as in Chapter 5).

However, Peru's left had misread contemporary developments and, because of that, held a skewed view of the political demands of Peruvian society. Blinded by Lenin's theory of revolution, many leftists had interpreted the enormous level of popular support for the *gran paro* as evidence that the country was undergoing pre-revolutionary upheavals.[105] The left was convinced that the old regime was on the verge of collapse via mass insurrection—especially given the sudden rise of the peasants in the countryside[106]—and that they themselves were uniquely positioned to foment revolution and guide the people toward socialism, their end goal (cf. Nieto 1983).[107]

In reality, however, the popular masses were not looking to storm the Winter Palace. Instead, street demonstrations were based, in large part, on economic grievances and a desire for political accountability from leaders:[108] urban residents were up in arms over the military's poor handling of the economic crisis, while *campesinos* were looking to recover their communal land that had been turned into cooperatives by the military government.[109] Indeed, the regime's response to the protests—reversal of food price increases, restored collective bargaining rights, the lifting of the state of emergency, and, as mentioned before, the announcement of open elections for a Constituent Assembly—were largely successful at appeasing the populace: the left's attempt at a second national work stoppage failed to garner the same degree of support. Indeed, even the left's

105 Author interview with former IU Senator Rolando Ames (14 July 2011).

106 According to Ricardo Caro, principal researcher of leftist parties for Peru's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Peru's peasants, while restive, were conservative, not revolutionary; they were looking to recuperate their lands from the modernizing efforts of Velasco's Revolutionary Government. Author interview (4 July 2011).

107 Little political learning took place, however. Later self-criticism did not focus on trying to foment a revolution, but rather, on trying to foment a revolution too soon: "a revolution comes about when the majority of the people rise up; revolutionary leaders arise from the uprising itself." Indeed, Peru's "revolutionary leaders" did *not* come about from the people. Author interview with former guerrilla and high-ranking IU party militant Hugo Blanco (10 August 2011).

108 Author interview with former guerrilla and leftist intellectual Héctor Béjar (25 July 2011).

109 The CCP opted to participate in the *gran paro*, organized by the CGTP, to fight for its political, economic, and social rights. Peasants employed their traditional form of protest, such as land occupations and the formation of look-out committees. Their participation thus was neither radical nor revolutionary, it was a time-worn tradition of defending their community's rights. Author interview with former IU senator and CCP President Andres Luna Vargas (19 July 2011).

extraordinary showing in the 1978 election was not exactly the sweeping mandate that it had been interpreted as: one of the main reasons that the Marxist left did so well was because AP, the party which would go on to win the presidential election two years later, had boycotted the 1978 election. In 1980, AP ended up performing particularly well in the South, precisely in those regions where the left had shone in 1978 (Tuesta 2001).

Wolves in Sheep's Clothing

Despite their belief in an imminent revolution, the majority of Peru's Marxist parties nonetheless opted to participate in the 1978 elections. Peru's undemocratic leftists participated in democratic elections in part because they wanted the free media time and subsequent protected institutional space to denounce the military, divulge their anti-system beliefs, and provide national political expression to the popular movements (Sanborn 1991, pp 145-146). According to former IU senator and CDN member Edmundo Murrugarra, the left used these elections to "criticize the government and prepare for an assault on power."[110] Hugo Blanco, the unreformed Trotskyist and former guerrilla leader, for instance, used his television spots to denounce democracy and advocate armed struggle (Tuesta 1980); he ended up receiving the third-highest number of votes nationwide.[111] That is not the expected behavior of a loyal democrat.

[110] Author interview (18 July 2011).

[111] IU's predecessor parties did surprisingly well in the 1978 Constituent Assembly elections: the seven leftist parties received a total of 36.22 percent of the valid vote. (Bernales 1980, p 36).

Marxist leftist party	Percentage of Valid Votes	Non-Marxist leftist party	Percentage of Valid Votes
ARS[112]	0.57	Christian Democrat[113]	2.36
FOCEP	12.34	PSR	6.62
FNTC[114]	3.85	UDP	4.57
PCP	5.91		
Total	*22.67 + 13.55 = 36.22*		

Table 3.1: Vote Shares of leftist parties in Peru's 1978 Constituent Assembly Elections

Even after getting elected, many leftist parliamentarians used their position as a soapbox from which to criticize the government.[115] Indeed, many of them did not participate in the drafting of the constitution, but instead remained active engaging in popular mobilizational efforts on the streets of Lima. Ricardo Napurí, another unreformed Trotskyist and former guerrilla, was convinced that the constituent assembly, of which he was a member, was a "Soviet commune," whose "sole purpose was to overthrow the prevailing regime."[116] Additionally, VR representatives introduced, unsuccessfully, a "red motion" (*moción roja*) in the Assembly's first session, which moved to vest all the powers

112 Socialist Revolutionary Action (*Acción Revolucionaria Socialista*).
113 *Demócrata Cristiano*.
114 National Front of Workers and Peasants (*Frente Nacional de Trabajadores y Campesinos*).
115 Author interview with former PUM leader Antonio Zapata (1 August 2011).
116 Author interview with Peruvian intellectual Julio Cotler (25 July 2011).

of the state onto the Constituent Assembly (Lynch 1999).[117] According to former guerrilla and leftist intellectual Héctor Béjar, FOCEP constituent assemblyperson Genaro Ledesma wanted to "convert the Constituent Assembly into the Paris Commune" and that virtually all leftist assemblypersons "saw democracy as an instrument."[118]

Participation in these elections thus should not be read as support for democratic politics. Rather, the left's reasoning was, if we can take power through the ballot box then why take up arms? Peru's leftists saw democracy as void of any intrinsic value and held ambivalent positions on representative democratic institutions—at best, seeing democratic elections as an instrument for their ulterior radical goals (Nieto 1983). At worst, they were acting as democratically disloyal provocateurs, unabashedly advocating the destruction of the current regime and promoting socialist revolution: wolves in sheep's clothing.

To be fair, no matter how undemocratic their intentions were, the very act of participating in elections did effect strategic moderation, however insignificantly. Former IU senator Javier Díez Canseco, of IU's radical wing, claims that "participation [in the 1978 elections] forced the left to democratize. It forced the left to reevaluate the importance of democratic space and the forms of democracy. As many leftists had been Maoists, and thus believed that power can be obtained through one of various different routes, the Constituent Assembly's elections changed how we think."[119] Regardless of his statement, however, Senator Díez Canseco remained committed to non-electoral routes of power well into the late 1980s, a decade later.

[117] Author interview with academic specializing in Peruvian intellectuals José Luis Rénique (1 September 2011).
[118] Author interview (25 July 2011).
[119] Author interview (2 August 2011).

Given their survival, ultra-radical parties and individuals were able to play a fundamental role in IU's foundation;[120] the *de facto* leader of Peru's left in 1980 was the unreformed former guerrilla, Hugo Blanco. All five leftist candidate-lists in the 1980 general election declared that they did not believe in representative democracy as a form of government (CIUP and Fundación Friedrich Ebert 1980). IU's immediate predecessor party, the Revolutionary Alliance of the Left (*Alianza Revolucionaria de Izquierda*, ARI[121]), could not decide whether democracy was merely an instrument to accumulate forces, or whether it had intrinsic value in and of itself. IU intellectual Nicolás Lynch argued that the party's failure stemmed from its internal contradictions: it had been designed as an electoral front for the country's democratic elections, yet its stated goal was a revolutionary assault on the government.[122] IU was thus born *un*committed to democracy; it held ambivalent positions on representative democratic institutions and saw democracy as void of any non-instrumental value (Nieto 1983)

The IU's central tenets included political, economic, and administrative decentralization; the strengthening of local-level government; nationalization and "genuine" land reform; and the establishment of mechanisms and institutions of popular participation, among others (UDP-IU 1983; IU 1985). Its stated objective was to "fight for the radical transformation of the economic structure, social system, and political superstructure" of Peru, and establish a popular-democratic state that would "open the way for socialism" through the "mobilization, organization, and revolutionary struggle of

120 At its height, IU was composed of seven parties and fronts: Socialist Political Action (*Acción Política Socialista*, APS), FOCEP, PCP, the Revolutionary Communist Party (*Partido Comunista Revolucionario*, PCR), PSR, PUM, and the Revolutionary Left Union (*Unión de Izquierda Revolucionaria*, UNIR) (IU 1988a, art 2).

121 "Ari" means "yes" in Quechua, the main indigenous language of Peru. It was composed of UDP, UNIR, PCR, and the Trotskyist members of FOCEP; PCP, PSR, and non-Trotskyist FOCEP members banned together to form the Unity of the Left (*Unidad de Izquierda*, UI). ARI collapsed and five leftist candidates ended up running for president in 1980. As a result, the left's overall vote share collapsed, from 29.4 in 1978 to 14.4 in 1980; Blanco received a mere 3.9 percent of the vote in the 1980 presidential elections (Tanaka 1998).

122 Author interview with IU intellectual Nicolás Lynch (1 August 2011).

the masses" (IU 1988a; PUM 1988a). Moreover, the IU explicitly did *not* foreswear armed struggle. It referred to itself as a revolutionary, socialist front, which

> does not renounce, on principle, any means of struggle or form of organization. It combines each and every [means and form], be they legal or illegal, overt or covert, depending on the circumstance [....] class struggle is complex, sharp, and, at times, violent (IU 1984).[123]

IU remained only partially loyal to democracy throughout the 1980s: its principal documents, formulated in 1983, established neither democracy as the "only game in town" nor the electoral arena as the only legitimate form of obtaining power (IU 1984). It advocated extra-legal political struggle, refused to renounce political violence, and dithered over categorically denouncing Shining Path, Peru's Maoist guerrilla group (cf. CVR 2003, section III.2.4). Indeed, a significant minority of the PUM, IU's largest and most radical wing/component party, was even convinced—*in 1989*—that the country was ripe for an end to the liberal-democratic order through armed struggle.[124] Undemocratic, radical ideologues ended up complicating IU's overall process of policy moderation by ensuring that the party's pragmatists were denied control of the party, unlike the case of those leftist parties in countries where military repression had chastened the left. Their relative strength and influence within the party enabled them to defeat IU pragmatists and derail any future attempts at party adaptation: it was because of them that the party never fully embraced democratic politics, a necessary condition of party adaptation.

One of the major reasons why IU (and LCR, as will be explained in the next section) was unable to adapt to the sweeping changes occurring in the late 1980s was

123 "*IU no renuncia por principio a ningún medio de lucha, ni forma de organización. Combina todas y cada una de ellas, sean legales o ilegales, abiertas o secretas, según las circunstancias*." This affirmation was repeated often throughout the 1980's: see PUM 1988a and APS 1987, for example.

124 Author interview with IU intellectual Nicolás Lynch (1 August 2011).

because it had been born without any external challenges that would have encouraged strategic moderation, which would then have limited the breadth of potential, legitimate ideological stances. Peru's left was challenged, however, but in the future. According to Peruvian intellectual Julio Cotler, "the Peruvian left discovered democracy through [being targeted for repression by] Shining Path and Fujimori."[125]

Unlike in Brazil, dogmatic and sectarian parties and individuals had not been destroyed and silenced by the military and thus played a fundamental role in the IU's formation. Indeed, parties that abide by a unitary theoretical matrix and believe in a single truth—as was the case with many of the IU's component parties—have difficulties compromising their beliefs. Given their presence from the party's foundation and onward, these radicals retarded and complicated the party's overall process of ideological moderation by ensuring that its initial median ideological position, from which it would later moderate, was far to the left of those leftist parties whose ultra-radical members had been chastened by military repression. Their relative strength and influence within the party, gained from the commitment of their beliefs and their ideological legitimacy, enabled them to defeat IU pragmatists and derail the party's adaptation years down the line. Much the same occurred in LCR.

LCR: VENEZUELA'S LEFT, UNENCUMBERED

As was the case in Peru, in Venezuela the left was minimally repressed, in relative terms.[126] Unlike the vast majority of its neighbors, Venezuela was democratically

[125] Author interview (25 July 2011).

[126] Author interviews with MAS founders and former leaders Franklin Guzmán (14 February 2012) and Hector Rodriguez Bauza (16 February 2012). Again, in response to the guerrilla movements of the Leftist Revolutionary Movement's (*Movimiento Izquierda Revolucionario*, MIR) and the Armed Forces of National Liberation (*Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional*, FALN), President Rómulo Betancourt (1959-1964) used brutal force; complicit leftists *were* targeted and repressed (D'Paola 2011, pp 47-52).

governed for much of the second half of the twentieth century. Because of this, the country's left was given more leeway to operate than elsewhere in Latin America, and radical, anti-democratic sentiment was permitted to continue, unchecked. As a result, LCR arose in 1978[127] with ambiguous views toward representative democracy that sought—first secretly, then openly—to obtain power via violent, non-democratic channels. This complicated the party's ability to adapt down the line: the party's split was principally caused by the debate over whether or not to support a civilian-military insurrection that sought to overthrow Venezuela's democratic regime.

Model Democracy

The Venezuelan left was allowed to participate in the political sphere because the country had had an uninterrupted history of democratic politics since 1958. This democratic "exceptionalism" was the result of a compromise to put to an end to the intense polarization of society and politics in the 1940s, the participatory explosion of the *trienio* ("three-year period") and its ensuing violence,[128] and undemocratic military rule (Levine 1978). Fear of continued autocracy had convinced Venezuela's political elites to agree to limit the possibility of conflict by imposing limits and checks on the political system: antagonistic political elites acknowledged and accepted the pressing need for consensus-building to guarantee stability (Myers 2004). Political elites thus agreed to restraint, by imposing limits and checks on the political system and by opting for

[127] LCR was born in 1973 as a social movement, albeit with broadly political goals; it only became a political party and started contesting elections in 1978. LCR's immediate antecedent organization, Venezuela 83, was born in 1971. Author interview with LCR founder Clemente Scotto (8 November 2011).

[128] During the *trienio* (1945-1948), Venezuela's first attempt at democracy, Democratic Action (*Acción Democrática*, AD) governed unilaterally, having won a clear mandate. It introduced universal suffrage, extended social services to the poor, and wrote a new constitution. However, it also severely polarized society and alienated certain groups, such as the Catholic Church, private sectors, and the right, and suffered a military coup in 1948 (Kornblith and Levine 1995).

compromise over destabilizing competition, in order to create an allied, pro-democratic front against the vestigial organs of authoritarianism remaining within Venezuelan politics (Coppedge 1994, p 38; McCoy 2004).

In this way Venezuela's two main political parties, AD and the Independent Electoral Political Organization Committee (*Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente*, COPEI), struck a power-sharing agreement to distribute power between themselves under the Punto Fijo Pact. Under this pact, the main parties pledged to respect elections—whatever the outcome, maintain a political truce depersonalizing debate, and share political responsibility and patronage (McCoy 2004, pp 274-275; Kornblith and Levine 1995, p 45). This agreement allowed the two parties to share upwards of 90 percent of the vote among themselves; however, this came at the expense of the left.

The leftist Democratic Republican Union (*Unión Republicana Democrática*, URD) participated in the Pact's founding, although it was increasingly sidelined from power; largely because of this, many of its leaders and sympathizers threw their support behind armed, leftist factions in the 1960s (Myers 2004, pp 22-23). The Communist Party of Venezuela (*Partido Comunista de Venezuela*, PCV) was never a party to the Pact. Nonetheless, save for a few incidents, leftists were not *repressed* as they were in the rest of Latin America. Opposition was defused and representation bought through the state's oil earnings: oil revenues trickled down in the form of clientelism (Hellinger, 2004), fostering stability and democratic governability so long as the "petrobonanza" held (Myers 2004, p 26).

Punto Fijo was quite successful in ensuring civilian rule in the face of authoritarian and anti-democratic currents.[129] COPEI consented to limited land reform in

[129] These being: the military, business community, and the Catholic church, all of whom feared AD "radicalism;" the influence of the Cuban Revolution, which had polarized politics throughout the region but also served as a warning to neighboring countries of the desperation of marginalized groups; and support for the former dictator, General Pérez Jiménez, remained strong among a vocal minority of the

the name of diminishing potential support for communist insurgents, AD dropped its secular education agenda, and both agreed to share power...and wealth. Oil windfalls were distributed liberally throughout society as a way of minimizing class conflict, quieting dissent, and purchasing support (Myers 2004). However, as income levels rose, societal demands and expectations grew, and distributive policy proved inadequate in buying off the new sectors that emerged in the 1980s and 1990s (Hellinger 2004). Furthermore, political stability came at the expense of representativeness, as AD and COPEI became increasingly catch-all[130] and informally boxed out other parties from power, starting with the PCV, then extending to the URD, fringe factions, and leftist social groups.

Punto Fijo had created a "*partidocracia*," or, the stranglehold of the democratic system by even more ossified political parties and their leaders (Coppedge 1994). AD and COPEI were highly centralized, limited citizens' electoral choices through closed-party lists, and forced legislators to vote as a party bloc. While no major media outlets were owned by political parties after 1969, they were nonetheless highly politicized and often ran one-party lines. Political options were highly limited (and became worse over time as parties ossified and hermetized to ensure continued success): "The system was so strong and self-contained that its key institutions left little room for emerging social forces to find expression; it was too rigid to respond to crisis with anything other than tools that no longer fit the job" (Crisp and Levine 1998, p 28). Nonetheless, because of this elite pact, democracy prevailed and the government had no need to repress the left.

population, especially in the poorer areas of Caracas (Coppedge 1994, p 154).

130 Party leaders fell more or less along two overlapping bell curves: AD's curve was slightly left-of-center, while COPEI's was slightly right-of-center. However, to be sure, many AD leaders fell to the right of those of COPEI, and vice versa, as political power trumped ideology. The lack of difference in their electoral programs fostered disillusionment with politics as sectors of society could not find their opinions represented by either party (Coppedge 1999).

Venezuela's left was thus sidelined, but not repressed. Indeed, there were always close personal connections between PCV leaders and the government, and the political establishment *encouraged* the left to become reintegrated into political and social life. Indeed, the leftist Movement for Socialism's (Movimiento al Socialismo, MAS) founding and process of legalization was so simple because AD and COPEI thought it would help shore up their own legitimacy.[131] In part because of this lack of a common external enemy, the PCV became wracked by internal conflicts. Similar to what later happened to the LCR (as will be explained shortly), the PCV never felt pressured to reform its internal structure and remained a traditional, cadre party, despite growing demands from rising leaders for change (D'Paola 2011). Triggered by the fact that its executive committee was grossly out of touch with political realities and regularly disregarded the will of the party at large, the PCV experienced a mass exodus of militants and followers in late 1970.[132]

PCV's internal division[133] was the result of increasingly bitter disagreements over how to interpret: the defeat of Venezuela's internal armed struggle, the understanding that armed conflict was not a legitimate route to power, the rise of the New Left in Europe, and pushes for increased freedom of expression and pluralism within the party—such as Teodoro Petkoff's published criticisms of the USSR and orthodox communism (Ochoa Antich 1997, pp 45-91; Ellner 1986).[134] Dissidents left the PCV to found the MAS and

131 Author interviews with MAS founders and former national leaders Rafael Guerra Ramos (27 February 2012) and Pedro Mujica (24 February 2012).

132 In particular, those associated with the PCV's highly organized, semi-autonomous Communist Youth of Venezuela (*Juventud Comunista de Venezuela*, JCV) left en masse. Author interviews with MAS founders Teodoro Petkoff (17 October 2011) and Pompeio Márquez (31 January 2012).

133 In broad strokes, the PCV was divided into three groups: the "rightist" pro-Stalin, pro-USSR, orthodox group (which was headed by the García Ponce brothers); the "leftist" reformers (headed by Teodoro Petkoff, along with Freddy Muñoz and LCR founder Alfredo Maneiro), and; the "centrist" group (headed by Pompeyo Márquez, along with Rafael Guerra Ramos and Héctor Rodríguez Bauza), which criticized the USSR up to a certain point, but initially believed in reforming the PCV rather than abandoning it (Díaz Rangel 1971, pp 45-99). Author interviews with MAS founders Felipe Mujica (9 March, 2012), Victor Hugo D'Paola (5 March 2012), and Rafael Guerra Ramos (27 February, 2012).

134 Author interview with MAS founders Rafael Guerra Ramos (27 February 2012) and Victor Hugo D'Paola (5 March 2012).

LCR because it was excessively bureaucratic, it did not embrace pluralism, and its leaders regularly made decisions that disregarded the will of the majority of party members (Bayardo Sardi 2001; D'Paola 2011).[135]

Unchallenged Left

It was in this context of PCV's collapse that LCR arose. While most former communists went on to form the MAS a month later, in 1971, veteran guerrilla commander and mid-level PCV leader Alfredo Maneiro broke from the group and, with a few other ideological dissidents, formed the heterodox Marxist *Venezuela 83*, which later became LCR (Rangel 1983).[136] LCR was created as a "party in permanent formation" (Maneiro 1986, p 181) because its founders, and Maneiro in particular, wanted to develop a party as far removed from the PCV, AD, and COPEI as possible (D'Paola 2011, pp 59-61). With this in mind, it is no wonder that LCR ended up remaining a "non-party" party, even as it later grew into the country's third-largest party and stood poised to take the presidency.

LCR had been constructed as a new type of party—a "movement party" without written laws, established party roles, or a structured bureaucracy. As such, it would not be beset by the same problems that plagued both its predecessor, the bureaucratic PCV, and

[135] PCV's Central Committee members had been selected in a PCV Congress in 1958 and, since the selection of new leaders had been delayed, most of the party's leaders were orthodox leftists with outdated ideologies. Author interview with former PCV General-Secretary and MAS founder Pompeyo Márquez (31 January 2012).

[136] Maneiro left the MAS during its very constituent congress because he was disturbed that MAS, which had allowed Pompeyo Márquez and other "USSR-apologists" to participate in the new party (cf. Márquez, 1981), would end up being bogged down by internal infighting over ideological positioning and struggles over bureaucratic positions, thus repeating the same mistakes of the PCV. According to MAS founder and former national leader Héctor Rodríguez Bauza, the MAS suffered from a "very large organizational incapacity: the party just fought and fought," and that there was "contempt for practical work" such that everybody within the party just "theorized and theorized." Author interview (16 February 2012). Reflecting back, with the benefit of hindsight, Petkoff admitted freely that perhaps it *would* have been better to break cleanly with the Communists like Maneiro and LCR: MAS ended up inheriting much of the bitter ideological debates and internecine fights from the PCV. Author interview with MAS founder and former MAS president Teodoro Petkoff (17 October 2011).

the two elitist, catch-all parties that dominated Venezuela's increasingly closed-off party system, AD and COPEI.[137] According to Andrés Velásquez, three-time LCR presidential candidate, "LCR does not affiliate militants...it does not provide ID cards, does not have a payroll record of militants;" all it does is unite like-minded people to "share ideas and responsibilities" (quoted in Sesto 1992b, pp 228-229). To the Venezuelan electorate, this innovative, malleable, non-bureaucratic party was a promising alternative not only to traditional leftist parties,[138] but also to the two moribund parties that had run Venezuela's increasingly ossified democracy since 1958. LCR was expected to sap support away from the two "undemocratic" parties, dismantle the closed political system, and, in this way, revive Venezuela's multi-party democracy (Coppedge 2001).

LCR was novel and noteworthy for the fact that it was an externally mobilized party, one generated from civil society (Crisp and Levine 1998), in a country whose party system was, in effect, closed off to outsiders and whose two main parties were elitist and overly rigid (cf. Coppedge 1994; Kornblith and Levine 1995). The party targeted: students, particularly at the Central University of Venezuela (*Universidad Central de Venezuela*, UCV), in Caracas, and the University of the Andes (*Universidad de los Andes*), in Mérida; the urban poor, particularly within the Catia neighborhood of Caracas; intellectuals, through its *La Casa del Agua Mansa* organization; and iron and steel

[137] Venezuela's political regime was democratic. However, *causaerristas* (i.e., members of LCR), who were not party to the Punto Fijo pact, thought otherwise: they saw themselves as radical democrats looking to break into and topple the "mafia and dictatorship of AD and COPEI" (Lagonell 1987, p 35).

[138] Beginning in the late 1960s and early 1970s, many leftist parties in Latin America began to emulate the Gramscian, Eurocommunist movement and question their own uncritical importation of the USSR's orthodox communist interpretations and dictatorial tutelage. This political watershed was generated mostly by a growing impatience on the part of both rank-and-file leftists and leftist leaders with the centralized, bureaucratic, and authoritarian nature of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Petkoff 1976). The primary catalysts for the shift, however, were the USSR's invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, which caused widespread disillusionment among many once-reverential Latin American leftists (Petkoff 1969) and the military defeat of Latin America's guerrilla uprisings (Blanco Muñoz 1980). For an analysis of Eurocommunism, see the writings of and on Enrico Berlinguer in Italy, Santiago Carrillo in Spain, and Georges Marchais in France.

workers in the greater Guayana region, particularly at the *Siderúrgica del Orinoco* (Sidor) factory.[139]

Power by *Any* Means

However, this participatory, radically democratic party also had a clandestine, military segment alongside those of workers, students, the urban poor, and intellectuals. This "fifth leg" dated back to 1973, when LCR was still just a social movement (cf. Medina 1999, pp 90-132).[140] LCR founder and mastermind Alfredo Maneiro did recognize the intrinsic value of democracy—"For us [*causaerristas*], the problem is democracy and the solution is democracy" (quoted in Rangel 1983)—and often proclaimed publicly his organization's (ill-defined) goal of "deepening democracy"[141] (cf. Yepez Salas 1993, pp 119-122); however, confusingly enough, he also had distinctly anti-democratic tendencies, and saw elections as just one of many possible routes to power.[142] Indeed, his definition of democracy was decidedly radical: "I believe in democracy in the sense that Marx gave it when he said, when the revolutionary movement conquers power, it conquers democracy" (Maneiro 1986, p 221).

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139 Edgar Yajure ran the student segment, the Moura brothers ran the popular segment, Farruco Sesto the intellectual segment, and Velásquez the worker segment. The military segment (to be discussed in the next section) was run by Maneiro, then Pablo Medina.

140 Author interviews with Federal Deputy Amérigo de Grazia (7 March 2012), LCR founder and leader Lucas Matheus (5 December 2011), and LCR founder and former national leader José Albornoz (9 November 2011 and 8 March 2012).

141 LCR president Velásquez himself had difficulty explaining it, both in an author interview (24 November 2011) and in an earlier interview (Sesto 1987, p 65). It means, roughly, making democracy more participatory, eliminating the distinction between leaders and subjects, and substantive socio-economic change. One of his presidential campaign selling-points was to "consult with the people on all important decisions" (Velásquez 1993b). As governor (1989-1995), Velásquez made a point of crisscrossing the entire state of Bolívar twice a year, along with all of his ministers, in order to talk with his constituents. Author interview with Ana Elisa Osorio, health minister for Bolívar under Velásquez (24 February 2012).

142 Author interviews with LCR founder and three-time mayor of Caroní (1989-1995, 2004-2008) Clemente Scotto (8 November 2011) and LCR founder and former leader Edgar Yajure (26 October 2011). According to Venezuelan labor specialist and former LCR intellectual Luis Salamanca, Maneiro "was a traditional [Venezuelan] leftist; he didn't believe in elections." Author interview (29 September 2011).

He was looking not to "bring social content to the democratic form, but rather, [to] reformulate the very democratic form itself" (Maneiro 2007, p 36). Furthermore, he was cognizant of the fact that, in order for LCR to be able to take power following an electoral victory, it would need the support of significant swaths of the armed forces, lest the elections go unrecognized or get stolen through fraud.[143] To this end, LCR infiltrated Venezuela's military,[144] conducted intelligence on potentially subversive servicemen who were unhappy with the country's political system, and recruited them for the party's long-term plan for an insurrectional uprising.[145]

LCR's civilian-military connection had been the idea of Maneiro,[146] who had met with Hugo Chávez and other subversive members of the military several times, beginning in the late 1970s.[147] Maneiro's political vision was for a civilian movement, spearheaded by LCR and with the support of progressive members of the military, to sweep away the prevailing regime via elections or, more likely, a broad-based national strike (similar to Rosa Luxemburg's vision of a truly democratic triumph).[148] Maneiro regularly denied having an ulterior motive in mind; in response to a candid question asking about the

143 Author interviews with LCR Federal Deputy Amérigo de Grazia (31 January 2012) and former LCR leader Rafael Uzcátegui (9 and 10 October 2011).

144 On this note, LCR did much the same within social movements as well. In the early 1970s Maneiro had sent Pablo Medina to work undercover and infiltrate the labor unions of Ciudad Guayana; it was in this way that the party discovered Andrés Velásquez, whom they recruited and nurtured into a national leader (López Maya 1994). Medina, who has used various *noms de guerre* over the years—Mario, Alfredo, Natalio—had taken on the identity of an uneducated ironworker named Alonso when he went to work at Sidor (Medina 1999, pp 11-28). Similarly, José Albornoz was sent to infiltrate the student movement in UCV (Rosas 2009b, pp 62-65).

145 Author interview with former LCR leader Rafael Uzcátegui (9 and 10 October 2011). According to LCR founder and national leader Lucas Matheus, the party either had "to neutralize [the military], or to include them. We chose the latter." Author interview (5 December 2011).

146 Technically, the idea predated Maneiro. Francisco Arias Cárdenas, who led the battalion that took over Maracaibo during 4F and who later was elected LCR Governor of Zulia, argues that the idea of a civilian-military "Bolivarian Revolution" dates back to 1957 and comes from Douglas Bravo, a veteran guerrilla and PCV leader (Garrido 2005, p 23).

147 Author interviews with LCR founder and leader José Lira (5 December 2011) and LCR founder and former leader Edgar Yajure (26 October 2011). For more on Maneiro's meetings with Chávez, see Rosas (2009b, pp 20-24) and Garrido (2000b, pp 19-20).

148 Author interviews with LCR founder and former leader Edgar Yajure (26 October 2011), former LCR leader Gustavo Hernandez (26 October 2011), and LCR leader César Ramírez (22 November 2011).

ultimate, "hidden" motivation behind LCR's quest for power, he claimed that it is merely to "broaden and deepen democracy" (quoted in Rangel 1983). However, according to many party members, the goal was, indeed, to instill in Venezuela a more just, direct, participatory democratic regime similar to that advocated by traditional Marxists. According to Pablo Medina, LCR had "an insurrectional design" from the very beginning (1999, p 90). General Müller Rojas (1991) claimed that LCR's birth was the continuation, via the political route, of "the revolution that had been pushed forth since the 1960s via the path of guerrilla warfare" (p 68), and that "as a revolutionary party, it did not abandon the idea of violent action through the mobilization of the masses as an instrument for achieving political control" (p 72).

LCR looked, in many ways, like a moderate, reformist party. Indeed, for the first five years of its existence (as a social movement) it was solely occupied with improving the social and economic rights of factory workers. This concern for fighting the corruption of the traditional syndicalism, promoting democratic participation in unions, and advocating workplace health and security among metalworkers was best embodied in Andrés Velásquez, LCR's most successful and well-known leader.[149] While this depiction of the party is not inaccurate, it only tells half of the story: LCR was founded as a radical, leftist party with the long-term objective of toppling capitalism through class warfare (Salamanca 1998, p 240). While the party purported to "deepen democracy," many of its members were not very committed to the democratic regime already in place. In response to the question, "is this democracy a fraud?" LCR secretary-general Medina responded (in 1988):

[149] In November of 1979, shortly after establishing itself as a political power, LCR's *Matanceros* fielded candidates in the elections for SUTIS, the Single Union of the Iron and Steel Works of Orinoco (*Sindicato Único de la Siderúrgica del Orinoco*). The *Matancero* slate garnered 2,932 votes, four-times as much as AD; they won seven of eleven seats on the board (Sesto 1987, p 63). "*Matanceros*," the precursor to LCR's worker wing, was the name given to the group of new unionism workers at Sidor. The term comes from the periodical, *Matancero*, created by Pablo Medina and others from the nascent LCR to create a worker's movement (Salamanca 1998, p 235).

> Of course, it's a fraud. The forces that drive it are not democratic. If you come to convert yourself into a threat to them...they will immediately reveal their antidemocratic nature. And if you think you can approach the State to effect profound changes, they are capable of making the State engage in a coup-d'etat upon itself (quoted in Sesto 1992a, p 37).

This seemingly contradictory embrace and rejection of democracy can be explained by the greater Venezuelan left's unmoderated disdain for representative democracy. According to Venezuelan left specialist Margarita López Maya, LCR's founders were "never sincere about their democratic discourse." In general, Venezuela's left has demonstrated a "profound lack of confidence in democratic rules and norms." This illiberal attitude, she argues, can be explained in part because the country did not suffer through a dictatorship in the recent past.[150]

While Venezuela's radical left suffered defeat in their attempted armed struggle in the 1960s, the overall lack of repression meant that only limited ideological renovation occurred.[151] Some of the earliest and most outspoken leftist critics of armed struggle in Latin America hailed from Venezuela—such as Teodoro Petkoff and Pompeyo Márquez; particular, Petkoff argued that a principal realization was that "Venezuela in the 1960s was not Cuba in the 1950s...the country was already democratic."[152] However, this political learning was not universal among the Venezuelan left. Bravo, in particular, had interpreted the decisive defeat of Venezuela's minor guerrilla insurgencies as a minor setback, not a call for a tactical retreat (as had most PCV militants); rather, he called for a "prolonged people's war" (quoted in Ellner 1986, p 83).

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150 Author interview (11 October 2011).

151 As punishment for their role in the guerrilla insurgency, PCV was temporary pushed underground in the 1960s (cf. Álvarez 2006).

152 Author interviews with MAS founder and former guerrilla leader Teodoro Petkoff (17 October 2011) and MAS founder Pompeyo Márquez (31 January 2012). See also Márquez (1968) and Petkoff (1976).

Many LCR militants were staunchly democratic individuals who saw the electoral pursuit of power as the best way to be able to improve the lives of Venezuela's lower classes; however, many LCR militants were also disloyal democrats, looking to obtain power by any means necessary in order to implement their non-democratic political goals by force, if need be. The tension between these two groups, discussed in detail in Chapter 5, prevented the party from adapting to external challenges and resulted in its division—and subsequent irrelevance—in 1997: LCR's radical members left en masse to form Fatherland for All (*Patria Para Todos*, PPT), diluting LCR's political cache and electoral power.

CONCLUSION

Suffering at the hands of repression forced the left to accept democracy's intrinsic value and see it as more than just one of multiple paths to obtaining power. In contexts in which leftist parties' predecessors had experienced firsthand the horrors that take place if and when political rights and liberties are not guaranteed, the left then embraced democracy. This strategic moderation was partially the result of desperation—in order not only to participate in the political arena, but also to *survive* potential further repression, leftists had to embrace democracy as the best form of protection against state terror.

Conversely, in countries where the left had not been subject to repression, leftist parties remained only partially committed to democracy; they continued to see it more as an instrument than anything laden with intrinsic value. Where this was the case, leftist parties had difficulties adapting when the electorate rewarded moderation both because their ranks remained occupied by revolutionary agents intent on radicalizing, not moderating, their parties' policies, and because the median ideological stance of the party

was so far to the left that reform-minded pragmatists were unable to bring the revolutionary ideologues around to the tangible benefits to ideological adaptation.

In this way, the strategic moderation of leftist parties is not only important in ensuring that all relevant political actors see democracy as the "only game in town;" it also has important effects upon leftist parties' future growth and developmental trajectories. Strategic moderation is a necessary but insufficient requisite for ideological moderation: accepting the rules of the game shortens the ideological distance within a leftist party by sidelining radicals and replacing "socialism" and other idealistic socio-economic goals with "democracy" and tangible, incremental social and political rights.

Chapter 4: Bureaucratic Obstacles: Party Building as Institutional Survival

That parties will necessarily engage in institutionalization is a common assumption. But, "[o]rganization building does not come naturally or automatically to political actors. It is a difficult, time-consuming, costly, and often risky enterprise" (Kalyvas 1996, p 41). All else being equal, if parties do not need to extend their limited time and resources, chances are that they will not. Conversely, if parties feel compelled to sink roots into society, construct a party apparatus, and work more as a unified team for their own survival, then they are *more likely* to engage in party building.[153] The hurdles to party legalization and electoral participation implemented by outgoing military dictatorships to thwart the nascent political left unintentionally created the incentive to do exactly this: early bureaucratic challenges encouraged nascent leftist parties, such as Brazil's PT (and Uruguay's FA), to construct their organizations and streamline their ability to make and enforce decisions. This strengthened these parties' adaptability, increasing their ability to adapt to changing external challenges.

Once repression had been (mostly) forsworn—be it for the sake of appearances or because changing power dynamics meant that state terror was no longer a policy option—military dictatorships in Latin America began instead to employ arbitrary and unreasonable rules and regulations to make success difficult for leftist parties. Paradoxically, this encouraged, amongst other things, the development of an effective and

[153] Whether or not this "need" translates into action is another story, as necessity does not always bring about change; this author merely contends that this need makes it more likely that party building will occur. See, for example, the recent literature on the dysfunctionality of institutions within the historical institutionalism literature (i.e. Thelen 2003)

disciplined party structure and a reliance upon democratic centralism over consensus as the basis behind decision-making mechanisms so that the party could react and respond quickly to external threats. Later on, such majoritarian decision-making mechanisms helped parties moderate, as dramatic institutional change often occurs thanks to disciplined leadership and effective decision-making (Grzymala-Busse 2002). Leftist parties that were not subjected to such challenges from authoritarian regimes, such as Peru's IU and Venezuela's LCR, had little need to institutionalize and, thus, did so to a far lesser extent, if at all (and, at a far slower rate). The result was an inability to engage in party adaptation. In this way, party structure and organization have important consequences for a party's ideological and institutional change (cf. Seawright 2012, ch 7; Kitschelt 1989).

This chapter explains the causal mechanisms at play whereby bureaucratic requirements imposed by outgoing authoritarian regimes encouraged new leftist parties to institutionalize, leading to party professionalization and thus facilitating later party adaptation. It first explicates in depth the theory, introduced in Chapter 2, explaining how and why such early challenges make party building a question of survival, instead of a seemingly unnecessary activity not worth its initial costs. Next, it explains the hurdles implemented by the Brazilian authoritarian regime and demonstrates how they encouraged the PT to institutionalize. Following that, it then shows how the lack of such challenges played out for IU and then LCR, neither of which engaged in party building; the ensuing lack of a professional party apparatus thwarted both parties' attempts at adaptation in the future. The chapter concludes with a few words on the importance of these birth pains on leftist parties' futures.

BUREAUCRATIC REQUIREMENTS

As parties diversify strategies and pursue a broader electorate, they become impelled to build, amongst other things, a routinized organizational machine, establish a hierarchy of offices, and train cadres (cf. Müller and Strøm 1999). Indeed, they cannot hope to remain viable in the long term without the support of a professionalized party apparatus. Organizational capacity, a bureaucratic structure, centralized chains of command, and disciplined decision-making and -enforcing mechanisms are needed to address head-on the internal and external challenges that parties will inevitably face; weakly institutionalized parties are simply not up to the task (Kitschelt 1989). Indeed, only those parties that had professionalized were adaptable enough to be able to respond successfully to the transitions to democracy and market economics. Since radical change, such as that needed to effect party adaptation, is generally the province of strong, centralized leadership and not diffuse power (cf. Share 1999), leftist parties must engage in party-building if they are to adapt successfully when the electorate rewarded it.

The problem, however, is that this worthwhile process is excessively costly—both economically and electorally—in the short run. Members and activists must be located, recruited, and trained. Local, regional, and national offices and branches must be built, furnished, and staffed. Resources to pay salaries and logistics must be sought, secured, and routinized. Rules and procedures governing lines of responsibility and decision-making must be developed, agreed upon, and formalized. This is much to ask, especially for an externally mobilized party, a party with limited—if any—access to state spoils and characterized by limited resources and short terms horizons (cf. Shefter 1993). As such, it is only natural for parties to put off such actions until they are absolutely necessary, or at least until the party has begun winning administrative government positions (Harmel and Janda 1994).

Complicating such efforts is a collective action problem that must be overcome: all else equal, individual politicians prefer not to have to compromise or share power either with other politicians or with their own political party. Party building involves institutionalizing decision-making and decision-enforcement procedures and mechanisms, at the expense of politicians' whims and personal freedom. This process of centralization and institutionalization is far more likely to occur when parties are subjected to strong external challenges, particularly early on in their institutional life.

Along this line, Levitsky and Way (2010) argue that "bonds of solidarity forged out of periods of violent struggle are perhaps the most robust source of [party] cohesion" (p 65). Similarly, Allison (2012) shows that warring factions and component organizations within the FSLN, the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (*Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional*, FMLN), and the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (*Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca*, URNG) put their internal differences over membership, preferred strategies and tactics, and analyses of social conditions aside when confronted by external challenges. Authoritarian repression in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala, respectively, generated strong pressures for these groups to unify into well organized, centralized political parties able to withstand future challenges (p 13).[154]

In a similar vein, authoritarian regimes in Latin America inadvertently helped solve this problem by increasing the benefits of institutionalization so much with their bureaucratic meddling that the process's short-term costs were no longer that onerous in comparison to the costs of not acting (i.e., the inability to legalize, the disbanding of the party). On their way out, many of Latin America's authoritarian regimes created legal

[154] However, Allison also notes that an end to the pressing challenges—i.e., negotiated settlements in the cases of the FMLN and URNG, and electoral defeat in the case of the FSLN—led to a partial fracturing of these party coalitions. Nonetheless, without that early pain, those parties would not have ever been unified in the first place.

obstacles to deter upstart leftist parties as a last-ditch effort to support authoritarian successor parties of the right and stave off their own political irrelevance (and potential persecution for human rights violations). To ensure success, parties on the right were, in a sense, "helped" by the outgoing regime in order that the parties on the left would not win "by an overwhelming majority" (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, p 62).

These rules and regulations—from excluding the left from transitional pacts to erecting onerous bureaucratic hurdles for party registration to limiting the availability of public funds—ended up having profound effects because they occurred during these new parties' formative years, when the newly formed parties were inchoate and malleable. Such challenges threatened the very survival of these parties and ended up having an indelible influence on their developmental trajectory. In this way, institutional survival trumped ideological positioning; failure to do so would have risked the unity (and thus strength) of the "party at siege."[155] For instance, Chile's PS gradually abandoned deliberation and pluralism[156] in favor of "Leninist norms of democratic centralism in its organizational life" in the late 1970s and early 1980s; such a mechanism ended up helping years later with the party's top-down ideological transformation and institutional maturation (Roberts 1998, p 102).

With democracy approaching, leftist parties felt that they *could* eventually win, in spite of the still-tilted "playing field," and thus were willing to accept the unfair existing rules of the game in order to compete. To this end, parties responded to these challenges by sinking roots into society and strengthening their capacity to mobilize voters; developing a bureaucratic structure that provided stable, valued, and recurring patterns of behavior (cf. Huntington 1968, p 12); creating a professional corps of full-time party

[155] Without legal recognition, parties do not have access to state resources budgeted to political parties. They also are unable to field candidates for public office, limiting access to indirect state rents via political appointments. Lacking such resources can easily spell the demise of a fledgling party.

[156] During its *transformative* years under the authoritarian dictatorship, not its formative years, to be sure.

workers to allow them to engage simultaneously in a variety of different tasks; and establishing greater organizational coherence by delineating clear lines of horizontal and vertical accountability. This led to the gradual construction of a disciplined leadership structure that streamlined decision-making mechanisms and strengthened decision-enforcement mechanisms so that the party could adapt quickly to future threats.

The short-term consideration of institutional survival had long-term repercussions: parties forced upon this party-building trajectory were more likely to adapt successfully when the need arose, thanks to the organizational structures and decision-making mechanisms they had adopted earlier. The combination of centralized leadership with majoritarian decision-making and effective enforcement mechanisms strengthened adaptability, enabling these parties to avoid the factionalist gridlock and schismatic tendency that often plague leftist parties as they try to engage in adaptation: hierarchical rigidity ensures that ideologues cannot just do as they please (cf. Kitschelt 1989).

Conversely, those parties that faced no pressing need to build an organized, bureaucratized, centralized party apparatus never built one. Parties that came about within the relative safety of democratic or soft authoritarian contexts had the "privilege" to be able to put off party-building and engage in the more normatively-valued (by the left) process of deliberative democracy, instead of adopt more disciplined, majoritarian-based mechanisms of decision-making. Some such parties—such as Venezuela's LCR and Peru's IU—went so far as to embrace consensus-based decision-making norms and rules; given the difficulties in reaching consensus, such mechanisms are anathema to adaptation since those who benefit from the status quo have every incentive to block reforms that would affect their privileged position as veto players.

In this way, leftist parties that were subjected to legal hurdles during their formative years developed a more disciplined party structure than those that did not;

given their earlier institutionalization and centralization efforts, they were thus more able to professionalize and engage in party adaptation if and when needed. The next section traces this process, whereby bureaucratic hurdles helped force the PT to institutionalize early in its history.

THE PT: LEGALIZATION OBSTACLES ENCOURAGE PARTY BUILDING

On its way out, Brazil's authoritarian regime worked to ensure that re-emerging left parties would participate at a disadvantage vis-à-vis authoritarian successor and centrist-establishment parties in the re-opened democratic political arena. In particular, high barriers to entry for new parties sought to discourage leftist parties from forming and complicate their efforts at vying for public office. As a new leftist party, the PT was negatively affected by this rule: at the very onset of its existence, the inchoate organization was forced to accomplish a series of onerous bureaucratic tasks within a short period of time if it were to become a legal party. Participating in this very process, however, ended up forcing the PT along an institutionalization trajectory that culminated in its transformation into a well-organized, centralized, majoritarian party (cf. Keck 1991). This positioned the PT to be able to engage in party adaptation in the 1990s, when external conditions (i.e., the "Americanization" of Latin American elections) rewarded parties that professionalized their organizations. The next three subsections detail the specific barriers to entry, the ensuing process of party building, and the culminating party professionalization of the PT, respectively.

Barriers to Entry

On 22 November 1979, Brazil's outgoing authoritarian regime promulgated legislation that disbanded the two officially sanctioned parties, ARENA and the MDB[157] and established onerous criteria for registering new parties, thus reestablishing the country's multiparty system.[158] Legalization consisted, in part, of completion of the following requirements of the Organic Law of Political Parties (*Lei Orgânica de Partidos Políticos*, Rule 6,767 of 20 December 1979):

> a) Creation of a manifesto, program, and party statute, as well as the election of a seven-to-eleven -member Provisional National Executive Committee (*Comissão Diretora Nacional Provisória*, CDNP), by at least 101 founders.
>
> b) Designation by the CDNP of seven-to-eleven -member Provisional Regional Executive Committees (*Comissões Diretoras Regionais Provisórias*, CDRP) in at least nine states. Designation by the CDRPs (with the authorization of the CDNP) of three-to-eleven -member Provisional Municipal Executive Committees (*Comissões Diretoras Municipais Provisórias*, CDMP) in at least one-fifth of the municipalities in their respective states.
>
> c) Completion of numerous bureaucratic requirements to obtain provisional registration.
>
> - Within twelve months of obtaining provisional registration, the party must:
>
> d) Hold municipal conventions in at least one-fifth of the municipalities of at least nine states in order to choose municipal directorates and elect delegates to regional conventions.
>
> e) Hold regional conventions in at least nine states to choose regional directorates and elect delegates to the national convention.
>
> f) Hold a national convention to choose the national directorate.
>
> g) Approve the party statute and program at all conventions; there are specific rules governing how these conventions should function, too.[159]

[157] For information on Brazil's top-down-mandated bipartisan years, see Alves (1984) and Reis (1978).

[158] AI-2 had disbanded all of Brazil's preexisting parties and mandated the creation of two parties, one pro-regime and one opposition. See Alves (1984).

[159] Skromov (1980) and Farias (1980). In reality, the PT had to take into account numerous laws governing party legalization, including: the Reorganization of Political Parties Law *(Lei de Reorganização dos Partidos Políticos*), the unrevoked articles from the former Organic Law of Political Parties, as well as resolutions and regulations from both the Superior Electoral Court (*Tribunal Superior Eleitoral*, TSE)

Formal registration is so important not only because it enables a party to contest elections; it also provides it with all the official rights and public resources guaranteed a party.[160]

This rule did not explicitly target leftist parties, per se; however, it did only affect externally mobilized parties, i.e., parties that formed outside of the halls of the legislature, usually by individuals or groups excluded from power.[161] If an organization counted at least ten percent of Brazil's Congress among its own, then it automatically could legalize as a party without having to go through any of the bureaucratic hurdles (Skromov, 1980). Given the fact that the outgoing authoritarian regime had outlawed leftist political parties and only permitted a centrist opposition party (the MDB) to participate politically, this law *did* end up specifically targeting the Brazilian left. Indeed, after having to disband, the regime's ARENA party automatically set up an authoritarian successor party, the Social Democratic Party (*Partido Democrático Social*, PDS); likewise, the MDB merely[162] added the word "Party" to its name, became the *Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro* (PMDB), and legalized easily.[163]

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and regional electoral courts (*Tribunais Regionais Eleitorais*) (cf. PT 1980).

160 Public funds are important for the growth and survival of political parties. Relatedly, Kathleen Bruhn (2012) argues that public financing of parties encourages organizational development in the largest parties (which subsequently stabilizes the party system).

161 Martin Shefter defines externally mobilized parties as those that are "established by leaders who do not occupy positions of power in the prevailing regime and who seek to bludgeon their way into the political system by mobilizing and organizing a mass constituency" (1994, p 5).

162 While the process was relatively easy, most MDB members were vehemently against the dissipation of their party (cf. *Jornal do Brasil* 1979).

163 The Popular Party (*Partido Popular*, PP), a centrist party composed of dissident ARENA and MDB politicians, also automatically formed in the early months on 1980. The party opted to incorporate itself into the PMDB less than two years later because of another bureaucratic obstacle erected by the outgoing military dictatorship: in the package of electoral reforms imposed by the regime in the run-up to the 1982 elections, a clause was included that prohibited party coalitions ("*coligações*") and mandated the "tied vote" ("*voto vinculado*"), meaning that electors could not split their vote. Rather than see the opposition vote diluted—undoubtedly the regime's intention—the PP opted to subsume itself into the PMDB. Author interview with PT founder and former mayor of Porto Alegre (1997-2000) Raul Pont (24 March 2011).

The process of legalization was more complicated for the left. Preexisting leftist parties had a more difficult time registering themselves. The military regime meddled in the internal power struggle over who would control the soon-to-be re-founded Brazilian Labor Party (*Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro*, PTB), the party of former president Getúlio Vargas (1930-1945, 1951-1954). Looking to weaken the once-popular party, General Golbery do Couto e Silva threw the regime's support behind Ivete Vargas, Getúlio's niece, instead of the far-more popular Leonel Brizola; the TSE sided with Ivete, forcing Brizola to found a new leftist party, the PDT, and thus dividing the once-powerful party name from a potential leftist threat.[164] Given the historical strength of the PTB, however, both parties were able to legalize rather easily: preexisting leftist structures and organizations had been targeted by state repression, but never *entirely* destroyed.[165]

Such restrictions constituted an enormous obstacle to the nascent PT.[166] In addition to having to contend with the troubles of constructing a party from scratch, the party also had to focus on institutionalizing itself right away, from its founding moments. The "fight for legalization" became the "central task" of the PT's construction, taking precedence over all else, including ideological debates (da Conceição 1980, p 3). For the PT, fulfilling these requirements became a question of "institutional survival" (Falcão

[164] Brizola, the informal leader of the then-underground PTB in the late 1970s, was a paradigmatic case of a repressed leftist who experienced ideological renovation in exile and helped steer his party toward the ideological center. He initially tried to organize an armed uprising in Brazil during his early years of exile, in neighboring Uruguay, only later to embrace democracy and the pro-democratic ideas of Euro-communism (Ribeiro nd).

[165] Brizola and his PDT were the PT's major leftist competitor throughout the 1980s. However, Lula gradually outshone Brizola—culminating in his edging out of the veteran candidate in the 1989 presidential election—in large part because of Brizola's hesitance to embrace the new unionists. The PDT became viewed less and less favorably by organized labor and social movements and resembled more and more a populist electoral vehicle for Brizola. Author interview with former mayor of Porto Alegre and former governor of Rio Grande do Sul Olívio Dutra (24 March 2011). In contrast, the centrist PMDB readily embraced the new unionists and often spoke out on their behalf (cf. Guimarães 1980).

[166] The PCB and the PC do B were only able to legalize in 1985. The PCB was wracked by internal infighting between a growing group of Eurocommunism followers and Luiz Carlos Prestes, as well as by continued harassment by the military regime (Prestes 1980, *Folha de S.Paulo* 1980, Pandolfi 1995). The government's *Diário Oficial* refused to publish its statute—one of the Organic Law's prerequisites—over concern that the party was still linked to external governments (*Correio Braziliense* 1984, *Folha de S.Paulo* 1984).

1984) since it could not rely upon earlier partisan organizations and structures: “the PT only survived because it was capable of resisting the impediments created by the regime” (Weffort 1984a).

Institutionalization by Force

The PT opted to work tirelessly to affiliate members and fulfill these time-sensitive requirements, on risk of its future existence: “Neither internal debates nor the campaign for the organization of the workers can serve to distract attention from the task of obtaining the party registry in the electoral courts” (CDNP 1980). To this end, the party published a small booklet, *Legalize the PT, now* (Farias 1980), explaining the importance of legalization and a play-by-play of how the party could accomplish the regime's dictates in the least amount of time possible. It also published a 27-page manual with 45 steps and 18 annexes detailing how precisely to construct a party directorate, the regime's mandated partisan structure (PT 1980; see Appendix B).

In this way, the PT was forced to quickly write up a concise party platform and statutes, despite the difficulty in ever reaching consensus over the party's ideological nature. According to Clovis Bueno de Azevedo (1995), the PT's political proposals are an “inconsistent mix, a contradictory combination of leninist and social-democratic theses” (p 147): the party never spent its limited resources and capital on hashing out formal responses to the ideological questions that plague most leftist parties. Indeed, the fact that the PT never adopted a unitary theoretical matrix may help explain the party's ability to engage in ideological moderation down the line: the party's ideology had always been flexible. Likewise, the PT was forced to open up party headquarters all over the country and develop a national scope, despite the party's regional nature: the bulk of the PT's

support came from within Metropolitan São Paulo.[167] Equally important was affiliating members into the party, an arduous campaign given the party's lack of resources, but one that, according to PT founder and later party president Ricardo Berzoini, "really helped party members become activists; it helped create the party brand."[168] These processes beget a virtuous cycle of party growth that continues to this day.

To legalize, the PT engaged in party building efforts throughout the country, although it grew the fastest in the states of Acre, Amazonas, Bahia, Ceará, Espírito Santo, Goiás, Maranhão, Mato Grosso do Sul, Minas Gerais, Piauí, Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grande do Norte, Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina, and, of course, São Paulo; the PT had established CDRPs in all of these states by December 1980 (Meneguello 1989 p 74; Weffort 1983b). The next stage (d) proved exceedingly difficult, due to the large number of municipalities in Brazil's larger states: in São Paulo, for instance, the PT had to hold municipal conventions in least 114 directorates. However, the party did end up establishing 203 by the 1982 election and, "without a doubt, this partisan infrastructure, concentrated mostly in the capital [city of São Paulo], guaranteed a certain contingent of militancy available for the electoral campaign of 1982" (Meneguello 1989 p 75).

While, initially, it was just adhering to the rules to be granted the right to register, these bureaucratic requirements ended up taking a life of their own and *changing* the party's goals and strategies (Skromov et al. 1983). These bureaucratic obstacles not only forced the PT to institutionalize when, under less challenging circumstances, it would have put off until later such tasks; they also ended up molding the PT into a distinctly

[167] In the 1982 elections, the first elections that the PT participated in, the party won 9.9 percent of the vote in São Paulo State, with almost 18 percent of those votes (203,533) coming from São Paulo's "ABCD" region: Santo André, São Bernardo do Campo, São Caetano do Sul, and Diadema (PT 1982). Nationally, it only won 1.67 percent of the votes for the Chamber of Deputies, translating into a mere eight seats, six of which were from the state of São Paulo: Airton Soares, Bete Mendes, Djalma Bom, Eduardo Suplicy, Irma Passoni, and José Genoino.

[168] Author interview (8 November 2010).

bureaucratic, centrally organized, majoritarian party. Such a model was far from what the PT's founders had envisioned when they set about to create a party in the late 1970s.

In particular, *petistas* had initially envisioned a horizontally-organized party characterized by a bottom-up leadership structure (Keck 1991; Meneguello 1989 pp 91-99). This took the form of party "base nuclei" (*núcleos de base*), local party headquarters that were a "combination of a primary cell for internal party deliberation with a window to connect to the masses"; nuclei were informal groups of militants that 1) dialogue regularly with social movements, debate issues, and contribute directly to the party's guidelines, and then, 2) discuss and apply these guidelines within the social realm (Gushiken 1990). According to the PT's Statutes (articles 35-37), a nucleus is a small group of party affiliates organized by neighborhood, place of work, social movement, professional category, and place of study, among others; it is considered a place of partisan democratic organization and political education. In other words, nuclei would dialogue with social groups to generate ideas, which were then sent up to state- and then national-level offices to be aggregated into official party policy; nuclei would thus serve as the conduit between party and society to divulge and promote the party policies at the local level.

Nuclei were really the essence of what would make the PT so different from other Brazilian parties (and most Latin American parties, for that matter): policy was to be decided from the bottom up. According to long-time national PT leader Luiz Gushiken (1990), the PT was to be a

> party of the poor; a bit informal—somewhere in between movement and institution, with a hint of anarchy in the dominance of the nuclei over the leadership; a party of the street, of the square, of the factory, of the schoolyard, of the fight, of the protest, and of the struggle.

Nuclei were responsible for collaborating with preexisting social movements and groups to formulate the PT national program beginning from the party's base (Passoni 1981). It was nuclei that would enable the PT to grow and function as a horizontal, diffuse organization.

However, the partisan legislation dictated the establishment of party directorates (*diretórios*). The administrative organ of all political parties in Brazil, directorates are vertically-organized organizations defined by top-down power relations (Meneguello 1989). Such organs are designed to hierarchicalize diffuse groups and replicate national, bureaucratic party structures at the local and state level; given their vertical nature, directorates are also adept at streamlining decision-making as decisions mandated from above can be efficiently sent down a clearly delineated chain of command. An early example of how the PT initially ran itself was with the administration of Fortaleza mayor Maria Luiza Fontenele (1986-1989). Considered by virtually the entire party (as well as much of Brazil) as a failure, Fontenele's administration was characterized by chaos and gridlock. According to PT founder and mayor of Belo Horizonte (2002-2008) Fernando Pimentel, she ran her city "like a Paris commune: in order to make any decision she first convened an assembly of the entire party's [Fortaleza] delegates."[169] Fontinele was an ultra radical, Maoist *petista*; according to Antônio Lassance, special advisor in the personal cabinet of President Lula, the "traumatic experience" of having her represent the party convinced the PT's pragmatic wing of the importance of sidelining radical factions and ensuring that party moderates are supported in internal primaries.[170]

Unwilling to break with its idealistic nature, yet unable to ignore the bureaucratic dictates of the authoritarian regime, the PT opted to try to construct and maintain both

[169] Author interview (5 November 2010).
[170] Author interview (5 October 2010).

simultaneously. However, it merely sought to fulfill the bureaucratic requirements on paper, leaving the true power diffuse, in the hands of local party militants. PT national leader Luiz Gushiken (1990) also argued that, in spite of the dictatorship's pressure to create parties in the "classical mold of parties with institutional and parliamentary cadres," the PT nonetheless stayed true to its origins. It continued to open and rely upon nuclei, keep internal party conflicts within the party (as opposed to appealing to the relevant "bourgeois" institutions established to resolve such conflicts, such as electoral tribunals), and substitute the dictatorship's style of decision-making mechanisms with the PT's own "alive, vigorous, broad—and sometimes tedious, time-consuming, and tumultuous—processes, which were more able to ensure a minimum form of internal democracy" (p 10). However, such an analysis was either wishful thinking or excessively optimistic: it is unclear for how long this compromise lasted, or if it did at all. The problem was that, unlike the directorates, nuclei were not seen as legitimate in the eyes of the state and were thus never legally recognized as official party organs (Skromov 1980, p 2).

The regime's dictates took a life of their own as the party ended up almost ignoring the nuclei and developing into a majoritarian party based primarily around the directorates. According to PT founder and former high-ranking member Ricardo de Azevedo, "The [party] legislation of the regime assisted with this defeat of internal democracy."[171] Furthermore, according to PT founder Markus Sokol, "This legalization process was beneficial in that it helped nationalize the party; however, it also made it very bureaucratic and heavy...it forged the internal mechanisms of the party."[172] Due arguably in large part to the fact that their external legality empowered them with internal legitimacy, directorates slowly but surely supplanted the role of nuclei. Militants from the

[171] Author interview (3 February 2011).
[172] Author interview (12 August 2010).

PT publication *Worker's Cause* (*Jornal Causa Operária*) lamented this development and sought, in vain, for ways to "overcome the antidemocratic structure imposed [upon the PT] by the partisan legislation of the military regime" (*Jornal Causa Operária* 1981).

The nature of the regime's rules favored the creation of a centralized, highly majoritarian party, which is exactly what ended up becoming of the PT, despite its initial plans to the contrary.[173] Another factor contributing to the PT's bureaucratization was the party's decision to phase out national meetings ("encontros") and rely more on congresses ("congressos"); the latter started to resolve those issues whose responsibility initially resided with nuclei.[174] Slowly but surely, the party developed into what the Brazilian news magazine *Época* called a "company" in its in-depth article, "Uma Empresa Chamada PT" (Mendonça and Nunes 2004). By 2004, the party had 5,352 directorates, over four times the number of McDonalds franchises in Brazil; but the directorates only tell part of the story of the party's professionalization. A party that once relied upon volunteer labor transformed into a highly structured organization with a highly specialized, full-time staff and boasting its own center for conducting opinion polls, interest groups, and in-depth voter surveys. The PT's Nucleus of Public Opinion (*Núcleo de Opinião Pública*, NOP) was established in 1997 to better understand public opinion. In preparation for the 2002 presidential campaign, NOP director Gustavo Venturi conducted 20 focus groups in state capitals to understand what voters thought of Lula and what he should do to become more electable; the result was "Lula lite" (a beardless, less-menacing-looking politician with softer corners and a less radical rhetoric).[175]

Furthermore, the party has developed its own exclusive system of data transmission to keep its directorates connected, similar to those used by large banks. It

[173] Author interviews with PT founder and former high-ranking member Valério Arcary (20 August 2010) and PT founder José Moisés (17 August 2010).
[174] Author interview with PT founder and former federal deputy Clovis da Silva (22 March 2011).
[175] Author interview with PT pollster and campaign consultant Gustavo Venturi (13 August 2010).

has a 0800 number to solicit campaign materials, make up to 20,000 robocalls per day, and engage in voter intention surveys for the PT's 30 most important campaigns. Furthermore, the PT allegedly has the name, address, and telephone number of each and every one of its over 650,000 party affiliates (Mendonça and Nunes 2004).

Party Professionalization, Party Adaptation

This costly party-building process had a huge pay-off: party institutionalization helped lead to party growth. According to Athos Pereira, PT founder and chief of staff of the PT Leadership in the Chamber of Deputies, it also helped "decide once and for all the debate between whether the PT should be a cadre-based party or a mass party" and grounded the party: during their affiliation drives and efforts to establish party headquarters, activists were surprised at how little the general public cared about the activists' exiles or formal political ideologies.[176] Arlete Sampaio, former vice-governor of the Brasília, claims that the task of canvassing neighborhoods to affiliate members also led to personal transformation. Speaking of her own experience, she argues that the process of building the party resulted in "doctrine coming into conflict with reality:" listening to the needs of the people made her rethink her former policy prescriptions.[177]

The PT grew from 29,000 affiliates in May 1980 to 300,000 in September 1981, an increase of 1,000 percent (PT Secretaria Nacional de Organização 1985) and eventually became Brazil's most structured party, boasting an enormous party bureaucracy, resource base, and professionalized staff.[178] Three years after its founding, the party enjoyed the support of ten percent of the electorate, according to a Gallup poll,

[176] Author interview (20 September 2010).
[177] Author interview (18 October 2010).
[178] According to PT founder and former secretary-general Francisco Weffort, the legalization campaign was directly responsible for the party's ability to train a corps of militants, create grassroots organizations, and engage in a strong "ground game." Author interview (15 July 2010).

making the PT Brazil's third largest party in terms of national preferences (*Jornal do Brasil* 1983). More importantly, though, party building helped professionalize the PT, thus enabling it to engage in party adaptation down the line.

Bureaucratic obstacles put in place by the authoritarian regime fundamentally altered the PT;[179] they forced an otherwise weakly institutionalized party into institutionalizing and constructing a distinctly professional party.[180] The PT always remained an internally democratic party. However, its majoritarian nature, coupled with its disciplined, centralized leadership structure, has made it a surprisingly top-down party: once you win the party leadership, the PT is yours to mold. PT founder Mariucha Fontana, who was expelled from the party along with the rest of the Socialist Convergence (*Convergência Socialista*, CS) in 1992, claims that, since the early 1990s,

> the PT does not have any internal democracy....Lula does what he wants. He has much more weight than the [institution that is] the PT. The 'base' does not order anything. Who runs the show is the party leadership. The PT changed its internal structure so that the leadership holds absolute control of the party. There are no nuclei nor debates at the base.[181]

Internal decision-making rests squarely at the top of the party.[182] Indeed, these strict majoritarian rules allowed for substantial change: by winning (often with little more than a simple majority of the vote[183]) and holding onto the party's leadership, ex-

[179] While trying to legalize, the party simultaneously had to deal with the campaign to reverse the condemnation of eleven labor leaders (including Lula), charges allegedly pursued with the intention of undermining the nascent PT. Author interview with former guerrilla and PT founder Markus Sokol (12 August 2010).

[180] Author interviews with Brazilian intellectual and former mid-ranking PT official Cláudio Gonçalves Couto (30 May 2011) and PT founder and high-ranking party cadre Adeli Sell (22 March 2011).

[181] Author interview (10 May 2011).

[182] The PT's pragmatic majority accomplished this not only by expelling unruly tendencies, but also by outlawing the existence of independent bases and journals amongst the party's factions, a policy that was used more and more in the 1990s. Author interview with PT federal deputy Luciana Genro, who was expelled (along with Babá and Heloísa Helena) from the party in 2003 (24 March 2011).

[183] The PT tendency Popular Power and Socialism (*Poder Popular e Socialismo*, PPS; this later becomes Socialist Side, *Vertente Socialista*, VS) put forth the motion in the early 1990s that party leadership

President Lula's pragmatist *Articulação* faction was able to steer the party, top-down, through profound transformations to conform better to the changing nature of the Brazilian electorate in the 1990's and 2000's. According to party intellectual Candido Mendes, Lula's position as de facto party leader was never seriously challenged (minor challengers included Plínio de Arruda Sampaio in the 1990s, Tarso Genro in the wake of the Mensalão scandal, and Eduardo Suplicy in 2002) because, given the party's background (as well as Brazil's geographic distribution of power), a new leader would have to come from São Paulo and be a unionist. Given the corporatist nature of Brazil's unions, no potential opposition could arise. Additionally, given his personality, Lula has always been adept at turning potential competitors into his own managers.[184]

The most visible manifestation of this change was in 2001, with the so-called Process of Direct Elections (*Processo de Eleições Diretas*, PED) reform, which altered the PT's statute and instituted direct membership elections for party president and leaders of national, state, and municipal directorates (prior to this, the party president and national directorate were chosen by delegates from the national conventions). While sold as a way to increase internal democracy,[185] the move was widely regarded as a way to further enable the party leadership, controlled by a core of pragmatic moderates for

should be based on proportional representation, not majoritarianism. This, according to PPS founder and several term PT federal deputy Eduardo Jorge, was just one of many failed attempts to "get the PT out of its Stalinist mindset." Author interview (23 August 2010).

184 Author interview (13 April 2011). The one close call was in 1994, when the PT's leftists revolted against the Articulação, banded together, and gained a majority of votes for party president. Rui Falcão, the leader of the leftist tendency, Time of Truth (*Hora de Verdade*), served as interim party president and was elected Lula's campaign manager for the 1994 presidential election, in which the PT's campaign and rhetoric were considered exceptionally radical. For instance, in March of 1994, Rui Falcão wrote an op-ed for the *Folha de S.Paulo* newspaper provocatively entitled "Cats with Gloves do not Catch Rats" ("Gatos con luvas não caçam ratos"), in which he defends the PT's embrace of land reform and the suspension of external debt payments and argues that "for every bit of support that the PT loses among the powerful [by adhering to radical policies and goals], it gains thousands of followers from workers, small business owners...and, principally, those who are excluded." Falcão still posits that the 1994 campaign was a failure not because it was too radical, but, rather, that it was *too moderate*. Author interview (17 February 2011).

185 Senator Cristovam Buarque, the main sponsor of this proposal (along with Eduardo Suplicy), asserts that its primary purpose was to increase dismantle the party's bureaucratic machine and increase internal democracy. Author interview (9 November 2010).

virtually the party's entire existence, to impose its will by circumventing party militants and organized factions—especially those averse to party adaptation—within the party by appealing directly to the PT's rank and file (Hunter 2010, pp 39-40). According to former PT president (2005-2006, 2007-2010) Ricardo Berzoini, this move sharpened lines of authority and further centralized the party's leadership, allowing it to operate less constrained by the more radical holdout—found mostly in the party's middle—that sought ideological purity and rejected any form of institutional change; the result was the top-down change desired by the party's top (the CEN) and bottom (mass membership).[186] This move helped sideline even the directorates; according to PT founder and former party intellectual Francisco de Oliveira, the party's power now lies squarely in the CEN at the expense of party militants (thanks to the party's majoritarian structure).[187]

Even so, strict majoritarianism and party centralization had begun far earlier. Citing the rationale behind the PT's early adoption of majoritarianism, PT founder, former party president, and six-tem federal deputy José Genoino claims, "When the collective decides democratically upon a position you can demonstrate against it, make criticisms, but you have to vote together. You can rebel against it, but the vote is the bond of the pact" (quoted in Coelho 2007, p 402). From the beginning, the nuclei-directorate debate had created tension between the party's core leadership, centered in São Paulo, and other groups, over the proper venue of intra-party contestation. One side effect of this debate was the founding of the Articulation of the 113 faction (*Articulação dos 113*), a group of approximately 113 party members, all from São Paulo, who sought to create a unified leadership that could rise above the problems arising from having the heterodox group of individuals that is the PT simultaneously filling two parallel party structures: nuclei and directorates (de Souza et al 1983). As the members were mostly from the

[186] Author interview (8 November 2010).
[187] Author interview (3 March 2011).

leadership ranks of unions and base ecclesiastic communities, the faction's outlook was quite pragmatic. Ultimately victorious and serving as the archetype for the PT's future governing, hegemonic, centrist faction, the *Articulação*,[188] the *Articulação dos 113* was the first pass toward sidelining party militants and centralizing power in the hands of the party's leadership (cf. Dirceu 1985).

Relatedly, the party's centralized nature allowed it to exert tight controls over party membership. Those who refused to sign off on the leadership's desired policy moderation were expelled, a particularly effective way of dealing with internal contradictions and ensuring adaptation. In 1990, the PT expelled the Trotskyist faction Worker's Cause (*Causa Operária*, CO) over its rejection of the PT's decision to engage in cross-party alliances; the group went on to form the Worker's Cause Party (*Partido da Causa Operária*, PCO).[189] Two years later, the PT expelled the CS for opposing the PT's moderate stance vis-a-vis Brazil's impeached center-right president, Fernando Collor de Mello; the group went on to form the United Socialist Workers' Party (*Partido Socialista dos Trabalhadores Unificado*, PSTU).[190] In 2005, the PT expelled the Socialist Popular Action tendency (*Ação Popular Socialista*, APS) for refusing to sign off on the PT's "neoliberal" reforms, particularly the 2003 Social Security Reform (*Reforma da Previdência*); the group went on to form the Socialism and Freedom Party (*Partido Socialismo e Liberdade*, PSOL).[191] This process began shortly after the party's foundation: "State deputies and leaders of the PT convinced themselves that its necessary

188 The *Articulação* has changed its name over the years; it has been called United in the Fight (*Unidade na Luta*), Majoritarian Camp (*Campo Majoritário*), and Constructing a New Brazil (*Construindo um novo Brasil*).

189 Author interview with former CO leader, current PCO president, and two-time PCO presidential candidate Rui Costa Pimenta (26 August 2010).

190 Author interviews with former CS leaders and current PSTU leaders Valério Arcary (20 August 2010) and Mariucha Fontana (10 May 2011).

191 Author interview with former APS leader and 2006 PSOL presidential candidate Heloísa Helena (12 January 2011). Leaders of each of these three groups all agreed that the real reason they were expelled from the PT was because they were "holding back" the party from moderating and professionalizing.

to isolate sectarian groups and the small leftist organizations camouflaged inside the party" (*Folha de S.Paulo* 1983).

Control over who can remain in the party is crucial for maintaining control of the party's direction and future trajectory. The PT's centralized leadership preempted many potential internal fights over its top-down program of party adaptation by simply expelling those who opposed change: preemptive damage control. Especially for ideologically-driven parties, changes to party orthodoxy—be it a promise that a PT administration honor all signed agreements with the International Monetary Fund (IMF),[192] or one to override the veto power of party militants—often generate internecine struggles that can rent a party in two, exactly what happened to Peru's IU and Venezuela's LCR.

The PT's colleagues, the PC do B and the PCB, did not follow the same institutionalization path. Neither the former, which was heavily influenced by the Albanian line of communism, nor the latter, which was being torn apart by an internal struggle between the party's ultra radicals (who had close ties with foreign nationals) and more moderate radicals (cf. Prestes 1980, Dias 1985) was able to legalize—both the PCB and the PC do B were outlawed until 1985 (Buonicore unpublished). In this way, legal obstacles did not create the incentive for institutionalization, they prevented any from happening whatsoever. Once the parties were finally allowed to legalize, the onerous but surmountable requirements for legalization had been relaxed. Having "missed out" on the need to institutionalize as a means of self defense, the PCB and the PC do B never felt the need to develop their organizations or professionalize their internal norms and mechanisms. Furthermore, both parties had participated clandestinely in elections in the

[192] Shortly before the 2002 presidential election, Lula wrote his famous "Letter to the Brazilian People." directed at the investment community, that promised to respect the center-right macro-economic policies of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002), pay off the public debt, and balance the budget (Silva 2002).

1970s under the MDB umbrella; this also helped preclude the need for the PCB and PC do B to engage in their own party building.

The institutionalization process, triggered by Brazil's authoritarian regime's efforts to undermine the resurgence of the left, ended up professionalizing the PT and thus preparing it for the party adaptation that proved to be necessary down the line. The PT's centralized leadership, top-down decision-making mechanisms, and internal coherence strengthened the party's adaptability, making possible the otherwise difficult process of engaging in party adaptation. If and where external challenges had not forced the party to develop its organization, this process of institutional and ideological change would have been far more difficult to achieve. Indeed, both Peru's IU and Venezuela's LCR failed in their party adaptation efforts. The next two sections will demonstrate that these parties were unable to adapt because they had never engaged in the relevant party building that would then make possible party adaptation that would be rewarded in the late 1980s and 1990s.

IU: Leftist Encouragement Precludes the Need to Institutionalize

Where leftist parties did not face early challenges there was no incentive to institutionalize. Since a lack of party building limits a party's adaptability, the absence of early challenges for a party complicated its future attempts at adaptation. In Peru, for example, the "revolutionary leftist" authoritarian regime did not look to harass or discourage the growth of leftist parties. Unlike in the rest of the region, Peru's leftist parties emerged from authoritarian rule not only intact, but *stronger* than they had been before. Furthermore, no restrictions were enacted to limit the political participation of radical, non-democratic actors (Sanborn 1991, p 137). Such a context did not bode well

for party institutionalization: IU had it so "easy" that it never felt compelled to institutionalize and so, given party-building's high upfront costs, never did. This lack of professionalization thwarted the party's efforts at adaptation in the late 1980s and early 1990s, complicating the various attempts at top-down change by the party's more pragmatic wing.[193] The next three subsections detail the Peruvian left's growth during the military dictatorship, the lack of restrictions upon participation, and the failed efforts at professionalization (as well as their consequences on the party), respectively.

The Left Flourishes

Unlike in the rest of Latin America, the left in Peru emerged stronger from the period of authoritarian rule in terms of organizational structure, mobilizational capacity, and electoral strength (cf. Huber Stephens 1983; Stokes 1995). Peru's popular sector mobilization flourished under the dictatorship of the armed forces, especially during the first phase of the "revolution" (1968 to 1975), but also from 1975-1980.[194] *Velasquismo* actively promoted social mobilization and tolerated organizing among the partisan left (Roberts 1996); policies implemented by Peru's Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces strengthened the left in a number of different way.

First, the regime harassed and worked to dismantle the left's traditional enemies. In particular, the armed forces sought to weaken the centrist APRA's[195] hold over organized labor, critically curtailing the mobilizational and organizational efficacy of the left's principal electoral competition (Sanborn 1991, p 86).

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[193] This process of early-challenges-leading-to-party-building is exactly what happened with Peru's centrist APRA, a constant target of the military regime that went on to become the country's most robust and institutionalized party throughout the 20th century (cf. Cotler 1995).

[194] As mentioned in Chapter 3, the military ruled Peru from 1968 to 1980. General Juan Velasco governed from 1968 until 1975, when he was deposed by an internal coup and replaced with the more hardline General Francisco Morales Bermúdez (McClintock and Lowenthal 1983).

[195] The APRA was the Peruvian military's archenemy (cf. Cotler 1995).

Second, the regime's sweeping land reform of 1969 dismantled large agricultural estates and transformed them into cooperatives (Chernick 2007). This destroyed the power base of Peru's two traditionally reactionary forces, the agro-oligarchy and the highlands landowners. Coupled with the industrial reform of 1970, which mandated worker representation on companies' boards of directors, the regime encouraged alternative forms of popular organization and fostered the growth and development of militant trade unionism, providing the left with a newly empowered support base in the countryside and in the cities (Sanborn 1991, pp 84-85). According to former guerrilla and high-ranking IU party member Hugo Blanco,

> In my opinion, the Velasco government was the most progressive government that Peru has ever had: he liquidated the semi-feudal *latifundios*; nationalized the mines, oil, fisheries, banks, etc; things that even today none of the 'progressive governments' of South America have done....He freed political prisoners.[196]

The number of recognized unions, a useful proxy for judging the extent of popular sector organization, doubled under Velasco, and continued to grow even after the more exclusionary Morales Bermúdez assumed power; likewise, the number of neighborhood associations surged. At the same time, strike-activity—a good proxy for popular sector mobilization—skyrocketed, as indicated both by the number of strikes and workers involved (see Huber Stephens 1983, pp 61-62). With the help of leftist organizations, labor unions and other popular organizations successfully staged the *gran paro* in 1977, which brought the entire country to a standstill (McClintock 1999). This protest compelled Morales Bermúdez to accelerate the timetable for the military's return to the barracks: a mere nine days later the regime announced the convening of constituent assembly elections for the following year (cf. Lynch 1992, pp 125-147).

[196] Author interview (10 August 2011).

Third, in 1971 the regime set up SINAMOS to organize the popular sectors so that they would be better able to contribute to and take advantage of the country's economic and social development.[197] Through SINAMOS, the government organized agrarian cooperatives, industrial communities, neighborhood organizations, and new unions, while simultaneously linking base-level organizations to the government via intermediate structures (McClintock 1983; Woy-Hazelton 1979). However, while the regime mobilized the left and popular sectors through SINAMOS, it never formed a political party with which to *channel* these forces, leaving the ultra-radical leftist parties to reap the resulting benefits (Stepan 1978b; McClintock and Lowenthal 1983). SINAMOS did nothing to fill the political vacuum it helped build on the left: by declining to form a political party, SINAMOS was unable to create and retain a social basis of support for the regime.[198]

In this way, while the process of mobilizing and organizing the population was a conscious effort by the Velasco regime to bypass the traditional party system and render political parties obsolete (one of the reasons why the military never sought to create a political party itself), by the end of the Velasco period, leftist parties were in a much stronger position than they had been twelve years prior (cf. Roberts 1998). Velasco's toleration of the left, coupled with his embracing of its traditional bases of support, had the unintended consequence of strengthening them. More than just strengthen the left, the "revolutionary leftist" dictatorship arguably also ended up radicalizing the partisan left, since it needed to differentiate itself from Velasquismo: Bernales (1980) argues that many leftists adopted revolutionary leftist ideas and strategies principally to differentiate

197 For information on SINAMOS, see Henry Dietz (1980, part III).

198 As a former Aprista, SINAMOS's founder, Carlos Delgado Olivera, was distrustful of political parties and the process whereby they bureaucratize and become hierarchical. As such, he convinced Velasco to eschew any efforts at institutionalizing SINAMOS as a political party. Author interview with Peruvian military expert Carlos Indacochea (6 September 2011).

themselves from the dictatorship's reformist leftist platform (pp 71-2). Leftists did their part, too: they capitalized on and took advantage of the situation presented to them. Their success can be seen at the ballot box: in 1978, seven small Marxist left and center-left parties won over a third of the seats in the Constituent Assembly (see Table 3.1).

No Restrictions to Participation

Unlike in Latin American countries governed by repressive authoritarianism (cf. O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986), no leftist party, no matter how radical, was excluded from participating in Peru's electoral arena (Sanborn 1991, p 137). A lack of obstacles to party legalization and participation meant that there was no pressure for leftist parties to engage in party building; in particular, there was no incentive to centralize power and streamline decision-making responsibilities. Because of this, IU never coalesced into a modern, professional party, but rather, remained inchoate and its leaders unwilling to put the collective interest over personal interest; as such, IU was unable to effect the top-down party adaptation demanded of it in the late 1980s.

In the late 1970s, Peru's military regime was eager to extricate itself from power. Since the regime had embraced a leftist agenda and much of the partisan left, it had little reason to hold the left back, as Brazil's top military brass had done. Thus, when drafting party legislation, it made the process of legalization straightforward and easy to achieve. D.L 21994, the decree law of 15 November 1977 that modified the Civil Code of 1936, merely required that a political organization gather 40,000 signatures in order to be inscribed in the JNE. Such a demand was not particularly onerous; indeed, all of seven leftist parties[199] quickly formalized and made it onto the 1978 ballot (Bernales 1980).

[199] ARS, Christian Democrats, FOCEP, FNTC, PCP, PSR, and UDP.

In fact, the *opposite* was the case: the outgoing military regime was relatively lenient upon the left, so much so that it imposed few, if any, bureaucratic hurdles in the path of extremist groups. Some leftist groups, such as Shining Path and Red Fatherland, were so radical that they opted for self-exclusion and boycotted the 1980 elections (Bernales 1980, pp 35-36, 53-54). Shining Path was a political organization which, in 1980, burned the ballot boxes in the Department of Ayacucho and began a bloody guerrilla war (cf. Woy-Hazleton and Hazleton 1990) and launched a Maoist-based armed insurrection aimed at overthrowing the Peruvian state, initiating a dictatorship of the proletariat, and guiding Peru—and the world—toward genuine communism (McClintock 1984).[200] Democratic regimes often exercise their right to exclude non-democratic political elements from competing in national elections; surely it should not have let Shining Path be able to choose whether or not it wanted to participate in the country's democratic elections.

The military government and, later, the subsequent democratic government of Fernando Belaúnde (1980-1985), imposed few, if any, unfair rules upon the left to discourage their growth. In this permissive environment, radical discourse, ideology, and actions flourished: witness the rise of Shining Path. The democratic government was slow to respond to the Maoists, at first trying to reimpose order by sending in ill-prepared, untrained, and resource-poor police to fight a violent insurgency (Basombrío 2003, p 158).[201]

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[200] For a definitive analysis of Shining Path's historical origins and development, see Steve Stern (1998), Gustavo Gorriti (2008), and the final report of the Commission of Truth and Reconciliation (CVR 2003, II.1.1).

[201] Belaúnde was rightly wary of relying upon the armed forces, who had just returned to their barracks. When the government finally did respond in a manner fitting to the seriousness and scope of the threat, two years later, it tried to overcompensate to make up for the lost time. It sanctioned the armed forces' use of draconian counterinsurgency tactics that ended up discrediting the state in the eyes of the peasants, undermining their ability to end the armed insurgency in a timely manner by wresting their support away from the peasantry (Chernick 2007; CVR 2003, II.1.3; del Pino 1998).

Also, having won almost thirty percent of the seats in the Constituent Assembly, the Marxist left saw little need to collaborate amongst themselves; they had done just fine divided. This belief was evident in the failure of the left to coordinate their efforts for the 1980 presidential election. A year before, four leftist parties had succeeded in banding together to form the ARI;[202] however, the brokered pact broke down amid bitter internecine quarrels before a single candidate could be chosen (Tanaka 1998). To complicate matters more, the reformist PCP and PSR had also created their own competing pact, Left Unity (*Unidad Izquierda*, UI).[203]

Leftist leaders were incapable of getting past their own sectarianism because there was no pressing need to overcome their differences and work together. In interviews with party leaders, this author struggled to keep straight details of the infighting among the various leftist tendencies that comprised IU. Hugo Blanco was convinced that ARI collapsed because the Maoists could not handle the thought of a Trotskyist like himself leading the Peruvian left. Javier Díez Canseco blamed the breakdown on the personal grudge between Alfonso Barrantes and Blanco. Many claimed that it was all Blanco's fault, as the Fourth International had convinced him to "go it alone" (he was, remember, the third largest vote-getter two years prior) instead of participate in a moderate electoral front with non-Marxists, such as the UDP (cf. Taylor 1990). Finally, nobody wanted to work with the PSR because it had collaborated with the "Nazi" Velasco.[204]

Because IU was not subject to unfair regulations like those imposed in Brazil, institutional development stagnated as the political costs for party building were just too high. Most parties—especially Latin American leftist parties—suffer from populism and

[202] ARI was composed of PCR, UDP, UNIR, and parts of FOCEP.
[203] ARI and UI went on to form IU.
[204] Anecdotes from this paragraph come from author interviews with ex-guerrilla and former presidential candidate Hugo Blanco (10 August 2011) and former PUM leader and current congressman Javier Díez Canseco (2 August 2011).

personalism; however, in other countries, the presence of a common enemy in the form of legal harassment by the prevailing regime created the incentive for such parties to band together, build up their organization, and streamline their decision-making and -enforcing mechanisms. With one's very institutional survival on the line, theoretical disagreements on tactics and ideologies gradually became secondary to practical discussions on how to comply with a regime's ever-changing rules and regulations, often designed specifically to discriminate against the left.

Professionalization, Aborted

Without early challenges in the form of bureaucratic hurdles to confront, IU had no incentive to band together and professionalize; in fact, IU could barely work together at all. Whereas other Latin American leftist parties were building their party apparatus at similar points in their institutional history, the IU could not even unify, much less begin the institutionalization process. Throughout its fifteen years of existence, IU was plagued by problems of coordination such that it took years even to agree to a formal set of party principles: IU remained a loosely bound coalition of parties that were often in bitter disagreement with one another. Preexisting component-parties would run candidates together under the IU logo, but each would maintain its own partisan structure and leader. According to leftist intellectual Héctor Béjar, each of IU's component parties retained their own party infrastructure, from the national level down to the base level, regardless of the actual level of support it held. This meant that, given the hypothetical scenario in which a particular district had only one single FOCEP supporter, that supporter could

then become the party's local party president. Such bureaucratic rules had the effect of strengthening the clout of radical party ideologues.[205]

Spearheaded by relatively moderate[206] leader Alfonso Barrantes, an effort to better unify IU was stifled by the reticence of party radicals who retained unaccountable positions of leadership (UDP-IU 1983).[207] Barrantes, along with his moderate allies (in particular, the PSR, independent politicians, and Henry Pease), advocated a number of reforms aimed primarily at strengthening the party organization and introducing internally democratic measures, but that would also have had the effect of weakening the control of the component parties. He lobbied for a system of party identification cards (*carnetización*) to allow Peruvians not aligned with any of the component parties to be able to join the IU, a move that would recalibrate the base of support from individual parties to the IU itself. Overall, the IU counted on far more non-aligned support than it did on partisan support from its component parties. Likewise, while the IU itself had virtually no presence at the base level, it garnered more support than its component parties ever could, since the latter were, by and large, elite-based parties. The parties were, according to former IU senator, vice-mayor of Lima, and high ranking IU official Henry Pease, "many 'little captains' ('*capitancitos*') lacking soldiers to order around."[208]

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205 Author interview (25 July 2011).

206 Barrantes was seen as the de facto leader of IU's moderate factions; however, his moderation was relative. Indeed, his home office was described to this author as a "Pantheon to Totalitarianism," with large photos not of François Mitterrand or Felipe González, but rather Fidel Castro and Joseph Stalin. Author interview with Peruvian intellectual Alberto Vergara (16 November 2012).

207 For example, FOCEP, IU's smallest party, with virtually no grassroots support, was wary of losing its cushy position of being treated as equal to the larger parties: despite being tiny, FOCEP held 1/8th of the power in the National Directive Committee (*Comité Directivo Nacional*, CDN), just as much as the far-larger PUM, that counted strong support from peasants and intellectuals. However, the PUM itself was generally opposed to the idea of a more unified party. While its leaders would have benefited from a more equitable distribution of power based on base-level support, they were averse to any changes in the status quo which could alter the power dynamics that had been successful at keeping the "reformist" wing of Barrantes at bay. Author interview with IU intellectual Nicolás Lynch (1 August 2011).

208 Author interview (13 July 2011).

According to former IU Senator and CDN member Rolando Ames, Barrantes also pushed, unsuccessfully, to overhaul the CDN's undemocratic selection process, advocating instead internally democratic elections based on a one-militant-one-vote principle.[209] Nevertheless, efforts to introduce a small semblance of internal democracy[210] into the IU encountered much opposition,[211] which was little surprise since the party itself had never been an advocate for external democracy. In the end, IU's leaders only ever agreed to a lax coalition that permitted the continued existence of the front's component parts.

Majoritarian-based decision-making mechanisms would have enabled Barrantes to override the ideologues within the radical PUM[212] and Red Fatherland: one-militant-one-vote elections would have produced a CDN far more amenable to his long-term goals, given the party's moderate base. Indeed, before giving up on the party in 1989, the moderates attempted a last-minute push, spearheaded by Senator Edmundo Murrugarra, to expel these two radical groups from the party. Unlike Lula's moderate wing of Brazil's PT, which on three separate occasions successfully expelled those groups that were

209 Author interview (14 July 2011). See also MAS-IU (1989).

210 Internal democracy is a flexible concept, similar in certain regards to the original, idealistic version of democratic centralism, in terms of its embrace of horizontal accountability and open elections to fill party leadership positions and select candidates for public office (cf. Lenin 1902), but with a far greater emphasis on substantive participation, deliberation, and the rights of the minority. If one were to simplify the decision-making mechanisms of a democratic centralist party as majoritarian, then those of an internally democratic party would be considered consensus-based. More broadly, the concept of internal democracy encompasses: deliberative and participatory mechanisms; non-hierarchical decision-making; the consensual method; a critique of representative democracy and the delegation of powers to elected officials as undemocratic, and; the notion that citizen participation in choosing public representatives contributes to good governance (Della Porta 2009).

211 In the end, the radical PUM also ended up supporting this measure. Indeed, internally democratic rules would have benefited the party, given its relative size vis-à-vis IU's other parties. The editorial staff of *El Zorro de Abajo* magazine, run by the PUM's moderate "*zorros,*" pushed, unsuccessfully, for more internal democracy within the party. They envisioned a reformed, democratically elected CDN to replace the existing one, which was virtually "unmovable," and characterized by an "almost-permanent catatonia" (*El Zorro de Abajo* 1985; p 4). The radical Red Fatherland and the sometimes-radical PCP vehemently opposed such internal reforms, however.

212 While at the macro level, the PUM was IU's most radical party, at the micro level it nonetheless counted among its supporters quite moderate militants; this Trotskyist/Castrist party counted among its members peasants, university professors, and urban professionals. Like IU itself, the PUM was torn between moderate and radical tendencies, termed the "foxes" ("*zorros"*) and the "Libyans," respectively ("*Libios"*). For a detailed analysis of the *Zorros*, see Osmar González (1999).

preventing institutional and ideological change, the diffuse leadership structure and weak party infrastructure of IU prevented Barrantes's moderate wing from doing the same. A few of these internal reforms were passed, albeit in water-downed version, in IU's first National Congress, of 1989; however, the sense of Barrantes et al. was that these measures were "too little, too late."[213]

IU's CDN was composed of the seven unelected leaders of IU's various component parties and fronts, plus Barrantes as IU president (UDP-IU 1983). IU's *Statutes, Regulations and Electoral Norms* (IU 1988a) stipulates that "The representation of the political organizations on the CDN will be as follows: one titular member per party and two per front[-party]" (art 26). These non-democratically elected party leaders were averse to building up IU's institutions because such a process would necessarily come at the expense of their own component parties, thus challenging their privileged roles as their parties' democratically unaccountable leaders. Unlike in Brazil (see Chapter 3), for instance, Peru's small leftist parties had not been destroyed by repression. IU developed on the foundation of strong, highly structured, sectarian parties, such as Red Fatherland and the PCP: these parties were "very organized and averse to giving up power," according to former member of IU's CDN, Santiago Pedráglio.[214]

This was a serious problem because fundamental differences between the leaders' positions, among other things, complicated the party's ability to get much done, much less remain united.[215] Had IU been subject to bureaucratic hurdles, such as those that were implemented in Brazil, one would expect the party to have responded to such constraints by uniting further, streamlining decision-making, and presenting a unified

[213] Author interview with former IU Senator Rolando Ames (14 July 2011).
[214] Author interview (13 July 2011).
[215] For self-criticism of the CDN, see PUM (1988a).

front in the face of external challenges. It also would have likely institutionalized ways to sideline party members that prevented much-needed change from occurring.

A long time in the making, IU's demise was predicated upon the inability of two contradictory strategies for dealing with Peru's economic and political crises to exist simultaneously, side by side. Barrantes—along with the more moderate PCR, former PSR (which became Socialist Convergence, *Convergencia Socialista*, COSO), and some independents—was concerned primarily by the fact that Peru's precarious democratic regime was at risk of collapse from either a rightist military coup or the Maoist insurrection in the countryside (PUM 1989; PUM 1988b). He concluded that a national accord with the governing APRA was needed to protect Peru's fragile democracy, and that general strikes should be discouraged lest they further destabilize the tottering democratic regime.

IU's more ideologically driven (and numerically larger[216]) wing, composed of PUM, UNIR, and FOCEP, was less concerned with propping up the existing representative-democratic regime, since, in their view, that was what was preventing their revolutionary political goals from being achieved (Taylor 1990). Indeed, IU's radicals saw the only possible solution to the crisis afflicting Peru throughout the 1980s was a "vanguard-led revolution" (CNM 1989, p 8). More broadly, the leadership's moderate minority (who were in line with the overall party's majority) saw politics and the pursuit of power in more pluralistic, democratic terms, while its radical majority saw politics more as a struggle—oftentimes violent—to obtain power. Criticizing the radical wing,

[216] Radicals dominated the party's leadership and held the most elected official positions, while moderates dominated the party's bureaucracy and followers. In 1985, UNIR elected 16 deputies and two senators, PUM elected 13 deputies and 4 senators, and FOCEP one deputy and one senator; on the moderate side, PSR elected five deputies and two senators, PCR elected two deputies and zero senators, and IU-affiliated independents elected five deputies and one senator. The PUM's analysis of these elections was that IU fared so poorly (in relative terms) because the party was "moving too far from the social movements in struggle" and was becoming too "bureaucratic and prioritizing the legal scene [over extra-legal ones]" (PUM 1985).

Albavera (1989) of the moderate wing wrote: "It should be noted that those of us who are in favor of the democratic game acknowledge that one cannot govern a country with a quarter or a third of the votes. For this we seek consensus and political matches, without surrendering our principles."

Unable to sway those groups and individuals on the fence to his side, and unable to sideline or expel the radical sectors from IU, Barrantes and his moderate followers gave up. In resignation, they left the party in August of 1989 to form the Socialist Accord *(Acuerdo Socialista*, AS, which later became the Socialist Left*, Izquierda Socialista,* IS).[217] Barrantes had been defeated in his efforts to sideline IU's radical minority leaders, the main thing keeping the party from engaging in adaptation. Another, related reason why Barrantes chose to leave the party, according to former PUM leader Antonio Zapata, was because he did not believe that the armed forces and conservative establishment would allow him to take power upon winning the presidential election were he to remain in such a radical party.[218]

In 1990, the Peruvian left ended up fielding two competing presidential candidates, Barrantes and Henry Pease. Combined, the two former friends and ideologically similar colleagues[219] received a meager 12 percent of the vote. Largely as a result, IU died a slow death, losing its registration five years later for failing to obtain the mandated five percent of the vote: it won a minuscule 0.58 percent of the presidential

[217] The PCP was generally seen as IU's center, siding with the reformists on certain occasions and with the revolutionaries on others. While PCP was generally seen as relatively moderate, it did not follow Barrantes out of the party in 1989.

[218] Author interview (1 August 2011). An interview with Barrantes prior to the 1985 presidential election demonstrates another pressing fear about the heterodox IU coalition. Were Barrantes to win, either the radical PUM faction or the "*chino*" faction (i.e., IU's Maoist groups) could split off, undermining his ability to govern and leading to political and economic instability, as had the departure of Jaime Paz Zamora done in 1982 to neighboring Bolivia (CIUP and Fundación Friedrich Ebert 1985, p 54).

[219] While Pease and the Christian Democrats were initially considered moderate, they did radicalize to a certain degree towards the end of the decade.

vote and 1.67 of the congressional vote in 1995 (Tanaka 2008, p 205). IS fared even worse.

IU remained an inchoate party without a modern, professional structure; it could never develop beyond a loose coalition of parties lacking an effective, centralized leadership. Five years after its founding, the party self-critically characterized itself by a "lack of political leadership" and "organizational paralysis" (PUM 1988a). Its caciques governed not by majority rule, but by consensus. IU's founding documents state that, "The CDN adopts its accords on questions that the organization considers fundamental by consensus" (IU 1988a, art 26; cf. UPD-IU 1983). And, since getting eight dogmatic, sectarian, leftist caudillos to agree on anything is considerably difficult, little could be agreed upon. Former PCP Representative to IU Carlos Esteves Ostolaza described such meetings as "interminable sessions," which were often held up by disagreements over the wording of a "single line of text."[220] Consensus-based decision-making stifled much-needed reforms and critical measures got derailed by ideological disagreements, tactical differences, and even personal vendettas.[221] The only accords that were able to pass, according to former PUM leader Antonio Zapata, were "watered-down versions of the original resolutions that pleased nobody and resolved nothing."[222] The result was the persistence of an ineffective and undisciplined leadership structure that stifled future adaptation efforts from ever coming to fruition.

Such a context does not bode well for would-be reformers interested in pushing through ideological moderation and institutional modernization. Barrantes and his

[220] Author interview (25 July 2011).

[221] Also hampering compromise was the romanticized conviction among leaders, especially from the dogmatic parties and fronts, that they were messiahs and thus could not compromise their position. This view also contributed to the continued support for armed struggle in the not-too-distant future: these leaders wanted to die fighting for the cause. Author interview with VR founder and former IU Senator Edmundo Murrugarra (18 July 2011).

[222] Author interview (1 August 2011).

reformist allies enjoyed the backing of a majority of IU's base support—as the electorate was more moderate than IU's median position and moderate IU politicians were increasingly demonstrating their competency as pragmatic managers in local-level government; what he lacked, however, was the ability to use this majority support for his moderating project to create a unified IU coalition capable of winning power and governing. According to IU intellectual Nicolás Lynch, "Barrantes always sought consensus; it was his greatest strength, but also his greatest weakness."[223]

Later on, when exogenous changes had fundamentally altered Peruvian society and a majority of the party's supporters sought a readjustment to IU's ideology and tactical approach to politics, the moderate wing was *unable* to effect top-down change. Kenneth Roberts (1996) argues that, "the insistent support of IU radicals for a revolutionary alternative prevented Barrantes from making the compromises and building the coalitions needed" to moderate the party and stand a chance at winning the presidency (p 87). The party became increasingly polarized between moderate democrats and radicals looking to overthrow the liberal democratic order and install a revolutionary order based on grass-roots forms of popular power (Roberts 1998, p 202), yet the pragmatic majority had no way of imposing order or forcing allegiance within the party. Adaptation was thwarted because undemocratically elected veto-players could derail the institutional and ideological change required by external changes. Instead of expelling the ultra-radical dinosaurs, it was the moderate faction that was forced to leave: party adaptation was thwarted.

[223] Author interview (1 August 2011).

LCR: No Early Challenges Mean No Party Building

Similar to the case of IU, Venezuela's LCR faced no early challenges in the form of bureaucratic hurdles to party legalization and electoral participation. LCR emerged within the context of democracy; it thus did not suffer any birth pains, as the PT had. As such, there was no incentive for LCR to institutionalize, in particular, because it was lucky enough to experience a "meteoric rise" without having to do much in the way of institutionalization; *causaerristas* thus had difficulty justifying to themselves the need to engage in the costly process of party building. Because of this, when the external environment necessitated profound institutional and ideological changes in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the still weakly organized LCR was ill prepared to adapt: a democratic/moderate – undemocratic/radical division deepened and ended up renting the party in two. The next three subsections detail LCR's relatively tranquil early years, its meteoric rise, and failed efforts at professionalization and, thus, party adaptation, respectively.

No Challenges

Venezuela's LCR did not experience any early challenges in the form of bureaucratic obstacles. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the country was democratically governed for almost the entire second half of the 20th century. Furthermore, the democratic regime did not impose any unfair legal restrictions upon leftist parties to deter their rise. As there was no external threat to the party's continued existence, there was no incentive to institutionalize. LCR thus remained a weakly institutionalized party with an inchoate organizational structure and ill-defined decision-making mechanisms—i.e., a party with low adaptability.

LCR was simultaneously fashioned as a "movement of movements" in "permanent construction," but with a small, central vanguard leadership guiding the various movements from above. It was to be a new type of left-wing party, one whose political stance, strategy, and composition were to be determined not by unchanging orthodox ideologies and inertial party bureaucracies, but rather continually defined and refined by popular movements (Salamanca 2004, p 239). It was designed to be fluid in form and content, horizontally structured, and guided by the internally democratic notion that decisions should be made unanimously; it also rejected formalized rules, did not regulate party membership, adopted a fluid organizational structure, and embraced diffuse leadership.[224]

Given the belief in the intrinsic value of democracy as the most desirable organizing principle of political groups, and the belief that political decisions should reflect as closely as possible the will of the people (interpreted by their elected representatives), consensus-based democracy should trump majoritarian notions of democracy. While many leftist parties adopted internally democratic policies, political realities—in particular, bureaucratic hurdles imposed to complicate the revival of the left—got in the way of most leftist parties' efforts at implementing truly consensus-based democracy. As demonstrated earlier with the case of Brazil's PT, such idealism was often tempered by the need to centralize authority and streamline decision-making mechanisms.

Largely given their unique lack of external threats, LCR went above and beyond what most leftist parties would ever consider when thinking about embracing internal

[224] During the same period in world time, Latin American trade unions underwent a similar phenomenon: New Unionism was challenging the formal, bureaucratic, corporatist, hierarchical organizational form and nature of the region's traditional trade unions. As unions were important sources of leftist support (and leaders), unionists and party members were well aware of, and learned, from the actions of one another.

democracy. While most of Latin America's leftist parties were limited to interpreting internal democracy as the process of implementing internal elections for party leadership positions and primaries to decide upon official candidates—overall positive developments in terms of party renewal, legitimacy, and appeal—LCR was able to put into practice and *retain indefinitely* the ideal by spreading out leadership positions horizontally amongst party members and making decisions based on consensus (instead of by majority). Such measures worked well when LCR was a small, tight-knit group of like-minded social activists in Venezuela's Guayana region;[225] however, it proved inadequate for a national party administering municipal and state governments and presiding over fundamental economic and political transformations.

Meteoric Rise Made Easy

Despite doing little in terms of institutionalizing itself, LCR was able to grow electorally. Indeed, once the decentralizing reforms of the Presidential Commission for the Reform of the State (*Comisión Presidencial para la Reforma del Estado,* COPRE)[226] instituted direct elections for municipal and state positions of power, LCR candidates began winning public office (López Maya 1994).[227] Furthermore, local office often served as a springboard for national office. In this way, LCR's "meteoric" electoral rise (Crisp and Levine 1998, p 39) to national prominence in the late 1980's and early 1990's

[225] LCR leader César Ramírez recalled nostalgically earlier party debates in which impromptu meetings of 30 members would be hastily arranged, via a few phone calls, in order to debate a pressing issue at hand. If and when consensus could not be reached, militants would agree to mull over the issue and agree to meet again a month later to readdress the problem. Author interview (22 November 2011).

[226] Created by President Jaime Lusinchi (1984-1989), COPRE was a move to reform Venezuela's political system in order to breath life into an increasingly moribund regime (cf Ellner 1993).

[227] Venezuela's closed-list voting system, which had enabled parties to control who got elected, was replaced with an open-list arrangement. This served to democratize party organization, allowing voters to know who they were voting for and thus exert more influence in the electoral process. Furthermore, elections for governors and mayors were changed to direct and secret vote under a system of simple plurality (cf. Kornblith and Levine 1995, pp 63-7).

said less about the party, per se, than about the overall political situation in Venezuela at the time: a crisis of representation and the slow erosion of the country's party system.

The party was, in a sense, in the right place at the right time: the two traditional parties were stagnating, and, with the recent constitutional changes allowing for direct elections of governors and mayors, LCR was one of few viable options available to voters.[228] The party's internal democracy and highly participatory nature were a breath of fresh air in Venezuela's otherwise ossified democracy; LCR's "otherness" helped it capitalize on the worsening crisis of representation, as seen in the slow collapse of the country's traditional AD and COPEI parties. Furthermore, the four orienting principles of Andrés Velásquez's 1989 gubernatorial campaign were: the exercise not only of democracy as elections, but democracy as governance; an end to political corruption; efficiency and transparency of government services (particularly, in health, education, and personal security), and; sustainable development of the Guayana region (López Maya 1995). As governor, Velásquez went on to win the praise and support of much of the middle class and businessmen for abolishing a semi-legal kickback scheme and identifying "phantom" workers on the public payroll (Hellinger 1996, p 124).

Thanks to this political context, LCR went from a minor, regional party to a national political force: in 1989 it won three seats in Venezuela's National Chamber of Deputies and the governorship of Bolívar State, thanks to the strong support of organized labor in numerous industries. Three years later, LCR won the mayoralty of Caracas, with support stemming both from the urban slums and from the upscale *Country Club* neighborhood, and, in 1993 the party garnered over a fifth of both the presidential and the parliamentary votes, spread out across the country. Despite only having 700,000 bolivares

[228] Note that it is not a coincidence that in Bolívar, the state where LCR had its most electoral success, AD had suffered a large internal crisis: the country's growing steel and aluminum industries had created a new class of workers that was wary of AD domination. Additionally, the state also had very high rates of abstention (cf. López Maya 1995)

of campaign funds to AD's 80,000,000 (Sesto 1992b, p 229), Andrés Velásquez won almost twenty two percent of the presidential vote, coming fourth in a four-way-split that many Venezuelans believed to be the result of systematic fraud.

There is a widespread belief among current and former members of LCR that the 1993 presidential election was marred by systematic fraud: "...in December 1993, Andrés Velásquez won the elections but recognized the triumph of Rafael Caldera" (Medina 1999, p 45). Velásquez himself claims that he "won the electoral process and 'they cheated me'" ("*me hicieron trampa*") (quoted in Giusti 1997); Velásquez had opted not to contest the results for lack of "smoking gun" evidence. Such a conspiracy theory is not that far fetched, though: LCR was widely seen as the victim of electoral fraud in the 1989 mayoral and gubernatorial elections. In response, party sympathizers had taken to the street throughout Bolívar in protest, and succeeding in enabling the winning LCR candidates (Clemente Scotto as mayor of Caroní and Velásquz as governor) to take office.[229]

Regardless of the results of the presidential election, in 1993 LCR won strong legislative representation—40 deputies and nine senators were elected, making it the country's third largest party. Furthermore, the positive management by its elected officials of municipal and state governments showcased the party as a force for decentralization, good governance, and the development of a participatory culture—achievements that bore a striking resemblance to those of the PT.[230] LCR transformed from a tiny, radical group into a reputable organization with a proven record of honesty, transparency, and

[229] Author interviews with LCR founder and former leader José Albornoz (9 November 2011 and 8 March 2012), LCR founder and leader Lucas Matheus (5 December 2011), and Andrés Velásquez (24 November 2011).

[230] Andrés Velásquez governed Bolívar State from 1989-1995, Clemente Scotto was mayor of Caroní Municipality (Ciudad Guayana) from 1989-1995 and 2004-2008, Pastora Medina was mayor of Caroní from 1995-2000, and Aristóbulo Istúriz was mayor of the Libertador Municipality of Caracas from 1992-1995.

good governance in its handling of regional and municipal governments (López Maya 1999); however, unlike the PT, LCR did not grow institutionally alongside its electoral growth.

LCR's "meteoric" electoral rise was not the fruit of earlier party building; furthermore, given its quick electoral success, there was nothing to encourage party building. In *spite* of its inchoate nature, LCR grew into a presidential contender because it had it so easy, both in terms of never experiencing early challenges—be they in the form of repression or bureaucratic hurdles—and also in terms of capitalizing on the collapse of the two traditional Venezuelan parties. Because LCR never professionalized, it was ill-prepared to confront headlong the problems that arose when it tried to adapt to the changing environment around it; the party was unadaptable. The next subsection details how and why LCR failed to adapt and ended up splitting into two, in 1997.

No Professionalization, No Party Adaptation

LCR's origins directly influenced its refusal to professionalize; unlike other leftist parties with similar origins, LCR never experienced any growing pains encouraging it to bureaucratize and centralize power during its formative years. The lack of an external enemy meant that LCR was able to remain a party in "permanent formation," even after it expanded geographically and electorally and became responsible for administering state- and local-level office, including the mayoralty of Caracas. LCR failed to engage in successful party adaptation precisely because of the persistence of a variety of weakly institutionalized party characteristics and mechanisms that were never discarded because the party never institutionalized.

First, LCR did not have any founding documents, such as a constitutive act, binding rules, or statutes. LCR members were required to write up a formal statute for the Supreme Electoral Council (*Consejo Supremo Electoral*, CSE) in order to register as an official party, which they got around to doing in 1978. However, this document was widely considered a meaningless formality that most members did not even know existed. As such, there was little correspondence between these norms and the actual party; LCR operated based on the needs and wants of its members. Informal and flexible party rules were changed as needed. José Lira, LCR founder and de facto political head of the party, assured this author in two separate interviews that the statutes had little, if any, effect on the party's makeup and running, and were written solely to appease the CSE.[231] In interview after interview, this author asked *causaerristas* about the content of the CSE Statute, only to be met with unknowing stares—its importance did not extend beyond compliance with official CSE dictates. Given this reality, most scholarly texts on LCR erroneously claim that no such statutes even exist (cf. López Maya, 2004, p 283).

Norms, procedures, and patterns of behavior are important for the institutional survival of parties, as they foster stable, valued, and recurring patterns of behavior and provide for agreed-upon ways to handle conflicts and issues as they arise (Huntington 1968, p 12). The fact that LCR had no founding documents or organic rules hampered party adaptation because it meant that there was no established way to effect institutional change within the party. In its early years, LCR dealt with whatever internal issues that arose on an informal, ad-hoc basis. This worked well enough when the party was a small, homogenous group of individuals living in the same city; however, such an informal approach outlived its usefulness and remained in place long after the party began to expand geographically.

[231] Author interviews (5 December 2011 and 27 February 2012).

This ended up hampering party adaptation by not providing established channels through which the party could address problems. Decisions were made on the basis of consensus (explained below); however, if and when consensus could not be achieved, the status quo remained in effect, no matter how counterproductive that may have been. There were no formal guidelines to establish the official protocol for such situations. And, since there were no authoritative ways to effect change, any proposed reform to the way the party functioned was sure to be denounced as illegitimate by those who benefited from retaining the status-quo. For instance, LCR's 1996 national assembly—whose objective it was to analyze the party's 1995 electoral setback, plan a new political direction, and choose a new secretary-general—ended with internecine fighting and few resolutions (López Maya 1998, p 86).

Lucas Matheus and other members of the "Bolívar group" had realized the need to separate the party from its component movements and tried both to formalize rules and register affiliates, only to fall flat in their efforts: given the clout and veto-power of minority radical groups, the moderate majority had little chance of achieving consensus (Ellner 1996). Contrast this with Brazil's PT, which formalized its rules and regulations during its founding moments and which had established, straightforward ways to engage in institutional reform; the PT engaged in an extraordinary amount of institutional and ideological adaptation over roughly the same period (cf. Hunter 2010; Ribeiro 2008; Amaral 2003).

Second, LCR had neither formal requirements for party membership, nor mechanisms with which to expel party members. In general, such lax rules on party membership all but ensure the growth of a heterodox party, potentially creating deep internal cleavages that could effect unruliness and hamper party efficacy. This turned out to be the case for LCR, which neither created a party registry nor attempted to identify

(and thus be able to target) its followers (López Maya 2004, p 299). LCR was never preoccupied with defining its official ideology (Salamanca 1998, p 240; Yépez Salas 1993, pp 92-97) because it did not want to be tied down by ideological purity in its struggle for the social rights of Guayana's workers. According to those who left LCR for the PPT, one of the principal reasons for the internal rupture was the fact that Andrés Velásquez had allegedly shifted his political stance to the right and was looking to do the same for the party's ideological orientation.

Furthermore, while party leadership had initially been restricted to social movements leaders, this requirement gradually gave way; from the beginning, anybody could join the party regardless of their ideology. Ana Elisa Osorio, a high-leveled public functionary who worked under both Caroní Mayor Clemente Scotto and Bolívar Governor Andrés Velásquez, explained that she never joined the party because, frankly, "there was no real way of joining."[232] LCR administrations were known to hire far more non-party members than party members and so-called party meetings were not limited to party members (union leaders of various political tendencies regularly attended).[233] Another example of this ideological flexibility was Jorge Olavarría, the center-right editor of *Revista Resumen* who was chosen as LCR's first ever presidential candidate (in 1983); his presence in the party, however brief, generated much internal strife. The seemingly sole point of agreement between the "oligarchic" Olavarría and LCR militants was their mutual disregard for corruption, political and otherwise (cf. Maneiro 1982). Olavarría's LCR candidacy was curtailed following the death of Maneiro, who was Olavarría's principal defender within the party.

[232] Author interview (24 February 2012).

[233] Author interviews with Yajaira Briceño, a high-level, apolitical civil servant who worked in numerous LCR administrations (8 November, 2011) and Alirio Martínez, general director of the Caracas Mayoralty under Aristobulo Istúriz (1 November 2011).

This lack of control over party membership ended up hampering party adaptation because it did not establish any formal way of *expelling* party members who disregarded party interests. According to LCR founder and current national leader José Lira, the party never felt the need to establish a disciplinary tribunal or other provisions for keeping internal cohesion.[234] What this meant was that the party, which was becoming more heterodox with time, found it increasingly difficult to find common ground amongst its members on important political issues, a tragic flaw for a political party responsible for administering more and more political offices. To be effective, parties need to be able to control who is allowed to join and, more importantly, to expel members who threaten the party's institutional coherence, success, or survival. For example, even after Pablo Medina went against the rulings of LCR's Executive Committee (*Comité Ejecutivo Nacional*, CEN), he was not expelled from the party and thus able to undermine it from within (see Medina 1999).[235]

Third, LCR established no specialized roles, professionalized staff, or organizational apparatus; there was never a party bureaucracy to speak of. There was no full-time staff, no party headquarters, and no regular financial contributions. A lack of a national party apparatus meant that the party could not control its component organizations and movements, all of which predated the party and had their own organizational structures. The case of "PRAG" (which is not an acronym but rather a short, catchy word), LCR's student movement at the UCV, demonstrates the tenuous, personal ties that connected the different organizations to the party. For instance, the departure of Edgar Yajure, PRAG's founder and the mastermind behind LCR's idea of autonomous party segments, spelled the end of the student organization. A debilitated

[234] Author interviews (5 December 2011 and 21 February 2012).

[235] Author interview with LCR founder and leader Adón Soto (23 November 2011). This incident is detailed in Chapter 5.

PRAG did remain a part of the party, only to disband for good following the death of Maneiro, who, according to Yajure, was the only real connection between the organization and the party.[236] Pro-Catia, LCR's urban poor segment, met a similar fate, according to LCR founder and former leader Ilenia Medina.[237]

This fluid, flat organizational structure and lack of organizational capacity ended up hampering party adaptation because the party could not engage in multiple tasks simultaneously. Without the division of labor, specialization of tasks, or presence of professionalized staff members, one cannot possibly try to administer a national party. LCR founder and PRAG leader Edgar Yajure lamented that tasks were repeated at various organizational levels (especially for national campaigns), organizational inconsistencies resulted in internal contradictions, and affiliate movements made their own decisions and eventually went their own way (e.g., PRAG, Pro-Catia).[238] Since Maneiro did not delegate responsibilities to other party members (he was known as a micromanager), the party could not grow in two places at once: numerous LCR members acknowledged that the main reason why their efforts at organizing students, intellectuals, and popular sectors fell short was because the party focused so much of its time and limited resources on Guayana's workers.[239] This phenomenon became self-fulfilling, since a professionalized staff was needed to delegate tasks if and when the party were to grow and professionalize.

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[236] Author interview (26 October 2011).

[237] Author interview (6 October 2011).

[238] Author interview (26 October 2011).

[239] Additionally, the fact that LCR was so inchoate meant that it did not have a national corps of party supporters helping it observe elections and denounce the alleged electoral fraud of the 1993 presidential elections, as it had done in the 1989 municipal and gubernatorial elections in the party's home state of Bolívar. Because LCR had never felt the need to build up a party structure to organize activities at the national level, it proved incapable of mobilizing against and denouncing the alleged national-level electoral fraud.

Fourth, LCR never felt compelled to establish vertical accountability; the party had no hierarchical structure. In order for a party to remain legitimate in the eyes of its members and followers, it needs to allow for leadership renewal over time; however, in order to remain dynamic and effective, a party also needs to have clearly demarcated lines of authority in the first place. Party leadership is needed to develop and communicate party policy to the general public. LCR founder and former secretary-general, Lucas Matheus, claimed that, within LCR, the position of secretary-general was a mere figurehead, created solely to fulfill the dictates of the CSE.[240] In reality, party members were all treated as equals, with leadership diffused amongst a core group of 40-50 militants. LCR had a National Political Team (*Equipo Político Nacional*) of thirteen members (one of which being the general-secretary figurehead); however, the highest authority within the party was the National Meeting (*Reunión Nacional*), composed of 103 elected delegates, plus the team of thirteen, in which the party's main decisions were made by consensus (LCR 2009, arts 7, 11).

This lack of formal, centralized leadership ended up hampering party adaptation because there was no set institutions for resolving internal conflicts. For instance, the protracted struggle between *velasquistas* and *medinistas* (i.e., supporters of Velásquez and Medina, respectively) in the mid-1990s ended up renting the party in two because the party had not established conflict resolution mechanisms. While Velásquez was campaigning for president, for example, Pablo Medina was actively advocating for extra-constitutional means to power (explained in Chapter 5) and trying to cause an extra-constitutional confrontation between the armed forces and other segments of society, claimed LCR leaders César Ramírez and José María "Chema" Fernández.[241] Unlike the PT's Lula, Velásquez proved unable to overcome or outmaneuver his party's more radical,

[240] Author interview (5 December 2011).
[241] Author interviews with Ramírez (22 November 2011) and Fernández (21 November 2011).

undemocratic wing (cf. Salamanca 2004). Such a lack of structured leadership meant that nobody was running the party: because there were no established positions within the party there were various different personalities jockeying for power.

Finally, LCR never felt compelled to establish and enforce majoritarian decision-making mechanisms; instead, of simply putting issues to a vote, it made decisions based on consensus without establishing any formal method of dispute resolution. Ideally, such a policy enables everyone to have a say in internal decisions and ensures that a final policy decision has the broadest possible support within the party; according to LCR national leader and four-time national deputy Amérigo de Grazia Veltri, it was often repeated within the LCR community that, "in a debate, we are all equal."[242] *Causaerristas* were surprisingly against the process of voting: "the vote produces factionalism and is not necessarily the best way to reach the most just and true response" (López Maya 1995, p 174). Many acknowledged the effectiveness and importance of voting; in discussing the difference between the old LCR and the post-1997 LCR, LCR founder and current leader Eleuterio "Tello" Benitez argued that the party's new, more majoritarian way of engaging in decision-making is "more efficacious and more democratic."[243] Nonetheless, the process was considered undemocratic: according to LCR founder and former national leader Clemente Scotto, "elections are a trap...it's easier to buy someone's vote than to convince them through debate."[244]

While rigorous debate among broadly like-minded individuals can lead to vastly superior final results, as the meeting of minds weeds out bad ideas and perfects good ones, it is far less efficacious than majoritarian rule and usually discarded by organizations as they grow and mature. LCR founder and former national leader Edgar

[242] Author interviews (31 January and 7 March 2012).
[243] Author interview (20 October 2011).
[244] Author interview (8 November 2011).

Yajure termed these consensus-seeking meetings "seemingly interminable debates."[245] Interestingly enough, former LCR secretary-general Pablo Medina assured this author that the party never "wasted time" voting.[246] However, since LCR never suffered any external challenges, it was able to continue to rely upon a more discursive approach of intense and protracted debate until consensus was achieved.

LCR's party statute, promulgated at the behest of the CSE, actually *does* establish majoritarian decision-making mechanisms. Article 10 states that "the decisions of the RN will be made by approval of one-half-plus-one of the members present," while article 12 state that "the decisions of the EPN will be made by the vote of one-half-plus-one [i.e., seven] of its members" (LCR 2009). However, as mentioned earlier, José Lira, LCR founder and de facto political head of the party, averred twice that the "statutes do not exist outside of the CSE."[247]

This lack of majoritarian decision-making mechanisms ended up hampering party adaptation because LCR was unable to confront and defuse internal conflicts and, thus, survive institutionally. For instance, LCR had no formal rules for internally selecting candidates and, since it did not believe in voting (internally, at least), it did not hold party primaries to select candidates for elected offices. Instead, the party relied upon internal debate to find consensus on suitable party candidates for offices desired by more than one party member. For instance, the debate over whether to select former Caroní mayor Clemente Scotto or Velásquez's protégé, Eliécer Calzadilla, as candidate for governor of Bolívar to replace Velásquez turned into a bitter, internecine war between *medinistas* and *velasquistas*.

[245] Author interview (26 October 2011).
[246] Author interview (7 October 2011).
[247] Author interview (5 December 2011 and 27 February 2012).

Medina and many party intellectuals supported Scotto (at the time, Scotto was married to Pablo Medina's sister, Pastora Medina), while Velásquez and most Bolívar workers supported Calzadilla. As consensus could not be reached and voting was out of the question, a subpar compromise was struck: both candidates would renounce their bid and a compromise candidate, Victor Moreno, would be put forth. This turned out to be a disaster, as Moreno did not have popular support and party members, bitter over the nomination fight, never fully rallied behind their party candidate. Predictably, Moreno ended up losing what should have been an easy LCR win, given Velásquez and the party's extraordinary popularity in the state; to this day, the party has yet to recover the state's governorship. More broadly, the consequences of this fight, which could have easily been determined by a simple, majoritarian vote, are widely credited as the catalyst that ultimately led to the party's inevitable division a few years later.[248]

Indeed, LCR relied upon consensus over majority rule, even if that meant political stalemate and interminable debates, because it had never felt the need to adopt more efficacious rules to handle external challenges (Yépez Salas 1993). In turn, LCR languished institutionally because it lacked a disciplined leadership able to make effective decisions in a top-down manner: according to LCR specialist Margarita López Maya (2005) "...the almost-exclusive use of the consensus mechanism, through which the party decided not only what policies to follow but also who to nominate for internal and popular elections, made it impossible to address the differences" that grew within LCR throughout the 1990s (p 189). And an internal policy change was out of the question, since that would require the *unanimous* approval of the LCR leadership. According to former LCR leader Gustavo Hernandez, "LCR could have been [like] the PT. It didn't, I

[248] Author interviews with LCR leaders Eliezer Calzadilla (24 November 2011), Clemente Scotto (8 November 2011), and Ilenia Medina (6 October 2011).

say, because LCR couldn't simultaneously be leftist and pragmatic at the same time. Why? Because you needed consensus for the party to function."[249]

For LCR, internal democracy came at the cost of efficacy and functionality. The party's anti-hierarchical, fluid nature, which had initially helped LCR attract so much societal support, seemed also to doom the party to eventual failure: the absence of decision-making and -enforcing rules and of hierarchical leadership meant that LCR had no established mechanisms or protocols with which to resolve political impasse. Furthermore, the party's lack of structure or formalized rules and regulations meant that much-needed political reform—which could have addressed the situation by establishing guidelines and rules—was stymied; there was no established way of effecting internal party change. This ended up making it all but impossible to confront the increasingly serious issues challenging the party as it grew exponentially and as the external environment changed fundamentally; as such, the party remained weakly institutionalized, unable to engage in party professionalization.

CONCLUSION

In order to survive, parties need to be flexible enough to respond quickly and effectively to external challenges and changes in their environment. As institutional change is generally the province of disciplined and effective leadership, majoritarianism is usually considered a more efficacious way of making decisions. Parties lacking

[249] Author interview (26 October 2011). On a trip to Mexico arranged by PRD founder Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, Medina met with Bishop Samuel Ruiz and asked him about the peace process between the EZLN and the Mexican government. Ruiz said it was difficult because Mayan culture is different from Western culture, especially when it comes to decision-making: "Imagine that, one has pre-accords to be signed and they first have to be debated within all the indigenous communities...Think about what that means: everyone debates everything...And so they debate and debate and debate and, just like that, suddenly they reach an agreement and make the decision..." Medina's response was "Wow! That's La Causa Radical! That's just like us!" (Medina 1999, p 66).

centralized leadership and effective conflict resolution mechanisms thus have more difficulty engaging in party adaptation. That's where the ill intentions of outgoing authoritarian regimes prove so helpful: bureaucratic obstacles seeking to stifle emerging leftist parties ended up forcing them along party-building trajectories that centralized power and streamlined decision making.

Brazil's PT developed into a professional party with centralized control over party membership, strategy, and policy; majoritarian decision-making and -enforcing mechanisms; and top-down leadership not because its founders wanted to construct a hierarchical, bureaucratized party, per se. Rather, the PT developed in that way because the dictates of Brazil's outgoing authoritarian regime encouraged the party to alter its course and pursue institutionalization along those lines. Since Peru's IU and Venezuela's LCR were never subject to such challenges, there was no pressing need to streamline the party organization and professionalize. The consequences of not institutionalizing were seen a decade later, when both parties struggled to adapt successfully to the changing political and economic environments around them: IU collapsed in 1990 while LCR divided in 1997. Both parties were not adaptable enough to survive.

Neither IU nor LCR were confronted by external challenges early on in their history, when the nascent parties had still been in flux and change could have come about relatively easily. Since there was no incentive to engage in the costly process of party-building, little took place. Later on, once institutions had settled, institutionalization had little chance of occurring since fragmentation already had been cemented, change ruled out, and power brokers refused to consent to changes in the status-quo that would challenge their influence. The historical legacy of this phenomenon was the persistence of an ineffective and undisciplined leadership structure that made decisions on the basis of

consensus, not the more efficacious majoritarianism. The prospects of sweeping change in such a context are slim to nil.

Chapter 5: Democratization: The Widening of Political Appeals

Given their externally mobilized nature, Latin America's leftist parties were, more often than not, born with an aversion to compromise and a reluctance to cooperate across partisan or ideological lines. Indeed, the definition of an externally mobilized party is that it did not emerge from within the walls of parliament (Shefter 1994, p 5). Ideological moderation, however, necessitates a certain amount of politicking and collaboration, amongst other things. For this reason, many leftist parties in the region had innate difficulties moderating; this translated into low levels of adaptability.

Without any incentive to change, leftist parties would (and did) remain fixed in their old ways, obstinate about ever having to compromise their beliefs for political expediency. Because of this, a prerequisite for ideological moderation—and thus party adaptation—was an external challenge that would create the incentive to broaden and deepen one's political appeals, in effect forcing one to represent a more diverse swath of society. Parties faced with such a challenge were thus able to moderate ideologically, while those that were faced with no such challenge did not sway from the status quo and thus were unable to moderate.

Active participation in the process of democratization—i.e., fighting against tottering regimes in favor of the return to democracy—was crucial to party adaptation. This effort induced these parties to rethink their unpopular utopian political prescriptions, expand their political demands, and cloak themselves with the banner of pluralism and progressivism, effectively gaining the moral high ground (vis-à-vis the authoritarian

regime) in the process. This change became self-fulfilling, as parties then had to represent politically those members of the electorate whom it had won over formerly. In contexts in which the left was obliged to help democratization move forward, leftist parties then found it easier to adapt down the line; in contexts in which the left was not compelled, for whatever reason, to fight for democracy, leftist parties had more difficulty engaging in adaptation when societal factors eventually rewarded parties with moderated policies.

In this way, the manner in which the power handover process took place conditioned the success of leftist party adaptation. Foot-dragging on the part of the regime induced leftist parties to participate in broad, pro-democratic alliances. Being obliged by a regime's intransigence to participate actively in the struggle for democratization encouraged parties to put aside theoretical debates and collaborate with a broader range of society in order to succeed in forcing the military back into the barracks. Such collaboration had positive repercussions: the make-up of leftist parties altered in the process, bringing into the fold middle-class actors and activists from a wide variety of social groups. These new followers then needed to be welcomed into the party, including by ensuring that their political views were represented within the party platform and bureaucracy. This process of opening up helped parties embrace their democratic role as political entities that collaborate, negotiate, and compromise with diverse parties and organizations. Conversely, a lack of incentive to adopt the democratic mantle precluded the steps necessary to prepare a leftist party for future ideological adaptation.

This chapter explains the causal mechanisms at play whereby regime obstinance, in the form of the military's reluctance to extricate itself from power, encouraged new leftist parties to widen their goals and appeals, leading to ideological moderation and thus enabling party adaptation. It first goes into detail on the theory, introduced in Chapter 2, that explains how and why regime obstinance encourages such parties to compromise and

engage wholeheartedly in the political process. Next, it shows how the Brazilian authoritarian regime's initial refusal to leave power encouraged the PT to change its ways and begin to engage in tactical, and then policy, moderation. Then, it shows how, conversely, the absence of such an incentive—Peru's authoritarian regime readily left power and Venezuela was governed by a democratic regime—meant that IU and LCR, respectively, did not moderate, thus thwarting future attempts at party adaptation. The chapter concludes with a discussion on the importance of experience and practice—actually going through the democratic movements and defending democracy as the best regime type—in ensuring a party's long-term growth and survival.

DEMOCRATIZATION

Many authoritarian regimes in Latin America were hesitant to turn power over to civilian hands, despite an ever-increasing understanding in the 1980s that democratization was inevitable. In Chile, for example, Augusto Pinochet prolonged turnover until 1990, finally leaving only after an embarrassing referendum defeat in 1988; the PS was critical to the plebiscite's "No" campaign, on eight more years of Pinochet (Hite 2000; Rojas 2008; Lanzaro 2004).[250] Such foot-dragging encouraged some leftist parties to act and fight for a speedy transition to democracy. Where the left participated in democratization (i.e., Chile, Brazil, Uruguay), that participation channeled leftist party discontent into democratic norms, strategies, and goals; where the left remained on the sidelines (i.e., Venezuela, Argentina) or participated, but not necessarily for the sake of democracy (i.e., Peru), it saw little need to engage in policy moderation. This complicated the future growth and development of such parties.

[250] Similarly, the FA was crucial in helping organize Montevideo's 1984 general strike (Harnecker 1991; Yaffé 2005).

In the former set of countries, the militaries' reluctance to leave power served as the catalyst for leftist parties to step in and push for an end to authoritarian rule. They did so by spearheading democratization efforts: mobilizing civil society, staging anti-regime marches, and petitioning the government. With such increased visibility and responsibility, however, came these parties' need to listen to the political needs and wants of their newfound, pro-democratic support base (i.e., those citizens who collaborated with leftist parties and ended up being won over). This meant distancing themselves from earlier ideological and partisan dogmatism for the sake of the broader goal of regime change and thus engaging in ideological moderation; furthermore, having assumed publicly the responsibility of promoter-of-democracy under military dictatorship, leftist parties were then hemmed into abiding by democratic norms and procedures down the line. This also led to the widening of appeals, as parties felt obliged to continue representing their newly diverse allies and transform them into an electoral base: thus arose the need to expand political appeals beyond a narrow focus (as well as radical ideologically-based prescriptions) and begin to follow public opinion instead of trying to lead it (cf. Przeworski and Sprague 1986).

These developments signaled a fundamental shift: parties began listening to supporters and the broader electorate, often at the expense of the left's sacred texts. The consequence, this author contends, was increased pragmatism, a greater respect for the will of the electorate, and gradual ideological moderation. It helped stem internecine battles over possible political strategies and goals by rendering moot the more radical options and further facilitating moderation later on. After having become broad-based groups with diverse political interests and demands, leftist parties had to renegotiate their strict adherence to ideological norms and focus more on representing their supporters, a fundamental redefinition of the role of leftist political parties (cf. Schönwälder 2002, p 7;

Przeworski and Sprague 1986, p 3). In this way, these parties focused more on building political capital through winning and retaining supporters—by constructing alliances-of-convenience with other parties and actors, for example—than on engineering a utopian society via seizure of the state apparatus (cf. Kitschelt 1989). This tactical moderation served as the basis for policy moderation down the line: such parties had already conducted "test runs" of the broad-scale ideological moderation that external events made electorally preferable in the 1990s.

It is worth noting that this theory is an amendment of the existing literature on de-radicalization which was developed to explain the moderation of radical parties during the third wave of democratization in Southern Europe—namely, Spain, Portugal, and Greece—but then stretched to explain the cases of Latin America as well (cf. Huntington 1992). Pressure for moderation, Huntington claims, came from both the conditionality implicit (or explicit) with inclusion in the new democratic system, as well as the desire for immediate electoral success. However, neither of Huntington's causal mechanisms function for Latin America.

First, leftist parties in Latin America were, by and large, not forced to moderate as a precondition for participation: this "participation-moderation trade-off" does not apply universally to the region. It was important for the case of Chile's PS (cf. Roberts 1995a) and, to a far lesser extent, Uruguay's FA.[251] However, this was not the case for Brazil's PT as it was not a party to the pacted transition—in fact, the PT vehemently opposed much of the terms of the debate. Most of Latin America's transitions from authoritarian

[251] The FA's moderation began in the early 1970s, long before the pacted transition began; also, the moderate *Blancos* did not take part in the *Pacto del Club Naval* yet they were allowed to participate in the ensuing democratic regime.

rule were elitist affairs that often excluded certain sectors: O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) describe this regional phenomenon as "democracy by undemocratic means."[252]

Second, leftist parties in Latin America were not forced to moderate immediately due to electoral constraints: stating that the quest for electoral success was a driver of de-radicalization blankets over important empirical differences. For instance, the FA won close to 20 percent of the national vote in 1971, despite its strong support for and ties to the Tupamaros National Liberation Movement (*Movimiento de Liberación Nacional-Tupamaros*), Uruguay's urban guerrilla movement inspired by the Cuban Revolution. Additionally, the PT's Lula won over 44 percent of the vote in the second round of Brazil's 1989 presidential election; at the time the PT's platform still advocated for, amongst other things, radical land reform and the nationalization of the country's banks (cf. Hunter 2010). Finally, radicalized leftist parties *did* take part in the democratic process post democratization. Indeed, sections of Peru's IU supported the Maoist terrorist group Shining Path throughout the 1980's; during this time the party remained torn between wanting to mobilize popular sectors *within* or *against* the established democratic regime. Yet, despite its support for anti-system groups, the party was granted political inclusion (cf. Roberts 1998).

Re-democratization *did* create the incentive for de-radicalization; however, it was neither the conditionality of inclusion nor the phenomenon of electoral competition that induced Latin America's leftist parties to moderate their ideological stance. Rather, it was the effect of being forced to collaborate with other groups in ensuring the military's return to the barracks that served as the necessary experience for leftist parties to be able to

[252] Furthermore, Nancy Bermeo (1997) challenges both parts to Huntington's moderation argument by showing that the Peruvian left felt no need to moderate in order to be included within the new democratic system; in fact, it continued to mobilize and radicalize, even as it stood for the Constituent Assembly elections (pp 312-313).

adapt, later on, to a changing political environment that rewarded policy moderation from political parties.

In Peru and Venezuela there was no incentive for leftist parties to cooperate with non-leftist parties or groups or otherwise expand their electorate to embrace a wider swath of society. Given this, parties were never compelled to moderate their policy prescriptions in order to represent their newly diverse support bases. In this way, such parties never experienced the need to compromise and, thus, had difficulty engaging in policy moderation down the line.

It is the very process of serving as protagonists in democratization that sows the seeds for future policy moderation. Parties that fought against authoritarian rule in the historical struggle for democracy widened their political appeals more than those leftist parties that had not be compelled to participate in democratization. Serving as a protagonist in democratization prepared parties for participating democratically in the ensuing political regime: as parties help change politics they themselves are subject to change as well. The next section traces this process, whereby regime obstinance helped force the PT to moderate tactically, preparing it for future policy moderation when external events rewarded moderate parties.

THE PT: PARTICIPATION IN BRAZIL'S BROAD, PRO-DEMOCRATIC CAMP

Brazil's authoritarian dictatorship lasted from 1964 to 1985. The Brazilian armed forces were only the second in South America to take power in the context of cold war polarization, a year after Ecuador's military coup of 1963 (cf. O'Donnell 1973), and were one of the last to leave power. The leisurely pace of their extrication from politics prompted a call to action among leftist (as well as centrist) parties and social

organizations. This obstinance compelled the PT to set aside its leftist sectarianism and collaborate across the aisle for the sake of the greater good: democratization, or a chance to be able to participate in the political process.

However, the process of participating in democratization also had important repercussions for the party: it broadened the PT's support base and demonstrated the benefits of political compromise. These factors encouraged policy moderation in the medium-run, as the party's newly expanded base had to be represented. In the long-run, its experience engaging in the art of compromise and collaboration facilitated efforts at the ideological moderation needed to keep the party in line with the changing times. The next three subsections detail the party's participation in the process of democratization, the path dependency of these actions, and the effects they had on the party platform, respectively.

Regime Obstinance Spurs Action

Brazil's military dictatorship presided over a period of political stability and economic growth. Especially prior to the 1973 oil crisis, Brazil experienced a golden age of economic development under military rule, characterized by rising incomes; a positive, long-term economic outlook; and rapid industrialization (Gaspari 2002b; Iglesias 1992). Largely given the positive perception of their handling of the economy, Brazil's military enjoyed a fair amount of legitimacy and a relatively robust degree of public support; O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) note that, historically, the most frequent event triggering a transition from authoritarian rule has been military defeat in an international context (pp

17-18). Therefore, the generals were in no rush to return to the barracks and were able to plan the timetable for extrication from politics themselves, free from pressure.[253]

The Brazilian military began its protracted extrication from politics in 1974 with President Ernesto Geisel's *distensão*, followed in 1979 by President João Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo's declaration of amnesty (Gaspari 2002a). However, the regime only called for presidential elections in 1985, and even those were indirect.[254] Worried that the regime would prolong the turnover even more, the PT joined others in helping organize the multi-class, multi-organization, and multi-party movement to convene direct elections: "*(eleições) diretas, já!*" (Weffort 1983a). In doing so, the party did not act how a cadre-based, orthodox leftist party should have. Rather, it embraced the non-ideological, middle-class movement and collaborated broadly with non-Marxists for the "bourgeois" goal of representative democracy: "we do not want to penalize and jettison the 'masses' who do not have the privilege of accompanying the endless, metaphysical political discussions of our party nuclei" (Silva 1983).

Diretas Já! was a broad-based civil/political movement from 1983-1984 aimed at pressuring the regime to hold direct, democratic elections as soon as possible in order to hasten the end of the military regime (Cardoso 2006, pp 147-154). The primary objective was to do away with indirect elections: up to that point, Electoral College electors (i.e., senators, state and federal deputies, and city-level lawmakers) had been the final arbiters for executive positions. As part of the military's slow, piecemeal transition to democracy,

[253] Contrast this with the case of Argentina's military dictatorship. Economic mismanagement all but forced the armed forces to create a distraction, in the form of waging an un-winnable war against the United Kingdom over control of the territorially disputed Falkland Islands (*Islas Malvinas*, in Spanish). Argentina's embarrassing military defeat exposed the ineptitude of the military government, hastening its demise: given its loss of legitimacy, the cost of continued political repression was too great to be sustainable.

[254] Given the armed services' piecemeal extrication from politics, the exact date of the end of the military dictatorship is debatable. While a few scholars claim that democracy was restored in 1979 (cf. Boix 2003), the vast majority claim that the regime became democratic again in 1985 (with full democracy restored in 1989).

direct elections were gradually being implemented for an increasing number of such positions; the 1982 election, for example, saw the return of direct elections for governors.

The direct election movement brought over five million people to the streets. While Brazil's military dictatorship had initially enjoyed surprisingly broad support for its political and economic project, the national, regional, and international contexts had changed by the early 1980s. The so-called "third wave of democracy" (cf. Huntington 1991) had spread from Southern Europe to Latin America,[255] delegitimizing military rule throughout the region. Additionally, the debt crisis, which generated acute economic problems and annual inflation in the triple digits[256] and put an end to the Brazilian Miracle, helped debunk the myth surrounding the armed forces' ability to run the country (Sallum 2000).

Diretas Já! began not with the PT,[257] but with civil society groups and, especially, the catch-all opposition party, PMDB, and the recently elected PMDB governor of São Paulo, Franco Montoro (1983-1987). The campaign began as a loosely-connected series of, admittedly, poorly attended demonstrations; as the Congressional decision on the constitutional amendment approached (the *Emenda Constitucional Dante de Oliveira*, PEC n°5 of 1983), however, attendance at the campaign's rallies and marches swelled. On 25 January, 1984, the 300th anniversary of the city of São Paulo, over 300,000 people congregated on Sé Square (*Praça da Sé*), in São Paulo, to pressure for direct presidential elections. In early April of that year, the movement gathered approximately one million people in Rio de Janeiro. On 16 April, nine days before the congressional vote on

255 Beginning with the Dominican Republic in 1978, this wave spread to Ecuador (1979), followed by Peru (1980), along with almost the entire region in the 1980s and into the 1990s.

256 The restructuring of the global economy in the 1970s caused by Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) windfalls created international liquidity and provided Latin America with an influx of cheap credit with which to fund debt-led growth. With the rise in interest rates in the 1980s, such heavy borrowing proved to be disastrous and caused massive debt crises (Bruton 1998).

257 The PT did *not* initiate *Diretas Já!*, despite taking credit for it repeatedly (see, for example, Gushiken 1984). The party was a late entrant to this MDB-initiated effort; however, it made up for it by helping fill the streets and stadiums with supporters.

whether to make the indirect elections direct, the movement attracted over 1.5 million people on a march through São Paulo, making it the largest public demonstration ever to occur in Brazil (Coelho 2007, pp 292-296; Leonelli and de Oliveira 2004).[258]

Weary of continued military control, as well as aware that the public tide was turning in favor of direct elections, the PT embraced wholeheartedly the movement and adopted it as its own. Lula, already a national figure for his role in the São Paulo strikes, soon began heading protests alongside leaders of the PMDB and PDT. According to PT founder and former CEN member (1984-1990) Wladimir Pomar, "The campaign for Diretas Já! was not only the first large mass mobilization that the PT put forth after its founding, but also the first grand alliance practiced by the party with different political currents—including bourgeois ones."[259] Indeed, during its formative years, the PT was deeply involved in Brazil's democratic struggle, from organizing labor strikes in the 1970s, to pushing for amnesty at the turn of the decade, to campaigning for direct elections in 1983 and 1984 (Keck 1992, pp 40-60). The political context had persuaded the PT to moderate its tactics and embrace a broader spectrum of society, not only to distinguish itself from the prevailing regime, but also to be able to participate openly in the political arena.

Embracing their New, Broad Representative Role

Organizing labor strikes, challenging non-democratic policies, and crossing the political aisle to collaborate with diverse groups had an indelible effect on the party's political strategy and appeals. Marching side by side with non-leftists challenged the PT's preconceived notions and political aversion to cross-party collaboration. According to PT

[258] Author interviews with PMDB founder Almino Affonso (30 November 2010) and former PT secretary-general Luiz Dulci (4 October 2010).
[259] Author interview (26 May 2011).

founder and former mayor of Belém (1997-2004) Edmilson Rodrigues, "Engaging in all these alliances changed us. We came in as hard-liners and left changed."[260] Mobilizing the entire spectrum of the pro-democracy electorate forced them to address, target, and, eventually, represent a larger, more heterogeneous swath of the Brazilian electorate.

According to Ricardo Berzoini, former PT president (2005-2006, 2007-2010), *Diretas Já!* fundamentally reordered the party's priorities; this experience made the party start focusing more on "middle-class concerns," such as establishing a minimum wage and advocating on behalf of the social rights of homosexuals, women, Afro-Brazilians, and people with disabilities.[261] Participating in the struggle for democracy encouraged the PT to broaden and deepen its political appeals so that it could better represent its growing and diversifying support base; the experience served as a "dry-run" for the party to witness how one represents constituents (Singer 2001, pp 52-53).

The PT's embrace of *Diretas Já!* helped solidify a change taking place in the party's political tactics, a topic that had been hotly contested within the party by radicals and moderates since its founding. Building off its initial need to rebrand itself as the defender of democracy, the PT fully embraced its new role and sidelined those within its ranks that harbored ultra-narrow sentiments. In this way, a temporary decision that was initially taken by the party—namely, mobilizing to promote a quicker transition from authoritarian rule—took on a life of its own and profoundly affected the party's future developmental trajectory: the PT became increasingly inclusive, representative of more broad opinions, and more open to collaborating across the aisle.

PT founder Ricardo de Azevedo argued that the PT's collaboration with disparate groups during *Diretas Já!* is what made possible the PT's 1988 mayoral wins in São Paulo (with Luiza Erundina), Porto Alegre (with Olívio Dutra), and Vitória (with Vitor

[260] Author interview with (13 October 2010).
[261] Author interview (8 November 2010).

Buaiz).[262] Indeed, shortly after *Diretas Já!*, during the PT's V National Meeting, in Brasília, the party approved the use of alliances with leftist parties. Alone, the PT would have had a very difficult time winning municipal office outside of the party's core support base, in the greater region of São Paulo (namely, Santo André, São Bernardo do Campo, São Caetano do Sul, and Diadema, often referred to as the "ABCD region").

*Diretas Já! f*ailed in its effort to instate direct elections for the 1985 elections. 298 deputies voted in favor of direct elections, with 65 against and three abstaining; however, since 112 deputies were absent, the amendment was 22 votes short of the two-thirds majority needed to change the constitution. The 1985 elections remained indirect. Although the *Diretas Já!* movement faded with the failure to pass the constitutional amendment, the PT nonetheless continued to demand that direct elections be held.[263] While upwards of 85 percent of the population was in favor of the amendment, the vast majority of civil society groups and political parties conceded to the inevitable and sought to plan accordingly for the upcoming indirect elections. The PMDB, in particular, successfully sought a political alliance with the pro-democratic dissidents within ARENA's successor party, the PDS. In this way, Tancredo Neves of the PMDB stood for —and won—the 1985 indirect presidential elections, with José Sarney of the newly formed breakaway from the PDS, the Liberal Front Party (*Partido da Frente Liberal,* PFL) as vice-president (Cardoso 2006, pp 152-154).[264]

[262] Author interview (3 February 2011).

[263] However, early in his term President Sarney instated direct elections for president; Brazil's first direct election was in 1989 (Sallum 2000, p 10).

[264] Tancredo, as Neves was popularly referred to, never took office. He was hospitalized with appendicitis the night before his inauguration. Sarney was sworn in as vice-president and immediately became interim president; once Tancredo died a little over a month later, Sarney assumed the presidency.

The PT, however, insisted on fighting on.[265] Partially due to its wariness of becoming just another voice in the already heavily-populated unified opposition, and partially due to its real fear of continued military control (or, at least, tutorship), the PT refused to concede and accept indirect elections with the PMDB's Neves as the opposition's consensus candidate. After much deliberation, the PT opted to boycott the Electoral College:[266] a pacted transition, its leadership argued, was no transition at all. In this way, the PT positioned itself as an extreme defender of democracy: the party would not budge from its principled defense of democracy, even if it meant not voting for the Democratic Alliance's (*Aliança Democrática*) consensus candidate. While seemingly extremist, the PT's decision not to accept defeat was very much in line with the broader public opinion at the time; it was the compromising *PMDB* that was the outlier. Furthermore, as the PT only held eight of 479 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, it was "allowed" to hold such a principled stance without fear of derailing the democratization process; the PMDB, which held 200 seats, was not so lucky. Such principled stances, explained Brazilian intellectual Bolívar Lamounier, earned the PT the name of "the contrarian party" ("*partido do contra*").[267]

Another example of the PT's newfound democratic zeal was in its opposition to Brazil's Constitution of 1988: while contributing actively to the elaboration of the text, the PT's 16 constituent assemblypersons ultimately voted *against* the final charter.[268] The constitution, they argued, did not go far enough to protect social and economic rights, or advance democracy. Lula and other *petista* assemblypersons denounced the text as

[265] What the PT saw as staying true to its principles other parties saw as sectarianism. The ideological moderation that this dissertation demonstrates was never perfectly linear; rather, it was a series of two-steps-forward and one-step-back.

[266] Three PT federal deputies (Aírton Soares, José Eudes, and Bete Mendes) rebelled and voted for Tancredo. Upon threat of expulsion, the three resigned (Keck 1992, pp 219-223).

[267] Author interview (11 August 2010).

[268] The PT "signed" (*assinou*) the Constitution, as it was a formal, legal requirement to do so. What the PT did not do was participate in the collective approval (*homologação coletiva*) of the Constitution.

"reformist" and, in particular, "against agrarian reform." In a formal announcement to the constituent body, Lula stated that "the party votes against the text, and tomorrow, by decision—majoritarian decision—of our directorate, we will sign the Constitution, because it understand that it is a formal requirement of our participation in this Constituent Assembly" (da Silva 1988). Twenty years later, Lula (2008), claimed that the PT

> voted against the final text of the Constitution because we did not agree with the future regulation (*regulamentação posterior*) of a series of social rights that were being guaranteed. We believed that it would be quite difficult to implement those regulations that had stuck.

In short, the Constitution was reformist and did not go far enough in terms of protecting social and economic rights, particularly for the working class, such as a 40-hour work week (da Silva 1998). Secondly, the Constitution did not do enough to institutionalize democracy. The military remained "untouchable, as if they were first class citizens, so that, in the name of law and order they can repeat what they did in 1964;" indeed, despite the fact that democracy was won by Brazilian society fighting in the streets, "the essence of power, of private property, and the power of the military remains intact" (da Silva 1988). The PT had internalized the wider demands of the Brazilian electorate and worked to channel them within the country's political institutions.

By being cornered into adopting democracy in opposition to the prevailing regime (and thus reformism, broadly defined), leftist radicals who had originally entered the party for purely tactical reasons, such as the Trotskyists (cf. Coelho 2007, pp 267-269), ended up being "absorbed and transformed in the PT. The party was transforming persons and organizations" (Paraná 2006, p 111). In this way, the PT's hands became tied. Its

earlier decision to take on the mantle of democracy created for it a new identity among the electorate based on its unwavering support for democracy; this replaced the party's earlier, far more narrow party platform. The party's initial tactical moderation created a virtuous cycle that linked the PT to a broader and broader segment of the Brazilian electorate. This process had important consequences on the party's ideological outlook, as well; the next section details the PT's process of policy moderation.

From the Politics of Principle to the Politics of Responsibility

The PT's tactical moderation paved the way for later policy moderation, when the political context rewarded parties with more moderate political stances. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the PT's adoption of the democratic banner was not taken lightly by many of the party's more revolutionary, anti-democratic members. However, given the external incentives and constraints to moderate tactically, such ideologues were at a definite disadvantage vis-à-vis their pragmatist counterparts. The defeat of these party members within internal party struggles made sure that the PT would be able to pursue top-down policy moderation in the near future, since the more rebellious members were systematically purged form the party and the real threat of expulsion silenced and/or moderated those radicals remaining in the party (as well as moderates who did not follow the party line).[269] Four instances of party expulsions demonstrate this process.

First, in 1985, three of the PT's eight elected congresspeople, Airton Soares, Bete Mendes, and José Eudes, did not follow the party's stance of boycotting the Electoral College and ended up voting for Neves. The rationale behind their actions was that anyone was better than the regime's candidate, Paulo Maluf. Nonetheless, the party

[269] The PCB and PC do B, which were only able to legalize in 1985, "missed" in a sense the political learning and positive repercussions that came to the PT with participating in *Diretas Já!* Largely because of this, they remained more insular and narrowly focused than the PT, complicating future efforts at policy moderation.

leadership harshly criticized the three congresspeople for "disrespecting the internal democracy of the PT by disobeying the majority decision, taken by its national bodies, to not appear before the Electoral College," and reminded them tersely that "all PT affiliates, even congressmen, should respect and abide by the majoritarian decisions democratically adopted by the party" (Commissão Executiva do PT 1985). After much internal strife, many denunciations, and the real threat of immediate expulsion, all three congresspeople resigned shortly after the incident (Keck 1992, pp 219-223). The party hierarchy demonstrated that it would not tolerate dissent within its ranks, no matter the issue.

Second, the PT's decision to compromise gradually its tactical position of refusing to enter into across-the-aisle alliances drew much ire from the party's leftist ranks. The PT's rejection of party alliances had been challenged from the party's inception by electoral concerns (cf. *Jornal da Tarde* 1983); however, it took the experience of *Diretas Já!* for the party truly to embrace the tactic (and, even so, only with other leftist parties). In particular, the Trotskyist faction, CO, vehemently opposed the change and vowed openly to block its implementation. The PT leadership used the opportunity to set an example and expel the members in question, as the faction had always been a radical thorn in the party's side (the expelled *petistas* went on to form the PCO[270]). The PT's ability to engage in party alliances (*coligações*) is one of many reasons that help explain its electoral growth in the 1990s beyond the party's original strongholds. Indeed, it is often argued that the PT's Lula was only able to win the presidency in 2002, after having lost *three* times before, by selecting a conservative running mate: his vice-president for both presidential terms was José Alencar, a conservative businessman of the center-right Liberal Party (*Partido Liberal*, PL). The PT of the early 1980s would never have

[270] Author interview with PCO president and two-time presidential candidate Rui Costa Pimenta (26 August 2010).

considered allying politically with a conservative politician, evidence of how much the party had changed in the ensuing two decades.[271]

Third, in response to the PT's institutional pursuit of the impeachment of President Fernando Collor de Mello and the party's decision not to challenge the prevailing regime (by agreeing to let Collor's vice-president, Itamar Franco, assume power), the CS faction rebelled against the official party platform and sought a more confrontational approach. CS sought to topple Collor through both institutional and extra-institutional means, while the PT sided with Brazil's centrist parties in not rocking the boat. CS preferred immediate elections—public opinion polls suggested that Lula could win—while the PT as a whole opted to let Franco serve out Collor's term. When CS began insisting on immediate elections, the PT leadership expelled members of the faction (the group went on to form the PSTU[272]).

Finally, and most contentiously, the PT was wracked by internal turmoil over President Lula's decision to implement a series of "neoliberal" reforms, particularly the Social Security Reform (*Reforma da Previdência*) of 2003. The most vocal faction in opposition to these reforms was APS, which was subsequently expelled in 2005 for its rebelliousness (the group went on to form the PSOL). Leaders of all these groups claim

[271] The PT's ability to engage in across-the-aisle alliances had its drawbacks, however: in order to placate the various parties within Lula's governing coalition, the PT ended up buying allied legislators' votes (cf. Hunter 2010; Mendes 2006). This practice was exposed and tried by the Supreme Court; amongst others, former PT presidents José Dirceu and José Genoino were found guilty of corruption (*Estado de S.Paulo* 2012).

[272] Author interviews with PSTU leaders Valério Arcary (20 August 2010) and Mariucha Fontana (10 May 2011). However, the party was only so willing to defend the prevailing regime. Despite helping impeach President Collor, the party decided not to support or help President Franco. Former São Paulo mayor Luiza Erundina, however, accepted a ministerial position from Franco, her rationale being that the PT owed it to Brazil to help ensure stability during such an unprecedented challenge to the country's nascent democracy. At the VIII National Meeting (1993), Erundina was suspended for one year and then subtly forced out in 1997. Author interview (4 February 2011).

that the real reason they were expelled from the PT was because they were "holding back" the party from moderating.[273]

PT pragmatists were thus able to retain control of the party platform and political trajectory. In this way, the party became free to moderate its policy: the absence of radical members plus the threat of expulsion for those who do not follow the party line muted the opposition that destroyed IU and LCR, as will be seen in the next two sections. The extent to which the PT engaged in policy moderation is staggering. A party that once supported bank take-overs, radical agrarian reform, and some ill-defined socialism has become the party of market reforms, implementing World Bank-endorsed targeted social programs (instead of the left's preferred universalist ones) and honoring IMF macro-economic agreements (da Silva 2002). In contrast with the failed cases of IU and LCR, the PT was only able to do this because of the widening of its appeals, which sidelined radicals, tied its hands, and opened the party up to profound policy changes down the line.

IU: Revolutionary Agitators and Terrorism Apologists

Peru's military dictatorship (1968-1980) did not follow the same script as that of the Brazilian one. Unlike their Brazilian counterparts, the Peruvian armed forces were eager to extricate themselves from politics for a variety of reasons.[274] This absence of foot-dragging meant that leftist parties had no need to reposition themselves as the country's defenders of democracy;[275] since IU had no incentive to fight for democracy, its

[273] Author interviews with 2006 PSOL presidential candidate Heloísa Helena (12 January 2011) and PSOL founders Babá (11 April 2011) and Luciana Genro (24 April 2011).

[274] They openly laid out the timetable for the transition: the holding of constituent assembly elections in 1978, such that the Assembly could write a new constitution, followed by parliamentary and presidential elections in 1980.

[275] The left *did* seek to hasten the military's extrication from politics; however, as will be explained shortly, it was *not* seeking a democratic alternative.

subsequent developmental trajectory was markedly different than that of the PT. Peru's soft authoritarian regime did not try to prolong its extrication from power, but instead agreed to leave after convening a constituent assembly (Lynch 1999). This meant that IU's immediate leftist predecessors did not have to adopt the role of defenders of democracy—with democratization assured, there was no need for them to act[276]—and thus felt no societal pressure to expand political appeals or moderate policy down the line. As such, sectarianism and orthodoxy remained strong within Peru's numerous small leftist parties, the immediate predecessors to IU.

Moreover, instead of defending democracy, IU did the opposite and dithered in denouncing categorically the violent leftist terrorist group, Shining Path.[277] Given this history, IU was unable to engage convincingly in policy moderation at the end of the 1980s: it had never tactically moderated, but rather, spent much of the decade parsing the exact circumstances in which political violence is and is not legitimate. Largely because of this failure to adapt, the party split in two and became electorally irrelevant. The next three subsections detail the party's bid for a transition to a non-democratic political regime, its ambiguous stand and tentative support for Shining Path, and the effects of its support on party adaptation, respectively.

The *Gran Paro's* Non-Democratic Ends

Especially after 1975, Peru's armed forces did not want to remain in power. Given the regime's unstructured corporatism and encouragement of mobilization, traditional patron-client vertical relations had broken down. As a result, confrontational and

[276] Nor was there a need to embrace political rights to safeguard their welfare, given the lack of repression against the left.

[277] In addition to being "unable to mark the line on Shining Path and its use of violence," throughout the 1980s IU "never believed in the free market" and "took a while to buy into the idea of liberal democracy." Author interview with Peruvian leftist specialist Cynthia Sanborn (12 July 2011).

combative tactics regained appeal as the military saw its hold over the mobilization and organization process collapse, leading to the praetorianization of society (Mauceri 1996, p 24).[278] Social unrest came to a head with the economic crisis triggered by the steep increases in oil prices in 1973. Economic decline ensued, given the parallel decline in the price of Peruvian commodities, spiraling inflation, and the resulting balance of payments crisis. As a result, General Morales Bermúdez inherited a restive society and a damaged economy from General Velasco, whose own deteriorating health was hampering his government's ability to handle these pressing challenges and run the country. The *gran paro*, or general strike, was the straw that broke the camel's back, convincing the regime of its need to convene democratic elections as soon as possible: a little more than a week after the general strike, the regime announced the convening of constituent assembly elections for the following year (Lynch 1992, pp 125-147).

Peru's left *did* play a role in the military's calculus to extricate itself from power. The left spearheaded the *gran paro* in 1977 (McClintock 1999); however, unlike the PT vis-à-vis *Diretas Já!*, it was *not* advocating democracy. According to Peruvian intellectual Julio Cotler, the Peruvian left had "never been a fan of democracy." Indeed, during the democratic transition, the left was "decidedly not in favor of democracy, but rather revolution; it got to democracy by default."[279] It was advocating a "transition from military rule," not a "transition to democratic rule:" it was looking to implement a radical form of socialism. Aldo Panfichi, press secretary for Barrantes' 1983 Mayoral Campaign Committee, claimed that the unifying call among the left at the time was not democracy,

[278] Samuel Huntington (1968) argues that modernization must take place within the context of positive institutional outlets. Otherwise, uncontrolled modernization may cause revolution and upheaval: praetorianism.

[279] Author interview (25 July 2011).

but rather "more than democracy" ("*más que democracia*"), meaning a "more direct and radical but less liberal" democracy.[280]

Blinded by their dogmatic beliefs, the left had interpreted the initially enormous level of popular support for the paralyzing strike as evidence that the country was ripe for popular insurrection and that the electorate was seeking a socialist revolution. According to former IU Senator Rolando Ames, there was, without a doubt, a large, combative, disaffected, popular movement in Peru at the time, "paralyzing strikes," "social unrest," the "tell-tale signs of a revolution in the making;" however, the belief that this was a "revolutionary mass was the figment of the left's imagination," according to former Revolutionary Vanguard militant Carmen Balbi.[281] Leftists were convinced that the old regime was on its way out and that they were the people's revolutionary vanguard, uniquely positioned to lead the people to socialism (Nieto 1983). Even after the military had agreed to hand over power to civilian hands, the left *rejected* the transition plan and denounced the democratic elections: it was hedging its bets on a genuine revolution from below (Sanborn 1991, pp 115-116).[282]

Peru's Marxist left participated in the elections, but only because they wanted the free media time and subsequent protected institutional space to denounce the military, divulge their anti-system beliefs, and provide national political expression to the popular movements (Sanborn 1991, pp 145-146). For instance, former guerrilla leader Hugo Blanco, who ended up receiving the most votes of any leftist candidate, used his television spots to denounce democracy and advocate armed struggle (Tuesta 1980). Even after getting elected, many leftist parliamentarians used their position as a soapbox

[280] Author interview (15 July 2011).
[281] Author interviews with Ames (14 July 2011) and Balbi (13 July 2011).
[282] There are two important (albeit minor) exceptions: two of IU's component-parties, PCP and the pro-Velasco PSR supported the elections from the beginning.

from which to criticize the government, according to former IU leader Antonio Zapata.[283] Some even boycotted the constitutional drafting, instead choosing to continue engaging in popular mobilizational efforts in the streets. For instance, the former guerrilla Ricardo Napurí unabashedly used his position of constituent assemblyperson as a platform from which to overthrow the prevailing order and install a socialist regime, claimed Peruvian intellectual Julio Cotler.[284]

Subsequently, because Peru's vanguard leftists were not compelled to defend democracy (they were advocating for socialism), they felt no need to reach out to diverse social groups or other political parties. IU did not find the need to widen its political appeals later on; instead, it insulated itself from all but the most radical elements in society as it continued to radicalize.

IU did end up administering a majority of Lima's many individual districts in the middle of the 1980s. However, the party remained incapable of engaging in a dialogue with its constituents and understanding what exactly society wanted from their elected officials. The lack of policy moderation led to much dissatisfaction with the party. Former IU militant Carmen Balbi put it succinctly: "people wanted their garbage collected, not the Cold War to be fought."[285] Henry Pease, vice-mayor of Lima from 1983-1986 under Barrantes, claimed that the process of administering the capital may have moderated those directly involved; however, "it just did not have much influence on the ideology of the party as a whole."[286]

Furthermore, the processes initiated by and mechanisms adopted as a result of earlier decisions became self-reinforcing, as IU found it increasingly difficult to support democracy after having repeated so often its mantra of socialist revolution. Indeed, when

[283] Author interview (1 August 2011).
[284] Author interview (25 July 2011).
[285] Author interview (13 July 2011).
[286] Author interview (13 July 2011).

armed insurrectionary groups arose to challenge the very existence of Peru's liberal-democratic state in the name of traditionally leftist goals, many sectors of IU never denounced the subsequent political violence and the party as a whole took too long to distance itself from the groups' violent means and totalitarian ends. Instead of entering into a grand alliance with non-leftists groups and parties to ostracize the imminent threat to Peru's democratic regime, IU opted to side with its ideological brethren, no matter how extreme, and thus close preclude the chance of new sectors of the electorate from entering the party.

Support of Shining Path

On election day of 1980—the very election that signaled the end of Peru's 12-year dictatorship—the leftist Shining Path launched a Maoist-based armed insurrection aimed at overthrowing the Peruvian state and initiating a dictatorship of the proletariat (McClintock 1984). Shining Path traced its roots back José Carlos Mariátegui, who had argued back in the 1920s for the creation of a Leninist vanguard party in Peru to organize its Indians as the revolutionary class, as Peru lacked an industrial proletariat class at the time. Helped by the political vacuum in the countryside created by the revolutionary military government's destruction of the old order in the 1970s, Abimael Guzmán revisited Mariátegui's works with a Maoist emphasis on rural rebellion as the motor for revolutionary change, founded Shining Path, and initiated its popular war. The group was so successful because it fed off of peasant redress and addressed the profound exclusion of Peru's mostly-indigenous, poor, underbelly: it promised to end poverty, inequality, and marginalization (del Pino 1998, p 170; Woy-Hazleton and Hazleton 1990, 1992).

Senderistas, as the guerrillas were known, were not anomalous to the Peruvian context. The group's origins lay squarely within the confines of Peru's Marxist left, whose parties considered them their "poor, provincial cousins" (Hinojosa 1988; Rénique 2003). Indeed, Shining Path counted among its followers many former members of IU's component parties, in particular Red Fatherland, Communist Party of Peru – Red Flag (*Partido Comunista del Perú - Bandera Roja*, PCP-BR), VR, and PCP. Julio César Mezzich of VR went on to become a high-ranking Shining Path figure, in charge of the short-lived project to turn the insurgent group into the militant wing of IU, according to IU party intellectual Fernando Tuesta.[287] Another paradigmatic case was Lino Quintanilla, a former VR militant who joined Shining Path in 1980.

Also in the progressive camp was the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (*Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru*, MRTA). IU's connections to the MRTA were even deeper and more direct. The MRTA was created by a radical faction of former IU militants and enjoyed, at the least, tacit support from IU. This complicated IU's ability to distance itself from them: MRTA "wasn't a distant and despised relative, but our dear first cousins" (Zapata 2009). Former IU senator and CDN member Javier Díez Canseco's comments in an interview with the author demonstrates the camaraderie between the MRTA (which was listed by both the US and Peruvian government as a terrorist organization) and IU (here, the PUM):

> We couldn't associate with them after they went clandestine, but before we were very close with them. They were different [from Shining Path]; they were not terrorists. Even though they placed bombs in buildings, used car bombs, and what not, they were not terrorists.[288]

[287] Author interview (8 July 2011).
[288] Author interview (2 August 2011).

Peruvian intellectual specialist José Luis Rénique claimed that the PUM had intended for the MRTA to become its military wing some day[289] (see also PUM 1987, p 113).

Former VR militant Carmen Balbi related that, to many IU members, *senderistas* were merely "*compañeros equivocados*," leftist peers "mistaken" in their interpretation of Marx and in their understanding of how to bring about a socialist revolution.[290] Many among the legal left—and even within IU's moderate wing—appeared concerned less about the nihilistic violence and atrocities committed by Shining Path than about the fact that the group was not engaging in the "proper" form of revolution (cf. Barrantes 1985): Shining Path was too Maoist, it was run by country-bumpkins, its actions were not in coordination with other Marxist groups.

The affinity between Shining Path and the legal left soured as the decade progressed: as the group began targeting more and more IU members, the party began to distance itself from Shining Path and denounce its tactics.[291] Nonetheless, IU members—particularly those from Red Fatherland—continued to flock to the group[292] and IU still shared much in common with the extremist group.[293] For instance, while Red Fatherland "postponed" the inevitable armed struggle for a later, more opportune moment and thus did not take up arms, it nonetheless remained quite militaristic, claimed former IU senator and PSR secretary general Enrique Bernales: its slogan was "power is born from a rifle" ("*El poder nace del fusil*")[294] Later on in the decade, even once virtually all of IU denounced and fought against Shining Path, "The public announcements and official

289 Author interview (1 September 2011).
290 Author interview (13 July 2011).
291 Author interview with Peruvian intellectual Julio Cotler (25 July 2011).
292 Interestingly enough, Julio Cotler admitted that "the left finally 'discovered' democracy through Shining Path and Fujimori [and his self-coup]." Author interview (25 July 2011).
293 Confusingly enough, after having finally distanced themselves from Shining Path, IU's radical wing blamed the group's rise and success in part on IU's moderates because "they were not able to crystalize an alternative government and power in the late 1970s" and were, thus, responsible for ARI's collapse (PUM 1987, p 85).
294 Author interview (14 July 2011).

declarations of IU and its [component] parties often criticized Shining Path for its 'provocative and adventuresome' terrorist actions; but they were not frontal boundaries, they did not treat Shining Path for what they were, that is, enemies" (Guerra García 2012, p 85).

According to the final report from Peru's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (*Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación*), the one thing that unified Peru's diverse leftist parties in 1980 was their support for armed struggle and their profound under-appreciation for the forms, rules, and procedures of democracy (CVR 2003, p 169). According to former IU Senator Edmundo Murrugarra, "almost all of the parties [of the Peruvian Left] had militant wings, but they let Shining Path take their place...when they declared war, we did not have a clear position. Most of the Left vacillated and was confused and contradictory vis-a-vis Shining Path" (quoted in *La Republica,* 11 September 2011).

Toward the end of the 1980s, some moderate IU politicians did explicitly foreswear political violence: see, for example, IU senator and CDN member Edmundo Murrugarra's (1988) "We Renounce the Dictatorship of the Proletariat Thesis" ("*Renuciamos a la Tesis de la Dictadura del Proletariado*"). However, the fact that a major, legitimate party had to make such proclamations—in 1988—demonstrates just how radical the party really was. Futhermore, Murrugarra states that neither PUM nor UNIR have abandoned the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

IU as a whole would *not* foreswear armed struggle; rather, it continued to see itself as a revolutionary, socialist front, which "does not renounce, on principle, any means of struggle or form of organization. It combines each and every [mean and form], be they legal or illegal, overt or covert, depending on the circumstance.…class struggle is complex, sharp, and, at times, violent" (IU 1984). By positioning itself close to Shining

Path, IU had no opportunity to bring new sectors in, meaning the party could remain an echo chamber since there was little internal pressure to widen its appeals.

Given their vocal support of armed struggle and socialist revolution, it proved difficult for IU to condemn Shining Path's actions, which had been made in the name of Marxism: denunciation would have been contradictory and hypocritical, according to former Senator and PSR General Secretary Enrique Bernales, former guerrilla and leftist intellectual Héctor Béjar, and principal researcher of leftist parties for Peru's Truth and Reconciliation Commission Ricardo Caro.[295] Instead, IU's reaction to Shining Path was indecisive and ambiguous (Burt 1998; Rénique 1998). Barrantes and other moderate IU politicians did eventually denounce Shining Path; however, their condemnations were generally tempered. During a discussion on Shining Path in 1981, Barrantes argued that IU's continued acceptance of political violence was legitimate not only because violence very well might be necessary at some future date—although Shining Path was wrong to use it at this juncture—but also because political violence does not necessarily mean terrorism.[296]

IU criticism of SL's actions was often premised on the fact that they would not be successful and would instead elicit a violent counteraction by the armed forces: "This coup [against Shining Path], as is evident, will have as its objective not only the liquidation of Shining Path, but also that of IU" (CNM 1989, pp 6-7).[297] Instead of criticizing Shining Path outright for its ultra-extremist ideology and deplorable actions, IU focused much of its criticism on the negative repercussions that its "popular war"

[295] Author interviews with Bernales (14 July 2011), Béjar (25 July 2011), and Caro (4 July 2011).

[296] Interview in *OIGA* (29 June 1981), cited in Barrantes (1985).

[297] Shining Path actually *was* attempting to provoke a rebellion in order to hasten the demise of the prevailing democratic regime (CVR 2003, II.1.1). Some in IU welcomed this: radical members of the PUM—termed "Libyans" ("*libios*") because many of them had allegedly traveled to Libya for training and had received guns from Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi (1969-2011)—hoped that Shining Path would destroy the State, facilitating IU's take-over and implementation of a "third way" between democracy and communism. Author interview with academic specialist on Peruvian intellectuals José Rénique (1 September 2011); see also Rénique (2004).

would bring about: by destabilizing the regime, Shining Path would incite the military to engage in a coup d'état. By doing so, IU effectively deflected its anti-Shining Path criticism by simultaneously condemning—and equating—Shining Path with the armed forces (which was portrayed as a loose cannon, waiting for any pretense to reenter politics). When IU moderates, such as Barrantes and members of the PSR, did condemn Shining Path's violence, it was often done so only after being likened to the violence engaged by Peru's armed forces in the countryside (cf. IU 1988a, p 12). State-sanctioned terror is a gross violation of the social contract between democratic states and their citizenry; however, there is a qualitative difference between excessive state violence during an anti-insurgency campaign and terrorism (Murrugarra 2003).

IU was never faced with the incentive to collaborate across the aisle and fight for democracy; as such, it never moderated its policies or outlook. Whereas other leftist parties began adapting ideologically during the same moment in world history, IU continued to defend armed struggle. Indeed, "IU's strategic objective was not the consolidation of the democratic regime, but rather the creation of conditions that would bring about a socialist society" (Lynch 1999, p 179).

To be fair, a very significant percentage of the IU *did* end up denouncing Shining Path by the decade's end, even if it left open the possibility of its own, "genuine" armed struggle in the near future; the first to do so were Barrantes, the PCP, and the PSR (cf PUM 1987, p 82). Toward the end of the 1980s, the IU's moderate wing began to denounce vehemently political violence and engage in scathing self-criticism of the Peruvian left's continued ambivalence toward democracy. However, some analysts claim that the about-face was the result of SL's increase in assassinations of the legal left: Shining Path murdered, among others, Deputy Eriberto Arroyo of Piura, and Alderman Benigno Ayala of Cangallo (radical leftist groups often target more moderate leftist

groups, as the latter are their principal competition, and vice versa, spatially speaking). Much was the same for Shining Path. However, so long as SL kept its persecution of IU politicians and popular-sector leaders to a minimum, the IU could turn a blind eye. Carmen Balbi, a former Revolutionary Vanguard militant, lamented that such assassinations had initially been accepted by the IU as "collateral damage" (daños colaterales), necessary but unavoidable losses in the broader goal of achieving socialism.[298]

Never any Policy Moderation

The Peruvian left was faced with an opportunity to prove its democratic credentials and appeal to a wider segment of society in the late 1970s; however, it failed to do so. Because the left never sought to enter into a broad alliance of pro-democratic forces, its base never diversified and the left never gained the experience of collaborating across the aisle. Had such actions taken place, it would have necessitated a widening of political appeals by the newly formed IU to represent its broad base. Instead, given the party's "ideological ambivalence" regarding democracy, and its "ambiguity" regarding Shining Path (Lynch 1999, p 179), the IU, like its leftist predecessors from the 1970s, came down narrowly in favor of armed, anti-system insurgent groups, instead of democracy, the prevailing political regime, and—most importantly—the diverse needs of

[298] Author interview (13 July 2011). Another, less pessimistic, view would see SL's 1983 massacre of 69 peasants accused of collaborating with the military, in and around the Andean town of Lucanamarca (see CVR 2003, V.2.2), as the left's turning point. In the beginning of the 1980s, there was much misinformation about Shining Path, what it represented, and what exactly it was doing in the countryside. This massacre, well documented and widely publicized, however, should have put an end to any ambiguity Peruvians may have had about the means and intentions of this messianic, ultra-violent extremist group. A counter-argument, however, would point to the fact that the Left never denounced MRTA, which, while far less violent, was likewise officially categorized as a terrorist organization: "...MRTA's armed actions, despite their conceptual and methodological differences from Shining Path, create distortions within the field of the popular organizations, creating difficulties the work of organization and mobilization and impeding the proper linkages between the fight for peach with justice, for democracy, and for socialism (IU 1988b, p 12). The MRTA, it should be noted, never targeted Leftist or popular sector leaders.

Peruvian society. IU was unable to denounce categorically Shining Path, according to Peruvian intellectual Julio Cotler, because, denouncing the group would simultaneously mean supporting the police, army, and the (bourgeois) democratic regime.[299]

By not defending the country's nascent democracy, the IU took the wrong side of Peru's public opinion trends (McClintock 1989); the party's core constituency remained limited and unrepresentative of (and thus unaccountable to) the average Peruvian voter, and the party's leadership had little experience or precedence collaborating across the aisle with political adversaries. IU thus remained only partially wedded to the legal-political realm as a result. This helped prevent the party from adapting successfully to exogenous changes in the future: the party never moderated tactically.

Into the late 1980s, IU members did not widen their appeals to appeal to more and more of the electoral. Instead, they advocated extra-parliamentary political struggles: "Revolution is a historical necessity in Peru...The definition of IU as a revolutionary front of masses comes from this idea, which determines its nature, goals, tasks, and forms of organization and corresponding struggles" (APS 1987, p 9). They sought to undermine the prevailing politico-economic regime: IU deputy Fernando Sánchez Albavera (1989) criticized his party's ideologues by pointing out that:

> What is happening is that [IU] Senator Diez Canseco believes that if the economic situation deteriorates even more, and if the people become more impoverished, it would favor a supposed pre-revolutionary situation, consistent with the insurrectional line adopted by the PUM in its last congress.

They refused to renounce political violence. In reaction to the push by some IU militants to renounce political violence,[300] the PUM (1989) declared that

[299] Author interview (25 July 2011).

[300] One such example, by José Luis Velásquez (1988), was: "It is urgent that all socialists break with their militaristic (and embarrassing) position and state that violence is neither a revolutionary principle nor a

> Renouncing the right to use violence and to rebel against oppressors is an unmitigated capitulation. History has taught us that those with power will not give up their privileges without fighting by all means at their disposal. It is not only naïve, but foolish and blind to think that announcing that we will not fight will ensure that their will not fight (p 6).

Finally, they took years to denounce categorically the Shining Path. In fact, the real turning point between Shining Path and the Peruvian state occurred when the peasants turned against the insurgency. Violence against peasants—and, particularly, the assassination of peasant leaders and members of the CCP—convinced the peasantry to jump ship and start collaborating with the state against the insurgency.[301]

This failure to engage in tactical moderation had ideological repercussions later on: policy moderation proved impossible, in effect assigning the party to the dustbin of history. Despite controlling the party's presidency, IU moderates were unable to push through policy moderation. Deepening divisions between the party's two wings led to IU's split, in the build-up to the 1990 election: unable to effect the kind of top-down change that Lula achieved in the PT, Barrantes and his more pragmatic followers were forced to jump ship and start their own party.

The IU was rent principally by internal disagreements over whether the party should engage in contentious politics alongside its electoral measures, and whether or not it should defend and accept the prevailing political regime, or try to overthrow it from the inside-out. For instance, former IU senator and CDN representative Javier Díez Canseco argued that the IU divided over fundamental disagreements over whether or not:

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libertarian value."

[301] Also helpful was Fujimori's embrace and promotion of peasant rounds (*rondas campesinas*), autonomous, rural, peasant controls. Author interview with CCP president Andrés Luna Vargas (19 July 2011).

> We should seek power through elections, or should we sit out of elections? Should we let Garcia govern out his term, or make him abdicate early? Should we participate and augment social conflicts? Should the 'transition' be purely electoral, or should it be electoral coupled with social struggles [i.e., strikes, land occupations, etc].[302]

Barrantes, as well as the more moderate component parties and independents, sided with liberal democracy, while the PUM, as well as the more radical component parties of UNIR and FOCEP, were less supportive of the prevailing democratic regime. Sectarian, internecine battles became drawn-out, particularly over the composition of IU's presidential and congressional slates.

The principal concern of Barrantes, as well as of the PSR and PCR, was supporting the democratic regime and protecting against economic collapse, a potential rightist military coup, and/or an escalation of hostilities by the insurrectionary Shining Path. He embraced APRA President Alan García's proposed national accord—which involved eliminating costly subsidies and bringing the IMF back in—with the left as a necessary evil. IU's radical wing, however, took this as evidence that Barrantes had become "each time more distant from the people, and each time more reactionary" (PUM 1988b) and that he was still an "Aprista at heart"—Barrantes had been a member of APRA before joining IU as an independent politician, not tied to any of its leftist component parties (Taylor 1990, pp 111-112). In fact, according to principal researcher of leftist parties for Peru's Truth and Reconciliation Commission Ricardo Caro, many radical IU militants and supporters actually think that Barrantes abdicated the second round of the 1985 presidential elections, letting García win. While Barrantes had served as a lawyer for many leftists, he was never considered a partisan of any of IU's

[302] Author interview (2 August 2011).

component parties; rather, he was embraced as an independent, consensus figure who garnered respect from virtually all leftists.[303]

For their part, IU's radicals—PUM, UNIR, and FOCEP, along with smaller groups and some non-aligned individuals—were holding out for social revolution, instead of looking to engage in across-the-aisle alliances in defense of the beleaguered democratic regime. The three main parties deemphasized parliamentary action in favor of establishing and training popular organization in the social sphere as a way of accumulating revolutionary forces for the impending showdown. As late as 1988, the PUM was criticizing its IU brethren for being too focused on seeking to obtain power via democratic-institutional channels (PUM 1988b), placing value upon the electoral struggle, and, most telling of all, looking to "manage the crisis and save the old system [i.e., the prevailing regime]" (PUM 1988c, p 77). The PUM (1988) reaffirmed—in 1988—its priority in "the revolutionary political struggle;" it sought to:

> Develop a counter-power capable of developing all the forms of struggle and combining the most varied forms of organization to defeat the bourgeois, semi-colonial power [of the Peruvian state]...We should reject the over-valuation of the electoral struggle [without abandoning or abstaining from it] (pp 76-77).

Unlike Barrantes et al., the "PUF faction" (named after the first letter of each of the three radical component parties) saw little point in defending what they felt was a democratic regime in name only, according to IU intellectual Nicolás Lynch.[304] the only way to to bring about the fundamental socio-political and economic changes needed for Peru to establish a truly democratic government and society free of abject poverty was to abolish the old system and start anew (cf. Taylor 1990).

[303] Author interview (4 July 2011).
[304] Author interview (1 August 2011).

These competing factions jockeyed fiercely for power. Beginning in early 1988, the Barrantes faction tried to consolidate their position and worked to expel the more radical factions; however, despite having more militants and nonaligned support, their moderate position was a minority position in the ranks of the party hierarchy. The problem was that many otherwise moderate IU members were plagued by their failure to moderate tactically. For instance, it was widely assumed that most members of IU's Christian Left, which were for the most part grouped under the party's "independent" label, would side with Barrantes, whether he succeeded in expelling the radicals or was himself expelled by them. Given the rigid structure of IU (see Chapter 4), party activities and decisions were all determined by one's component party. For this reason, nonaligned party militants, which made up the bulk of IU's rank-and-file (and which were, for the most part, moderate), had little formal power or sway within the party bureaucracy.

What ended up taking place, though, was that the formerly moderate Christian Left insisted on continuing to equate terrorist violence with the "violence" committed by the Ministry of the Economy (Lynch 1999; Murrugarra 2003). In part for ideological reasons, they were convinced to remain within IU once it became clear that Barrantes had lost the battle and would leave the party.[305] Following Barrantes's departure, Henry Pease, the de facto leader of IU's Christian Left, became IU president and presidential candidate; his 1990 campaign slogan was "no to killing by hunger [caused by capitalism] nor by [Shining Path's] bullets" ("*No mata ni con hambre ni con balas*"), according to IU intellectual Nicolás Lynch[306] (cf. Murrugarra 2003). Much the same can be said for the middle-of-the-road PCP, which opted to remain within IU.

[305] To be fair, many moderates also remained within IU for the sake of not splintering the party

[306] Author interview (1 August 2011). On the other hand, Barrantes's slogan was "everyone against terrorism." Author interview with former IU Senator and CDN member Edmundo Murrugarra (18 July 2011).

The IU collapsed in 1989, along with any hopes of remaining a viable national contender: Barrantes, the PCR, and nonaligned militants left in August of that year to found the AS, later renamed the IS. The split distracted the two sides from focusing on the municipal and presidential elections of 1989 and 1990, respectively, in which both parties fared poorly; many former IU supporters ended up throwing their support behind presidential candidate Alberto Fujimori.[307] Had the party been able to adapt without splitting in two, Barrantes would most certainly have made it at least to the presidential run-off, given his high level of voter preference just months before (cf. Taylor 1990, p 113).[308] Given the poor electoral showings, coupled with confusion and anger on the part of IU's former supporters at its inability to represent them, both parties fizzled out in the early 1990s, with dire consequences for Peru's party system. To garner legitimacy, party systems need to represent the full range of policy options to the electorate; Peru's party system collapsed shortly after IU's demise.

The IU did not collapse because of Peru's party system collapse;[309] in fact, the collapse of the IU is, arguably, partially to blame for Peru's party system breakdown. The right (Belaúnde) and center (García) had already tried their luck at running the country in 1980 and 1985, respectively. Had the left been able to adapt successfully to the changing times Barrantes could have won the 1990 election; had the left been able to adapt

307 While Fujimori is perhaps best known ideologically for his neoliberal shock program, he ran on a center/center-left platform in which he vehemently denounced neoliberal structural adjustments (cf. Stokes 2001; O'Donnell 1994; Roberts 1995b; Cameron 1994).

308 In March of 1988, Barrantes enjoyed 36 percent support and was projected to win a landslide victory in a second round run-off. His percentage of the voter preference slipped shortly thereafter; however, he remained in a safe second place until two months before the 1990 election (Schmidt 1996, p 329).

309 One could claim that it was not the political context in which the IU was born that was to blame for its failure to adapt, but rather the collapse of Peru's party-system as a whole that was responsible. Such an argument is flawed, however, because the party system collapsed after the IU did. Peru's political parties were doing relatively fine throughout the 1980s: parties had successfully achieved the basic partisan goal of political representation throughout this tempestuous decade (Tanaka 1998). Peru's party system deteriorated in the early 1990s, then collapsed in 1992 following Fujimori's self-coup (Dietz and Myers 2007; Tanaka 1998). Fujimori disparaged the country's traditional parties, withdrew state support from parties (Tuesta 2001), and disbanded congress (Conaghan 2005)

successfully it would not have opened up a vacuum on the left side of the political spectrum, of which the anti-system, centrist Fujimori so adeptly took advantage.

LCR: Unchastened Radicals and the 1992 Coups

Similar to IU, LCR was never compelled to stand up in favor of democracy—and thus enter into a broad, pro-democratic alliance—because it arose within a democratic context: Venezuela had been governed by a democratic regime for twenty years prior to LCR's birth as a political party. As such, LCR never had the same need as Brazil's PT, Chile's PS, or Uruguay's FA had to differentiate itself from the prevailing regimes and become democratic stalwarts. This lack of incentive to engage in tactical moderation meant that LCR was less likely to do; it also complicated future moves to engage in policy moderation, making it less likely as well. Like IU, LCR never witnessed the broadening of its support base (along with the ensuing positive repercussions that this would bring) that the PT did.

Similar to the case of IU, internecine battles over the proper role of political parties and the legitimate realm of political action led to a party schism, which spelled the end to LCR's political relevance. The next three subsections detail the party's internal struggle between democrats and revolutionaries, its role in what became the attempted military coup of 4 February 1992 (as well as the one on 27 November of that same year), and the effects of its non-democratic support on party adaptation, respectively.

The Battle Between Democrats and Revolutionaries

Since 1958, Venezuela had been categorized as a democratic regime. As it was not possible to construct a mobilizing cleavage around regime type, *causaerristas*

initially focused their efforts on building off of the struggles of narrow, pre-existing social movements. Indeed, after years of mobilizing and organizing in the state of Bolívar, Velásquez and his *Matanceros* successfully took control of Sidor's labor unions, which had previously been dominated by AD, and pushed their New Unionism agenda of ensuring that workers get their due say in the decisions that affect their lives and livelihood (Salamanca 1998). Due in large part to the extraordinary success of the *Matanceros*, LCR ended up being seen as a narrow, single-issue and -class party (Hellinger 1996). This myth became self-fulfilling as the party's three other segments (students, the urban poor, and intellectuals) were ignored in favor of the worker success story; their movements broke with the party or slowly petered out.

Given his charisma, electability, and extreme popularity, Velásquez quickly assumed the mantle of de-facto party leader following the death of Maneiro, LCR's founder and intellectual mastermind, in 1983. While Velásquez undoubtedly was (and continues to be) a democrat concerned primarily with improving the working and living conditions of Venezuela's steelworkers and the country's middle class overall, other members of the party were not as moderate in their tactics or political goals. Although Velásquez was LCR's public face and most popular politician, within the party, Pablo Medina, LCR's nominal secretary-general, held a significant amount of sway. And unlike Velásquez, Medina's ideological stance was extremist; he was uninterested in widening the party's appeals to capture a larger audience.

Medina, like Maneiro, was a former guerrilla who retained much of his 1960s radical bend. He had been sent to Bolívar in 1972 by Maneiro to infiltrate the region's social movements and look for organic intellectuals and native leaders that could be recruited into the future LCR project. Medina bided his time as the party increased its scope and gained new converts among social movement militants; his real goal was to

"deepen democracy" by inaugurating a new, radical form of democratic governance after having dismantled the pre-existing, "nominally democratic" one. The *Caracazo*—the massive, spontaneous urban uprising that came about in 1989 in response to President Carlos Andrés Pérez's "*Gran Viraje,*"[310] in which hundreds to thousands died by the hands of Venezuela's security apparatuses[311]—convinced Medina (and many others) that the time was ripe for action.[312] Along with treasonous members of the armed forces, who had been converted and nurtured since the 1970s, Medina and LCR's more radical members began plotting a civilian-military insurrection; they had no interest in embracing a larger portion of Venezuelan society, but rather, sought to take power by force.

The Coup of 4F

A series of internal and external events triggered fierce intra-party debates that exposed and accentuated the ideological and institutional incoherence that had existed within LCR ever since it stopped being a small, tight-knit group of like-minded social activists in Venezuela's Guayana region. The most bitter of these debates was over the decision of whether or not to participate actively in the planned civilian-military insurrection of 4 February 1992 ("4F"), which turned into an attempted military coup

310 The abrupt shift towards an open economy in full compliance with the IMF's dictates. While arguably unavoidable, Andrés Pérez's actions have been criticized because he did not consult with the business community before adopting the austerity package. Because the private sector was caught off-guard by the threat of the imminent dismantling of protection, manufacturers swiftly cut back production and businesses withheld government-regulated food to drive prices up, further exacerbating the plight of poor workers and consumers (Coronil and Skurski 2004, p 93).

311 The Committee of the Relatives of the Victims (*El Comité de Familiares de las Víctima*s, Cofavic) has documentation thus far of 470 deaths, almost twice the official number (276). However, a mass grave was uncovered in Caracas's public cemetery in which the government had buried sixty-eight victims in plastic garbage bags; these unidentified bodies were never included in the official number (Coronil 1997, p 377). Furthermore, there were approximately 2,000 disappeared persons from 27 to 28 February 1989.

312 For a definitive picture of Venezuela during Carlos Andrés Pérez's second term of office (1989-1993), see Rivero (2010).

headed by Hugo Chávez. Since LCR had never been presented with an incentive to moderate tactically, much of the party remained ambivalent towards democracy and the party's representative role within Venezuelan democracy, and ended up leaving LCR over the party's official line, insisting on parliamentary and electoral political engagement.

Throughout the 1970s and up to his death, Maneiro had regular contact with a number of members of Venezuela's military. According to General Müller Rojas (1991), LCR's continued adherence to the idea of armed struggle as a legitimate means to power led its members to look to utilize the "internal contradictions of the military sector of society [i.e., the fact that some servicemen, many from lower class backgrounds, felt uncomfortable propping up an increasingly exclusionary democratic regime that had, in 1989, used force against the people] to achieve their combined participation in the popular insurrection" that they sought to foment (p 72).

To this end, in 1983 Chávez and other military figures, who had been in regular contact with Maneiro and Medina, founded a clandestine, subversive, civilian-military organization aimed at toppling the existing political regime and taking power by force (cf. Zago 1998; Garrido 2000b). The MBR-200 combined the Marxist-Leninist ideals of Douglas Bravo with populist/nationalist ones from Simón Bolívar, Simón Rodríguez, and Ezequiel Zamora, three historical Venezuelan heroes (Garrido 2000a, pp 5-10).

Original plans had called for a popular, civilian-military insurrection. Chávez—along with Francisco Arias Cárdenas and other treasonous colonels, majors, captains, and lieutenants, along with the troops from the Maracay, Maracaibo, and Valencia quarters—had been planning for 10-15 years with leftist civilian radicals an eventual overthrow of the existing Punto Fijo regime. According to Arias Cárdenas—4F's second-in-command and later LCR governor of Zulia (1996-2000)[313]—the idea was for Chávez and himself to

[313] The main catalyst for MBR-200's decision to embrace the electoral route was Arias Cárdenas's surprise win in 1995. The group did not consider its leaders—including Chávez—viable political candidates in

overthrow the government, disband the noxious traditional parties, transform the army into "guardians of the revolution," and then immediately create a civilian-military, tutelary junta to rule for one year until elections for a constitutional assembly would be held; on that junta would sit Andrés Velásquez, as well as José Vicente Rangel of the leftist MAS (Garrido 2000a; Garrido 2000b).

Until roughly 1996,[314] MBR-200 rejected elections as the route to power and called for abstentionism (López Maya 2005, p 175). Civilian leftists included Maneiro, Medina, and especially militants from the two minuscule parties Red Flag (*Bandera Roja*) and Revolutionary Venezuelan Party (*Partido Revolucionario Venezolano*, PRV). Similarly, many PRV militants, such as Rodríguez and Uzcátegui, flocked to LCR in the late 1980s (Ruiz 2001; Sonntag and Maingón 1992; Ramírez 2006). Chávez sidelined many of the LCR plotters at the last minute. The plot failed and the principal military participants were jailed; many of the insurgents were surprised that there was no popular insurrection following the attempted coup (Müller Rojas 1992).

By 1987, certain LCR leaders, including Secretary-General Pablo Medina and Alí Rodríguez, were clandestinely participating in the preparations for a civilian-military insurrection (Rosas, 2009a). Instead of seeking out like-minded individuals and groups within the legal political realm, LCR's ideologues were plotting treason. Following the *Caracazo*, the group of *causaerristas* actively plotting with the MBR-200 grew to include Roger Capella, Freddy Gutiérrez, Rafael Uzcátegui, José Albornoz, and General Alberto Müller Rojas, as well. It is unclear whether or not the rest of LCR's leaders knew about the preparations: according to Rafael Uzcátegui, former LCR leader and national deputy, many claim to have known nothing of these subversive plans until a few months

democratic elections (Sánchez Urribarri 2008).

314 MBR-200 transformed into Chávez's Fifth Republic Movement (*Movimiento Quinta República*, MVR), one of Chávez's many personal electoral vehicles, in 1997.

beforehand,[315] while the rank-and-file only found out about the participation of many LCR leaders after 4F. Venezuelan left specialist and former LCR intellectual Margarita López Maya, however, claims that all of LCR's leaders were complicit, including Velásquez. Shortly before 4F, she avers, Velásquez had a change of heart and then subsequently denied any knowledge of LCR's involvement after the fact because he thought it would harm his electoral prospects in the upcoming presidential election.[316] Chávez seems to concur (cf. Blanco Muñoz 2003). Former LCR national leader Gustavo Hernandez claimed that discussion of this insurrectional vision was openly taking place within the party since, at least, 1989.[317]

In November of 1991, in a meeting of LCR national leaders in Valencia, Pablo Medina divulged to the party that certain LCR leaders were helping prepare for a civilian-military rebellion (Medina 1999, pp 41-44). While the majority of LCR's leadership initially rejected any form of participation on the part of the party, unanimity was not achieved and no action could therefore be taken, thanks to internal decision-making mechanisms stipulating that decision-making be done on a consensus-basis, according to former LCR leader and national deputy Gustavo Hernandez.[318] Given the failure to achieve consensus behind the party's non-involvement, Medina and Rodríguez were, technically, permitted to continue their role as the civilian leaders of the rebellion and participated, along with Uzcátegui, in both 4F and the second attempted coup, of 27 November 1992 (Rosas 2009a, pp 94-111). This phenomenon of unresolved issues hampering the party's coherence was a recurring theme throughout LCR's history. The first example of this, recalled LCR founder and former national leader José Albornoz, was back in the early 1970s when the party was deciding whether to side with China or

[315] Author interviews (9 and 10 October, 2011).
[316] Author interview (11 October 2011).
[317] Author interview (26 October 2011).
[318] Author interview (26 October 2011).

the USSR. Given strong sentiment in both directions, a subpar alternative was chosen: to side with neither and both.[319]

In this way, amidst LCR's "meteoric" rise to prominence through democratic channels,[320] some from the party's highest leadership ranks were simultaneously looking to overthrow Venezuela's democratic regime. Rafael Uzcátegui was briefly detained (for the fourth time) in 1993, Freddy Gutiérrez was accused by the government of arms possession, and Pablo Medina was allegedly involved in a number of shady activities, from stealing arms from a military barracks in the Caracas neighborhood of Bello Monte, to confronting physically Minister of Defense Vice-admiral Radamés Muñoz León at an official ceremony, to brandishing a gun at a peaceful demonstration, according to LCR leader José María "Chema" Fernández, LCR leader Luis Medina, and LCR leader César Ramírez.[321] When asked—twice—about these incidents, as well as his involvement in 4F, Pablo Medina vehemently denied everything and changed the topic[322] (see also Medina 1999, pp 121-123).

The "Three Musketeers"—i.e., Medina, Alí Rodríguez, and Roger Capella—"spoke of democracy, but did not believe in democracy;" LCR national leader Luis Medina (no relation[323]) also claimed that Medina had ties with guerrillas in Colombia, while Rodríguez was close to Fidel Castro.[324] This group's anti-democratic behavior was foreign to the party's history as fighting for workers' rights, according to LCR founder

319 Author interviews (9 October 2011 and 8 March 2012).

320 Even those LCR politicians who rose to power through the electoral route were not completely committed to parliamentary action. In describing the whopping 40 LCR candidates who won seats in Venezuela's Chamber of Deputies in 1993, Venezuelan labor specialist and LCR intellectual Luis Salamanca called them "more activist than anything." "They were more about protesting and agitating [than legislating]." Author interview (29 September 2011).

321 Author interviews with Fernández (21 November, 2011), Medina (22 November 2011), and Ramírez (22 November, 2011).

322 Author interviews (7 October 2011 and 28 February 2012).

323 N.B. Luis Medina is not related to Pablo Medina; Pastora and Ilenia Medina, however, are Pablo's sisters.

324 Author interview with (22 November 2011).

and current national leader Eleutorio "Tello" Benitez.[325] Maneiro had always harbored insurrectional goals for the party; however, he had envisioned a democratic overthrow of the only nominally democratic regime (see Chapter 3). Medina and Rodríguez (and Chávez, for that matter), on the other hand, seemed to interpret the idea as more of a military coup with the tacit approval of the masses; it was for this disconnect that many LCR members did not adhere to the putschist 4F idea at first.

However, according to LCR founder Edgar Yajure, who left the party early—and thus was never a party to the internecine struggles that arose later—the ideological debate was not over "representative democracy" versus "some sort of radical, socialist democracy;" rather, it was over how exactly to arrive at that radical form of democracy. From the party's founding, *all* militants were in favor of spearheading a popular, civilian-military insurrection to overthrow Venezuela's lackluster and elitist democratic regime; however, until the early 1990s, few were willing to agree to a military-based overthrow of the prevailing regime, which is what was attempted on 4F. Such a radicalization of the terms of the debate was due, continued Yajure, to Medina, as well as: the Caracazo and the ensuing radicalization of Venezuelan society; an increasing economic crisis; and the influx and/or rise in importance of radical militants inside LCR, including, but not limited to, Rafael Uzcátegui and Alí Rodríguez.[326]

Chávez has insinuated that Velásquez was also compromised in the planning of the 4F conspiracy. With lament, he mentions that, after a conversation with Velásquez shortly before winning the Bolívar governorship in 1989, he came to understand that

> Velásquez started to believe in the electoral project, in the power behind elections, etc, that which led him to say on the afternoon of 5 February 1992 that, 'these [4F conspirators] are gorillas,' even though we had spoken various times and he knew

[325] Author interview (20 October 2011).
[326] Author interview (26 October 2011).

> about the project. We always had contacts with LCR; however, in October of 1991 they broke these ties and even began to distance themselves from the more radical wing of Pablo Medina and others (quoted in Blanco Muñoz 2003, pp 274-275).

Whatever the case may be, Velásquez and the more moderate *causaerristas* most certainly distanced themselves from the 4F plotters after the failed coup took place. This effort was both conscious and subconscious: López Maya (2005), a former LCR intellectual, argues that the moderates became so caught up with their electoral triumphs —and ensuing responsibilities—that they became even further removed from their historical role as fomenters of social agitation. This caused tension and contributed to the growing distance between LCR moderates and radicals (pp 174-175).

At the time the party had a very good chance of winning power *democratically*, thanks to Velásquez's charisma and growing popularity, as well as to the party's proven record of good governance on the local level. LCR's uncanny ability to administer cities and states became renowned throughout Venezuela (cf. Harnecker 1994). Ana Elisa Osorio, a former high-ranking civil servant who served under both Mayor Scotto and Governor Velásquez but who is now part of Chávez's United Socialist Party of Venezuela (*Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela*, PSUV) and thus a direct opponent of LCR, nonetheless admitted that LCR transformed the way the country looks at local governance.[327] But internal contradictions confused sympathizers and would-be followers, as well as exacerbated pre-existing differences between the more radical and revolutionary wing of the party, headed by Medina, and the more moderate and reformist wing, headed by Velásquez and supported primarily by those with ties to Bolívar State syndicalism.

Compared to their policy positions, the Velásquez group saw Medina's actions as extremist, foreign to the party's self-proclaimed efforts at deepening democracy, and

[327] Author interview (24 February 2012).

dampening the electoral hopes of the party. Indeed, Velásquez's 1993 presidential platform was a paragon of moderate leftism, much to the chagrin of LCR's radical members. He proposed a "radical cultural transformation," i.e. encouraging educational reform, anti-corruption measures, and decentralized health-care, and a "productive revolution," namely moving beyond the rentier economy. Velásquez even clarified his use of the word "revolution" in the text: he did not mean "violent," but rather, "accelerated, intense, and deep" (1993a).

However, given the party's inchoate nature, horizontal accountability, and need for consensus to make decisions, Velásquez and LCR's pragmatists could do little about the traitorous plans being developed by the party's secretary-general and by many of its national leaders. As seen in the PT, all leftist parties have marginal, ultra-radical elements within their ranks; however, such factions are sidelined when, having collaborated across the aisle, parties find themselves representing a broader segment of the populace and feel the need then to represent this base. Many LCR leaders precluded this possibility by opting to side with (and, indeed, help spearhead) undemocratic agents, instead of enter into broad, pro-democratic alliances with other parties in order to sideline the country's growing threat to democracy.

The distance between the two factions' tactical decisions was too great to overcome and LCR ideologues proved too powerful to be sidelined. LCR's Executive Committee had not approved of Medina's measure requesting the party's formal support for the rebellion: upwards of 80 percent of the party's national leadership had been against the idea, according to LCR Federal Deputy Amérigo de Grazia and LCR presidential candidate Andrés Velásquez.[328] However, official policy toward the rebellion was, technically, never defined since consensus was never achieved. Thanks to this, the

[328] Author interviews with de Grazia (7 March 2012) and Velásquez (24 November 2011).

formal setback did not preclude Medina and other radical *causaerristas* from participating in the preparations: Medina was later accused of supplying arms for the attempted coup, and went on the record to document publicly his role in the affair (cf. Medina 1999). Furthermore, when it seemed as if LCR would win the 1993 presidential election, he attempted to sabotage Velázquez's presidential campaign, alleged LCR militant and two-time national deputy Adón Soto.[329] Many current LCR militants claim that Medina intentionally provoked the powers that be prior to the 1993 election because he was convinced that Velásquez was going to win the election, legitimizing the "reformist," electoral route over his preference, a civilian-military uprising. According to Velásquez, "Among the factors that provoked this whole plan against my victory, in 1993, is the [subversive] conduct of Pablo Medina" (quoted in Giusti 1997).

As the decade progressed, however, more and more *causaerristas* took Medina's side, tilting the party's balance-of-power to the side of the ideologues. Amidst all of this jockeying for power, the Venezuelan public could not figure out what LCR stood for and so the party's base did not diversify as the PT's had following that party's entrance into a broad, pro-democratic alliance.

Incomplete Policy Moderation

The decision as to whether or not LCR should wholeheartedly participate in the upcoming political insurrection of 4F exacerbated the tension between the party's two main political factions. The failure to engage in tactical moderation complicated future attempts to effect policy moderation and thus party adaptation; because the party had never been forced to reckon with the democracy-authoritarian question, LCR remained ambiguous about its tactical approach to obtaining and exercising power. The failure to

[329] Author interview (23 November 2011).

adopt wholeheartedly the electoral route to power precluded the need to broaden its electoral appeal beyond its core group of supporters: if the party were to come to power via a civilian-military insurrection, what's the need for attracting a broader support base? This political impasse between *causaerrista* democrats and revolutionaries eventually led to the party's division in 1997.

The profound political difference over whether or not to support or undermine the prevailing democratic regime polarized the party leadership, bringing other contentious issues to the foreground and turning seemingly innocuous issues into bitter fights. For instance, many saw Velásquez as domineering and looking to control unilaterally the heterodox party and the Medina camp was weary of Velásquez's political compromises with the economic establishment in Bolívar State. While Velásquez did provide support for certain "neoliberal" structural reforms in the face of the country's economic collapse in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the party had always been pragmatically oriented (cf. Salamanca 2004). One of the principal complaints of the radical camp, according to founder and former LCR leader Pastora Medina and current LCR leader Luis Medina, was that Velásquez had become too "chummy" with Leopolde Sucre Figarella, the businessmen who ran the Venezuelan Corporation of Guayana (*Corporación Venezolana de Guayana*, CVG) and who also served as AD Senator for Bolívar.[330]

The Velásquez camp, in turn, started questioning Medina's figurehead role as the party's secretary-general for life, a role which he held since the death of Maneiro in 1983. As there existed no institutionalized way to deal with internal disagreements, these conflicts grew and ended up casting into doubt the party's very survival. The Bolívar segment proposed that a new secretary-general be chosen, and, as Medina could not rally the leadership behind his candidacy, Lucas Matheus (of the Velásquez camp) was

[330] Author interviews with Pastora Medina (2 November 2011) and Luis Medina (22 November 2011).

selected; this was the beginning of the end. Sensing a battle over the party's resources and acronym, Matheus and Velásquez successfully appealed to the CSE, the predecessor of Venezuela's National Electoral Council (*Consejo Nacional Electoral,* CNE) and thus held onto the party, while Medina, Rodríguez, Albornoz, Uzcátegui, Istúriz, and many others[331] left to found PPT on 27 September, 1997.[332]

Further exacerbating the political impasse was Velásquez's refusal to take to the streets in protest of the alleged fraud that had snatched the 1993 presidential election out of LCR's grasp. Velásquez did not want to fight the results through non-judicial channels, whereas Medina and many others leaders were adamant about shutting the country down through mass protests. Velásquez acknowledged to this author that there was, most likely, widespread, systematic fraud; however, he stressed that the party had no tangible evidence to prove their allegations and that the powers that be held such a tight grasp over the media such that LCR members could not circulate what imperfect information they did obtain.[333] Another issue discouraging LCR from taking to the streets, according to LCR national leader and four-time national deputy Amérigo de Grazia Veltri, was the fact that a large percentage of the progressive military men whose allegiance LCR had spent decades cultivating had all been imprisoned for their role in participating in the

[331] It is difficult to find firm numbers as to what percentage of the party stayed and which left. What is not debatable, however, is that the majority of LCR elected officials, as well as a large number of national leaders, followed Medina to the PPT. Many supporters, as well as militants with connections to the Guayana region and virtually everyone with direct ties to Sidor, remained in LCR. In the 1998 parliamentary and gubernatorial elections LCR won one senator and six deputies, while PPT won one senator and seven deputies. LCR won 3.71 percent of the gubernatorial vote, while PPT won 3.01 (PDBA).

[332] *Pepetistas*, who felt that they had been expelled from the party, have claimed that *they* are the real LCR (cf. López Maya and Lander 2011). Author interviews with PPT intellectual Margarita López Maya (11 October 2011) and PPT founder Ilenia Medina (6 October 2011). To this end, PPT's founding document explicitly speaks of a "rebirth," not a "birth" (Sesto 1997). PPT went on to become an important component of Chávez's Patriotic Pole (*Polo Patriótico*, PP); General Arias Cárdenas, Ana Elisa Osorio, Aristóbulo Istúriz, and Alí Rodríguez all held high-level positions within Chávez's government.

[333] Author interview (24 November 2011).

insurrection of 4F; over 3,000 members of the armed services were arrested for their role in the two attempted coups of 1992.[334]

Furthermore, Velásquez, along with all of the major presidential candidates, had signed a national accord the week before with then President Ramón Velásquez (no relation), committing himself to respect the official results of the 5 December election (*Latin American Weekly Report* 1993, p 555). Velásquez's decision not to engage in extra-parliamentary action was cited by virtually every PPT party member with whom this author spoke—especially Pablo Medina[335]—as a principal factor behind the increasingly deep schism in the party. In Velásquez's defense, however, he protested to this author that he *did* submit formal protests to the Supreme Court of Justice (*Tribunal Supremo de Justicia*) and the Supreme Electoral Council (*Consejo Supremo Electoral*).[336]

Whatever the case may be, LCR's electoral success was short-lived: the party collapsed before winning national office, having been torn apart by its inability to engage in policy moderation. The straw that broke the camel's back was a heated debate over the party's stance over the role of the IMF within Venezuelan politics (cf. Medina 1999, pp 54-57). Internecine fighting, which had forced the party to lose its bid to hold onto the Bolívar governorship, escalated and led to division: in 1997, the party was hollowed-out by the exodus of numerous leaders and militants, who went on to found PPT and help Hugo Chávez win the presidency (PPT 2007; López Maya 2004).[337] To this day, LCR

334 Author interviews (31 January and 7 March 2012).

335 Author interviews (7 October 2011 and 28 February 2012).

336 Author interview (24 November 2011).

337 Fast forwarding thirteen years, PPT, having broke off its support for Chávez, is now suffering from the same issue that LCR had gone through in the 1990s (which led to the founding of PPT in 1997): since decisions within PPT are also made by means of consensus, the party is at risk of being rent in two over whether or not to continue supporting Chávez's political project. In response to the alleged attempts by pro-Chávez *pepetistas* to undermine the party (and, thus, one of Chávez's opposition groups), seventeen regional PPT general-secretaries "rejected the use of internal debate to try to destroy the political organization" (*El Universal*, 2011). The PPT did try to address the failings of LCR, by making its organization and internal decisions procedures more "explicit and formal" (López Maya 2004, pp 291-296; López Maya 2005, p 190), but to little avail.

retains a limited role in local Guayana politics (as well as in a few other small pockets around the country) and continues to demonstrate and advocate for transparency and good governance; however, it has lost its position as a national power contender and constantly runs the risk of electoral irrelevance. Nonetheless, it has finally taken a firm stance on democracy and entered into a broad, multi-party, pro-democratic front: it is an active member of the Democratic Unity Roundtable (*Mesa de la Unidad Democrática*, MUD), the opposition to Chávez. In large part thanks to its participation in the MUD, LCR has finally been able to widen its appeals: with the former ideologues gone (having mostly left the party in 1997), LCR is today a broad, moderate, pro-democratic (albeit small) political party.

Given the prevalence of counter explanations to LCR's failure, some should be mentioned here. One is the political Darwinism argument, that all of Venezuela's parties (not only the traditional ones) were unable to adapt to external changes and collapsed. Indeed, this was the case for AD and COPEI, which had become top-down and overly disciplined, incapable of supporting internal competition and stifling of civil society (Coppedge 1997). However, LCR was a *reaction* to the overly orthodox and disciplined AD and COPEI; one would have to stretch the concept of "traditional party" to be able to include LCR (cf. Coppedge 2001, p 189). LCR was to be a part of the *solution* to Venezuela's crisis of democratic representation and legitimacy, not another victim (Crisp and Levine 1998). Indeed, by the rationale of party-system collapse, LCR should have benefited from the collapse of the old order and swept the 1998 elections; however, the party collapsed *before* the political crisis reached its high point and before Chávez's anti-party machinations took effect. According to Salamanca (2004), "LCR was affected more by its internal shock than by the party system crisis. It was its own internal contradictions

and their institutional carelessness or negligence" that spelled the party's demise" (p 222).[338]

Another counter explanation is the two-level framework put forward by Burgess and Levitsky (2003) on the adaptation of populist parties in power. Adopting their criteria for this project's case, LCR would score "high" on fluidity of leadership hierarchy (there were no barriers to entry into the party and no bureaucratized hierarchy with institutionalized career paths and tenure security in leadership posts) and "high" on autonomy of elected officials from the party leadership and party-affiliated unions (office holding party leaders were not formally held accountable to either the LCR "leadership" or the politically diverse Guayana unions). And, since there was a "medium" level incentive to adapt, the theory would falsely predict LCR adaptation, not continuity.

CONCLUSION

Throughout Latin America, where the left participated in democratization—i.e., Chile, Brazil, Uruguay—that participation channeled leftist party discontent into democratic norms, strategies, and goals. Where the left remained on the sidelines for whatever reason (or, where it helped extricate the military from politics, but with non-democratic goals in mind)—i.e., Peru, Venezuela, Argentina—it remained unable to engage in policy moderation down the line. Given the continued clout of party radicals and diffuse power structure, efforts at policy moderation proved ineffective: a lack of diverse voices within the parties' support bases, as well as disagreements over the proper role of parties within society and the legitimate sphere of political action complicated efforts at party adaptation. For instance, such a debate roiled IU's component party the

[338] Salamanca (2004) and López Maya (cf. 1998, 1999, 2004), the two leading LCR scholars, have proposed system-specific theories—which include numerous factors (i.e. personal rivalries, electoral ambitions, etc)--that share in common the fact that LCR's lack of institutionalization led to the party's collapse.

PUM. In its main journal, radical and pragmatic PUM militants debated the pros and cons of trying to lead society versus trying to follow (and appeal to) public opinion. An editorial in favor of the party's moderation argued that the PUM needs to "do away with its conception of the cadre party." "A little army party to attack frontally power" is not what's needed; rather, "we need to conquer society, not the state" (*El Zorro de Abajo* 1985, p 4).

Parties that felt compelled to compromise their beliefs and tactics ended up experiencing a genuine paradigm shift, as the very act of collaborating across the aisle and engaging diverse groups—whether or not done in an ad hoc way, strictly for the purposes of regime change—had profound, long-term effects. Parties that were faced with the incentive to collaborate and negotiate in such a way were encouraged to adopt the role of formal political party and, from there, gained the incentive to 1) broaden their parties' appeals to appease their newfound audience, 2) expand their policy platform to include more diverse interests under one party umbrella, and 3) recalibrate their goals to ensure that they support and defend the rules of the political system for which they have recently fought. This "dry run" of tactical moderation ended up allowing for policy moderation down the line. Grzymala-Busse (2002) finds a similar phenomenon at play in her analysis of adaptation of former Communist parties. The experience of engaging in reform and negotiation under Communism taught party elites in Poland and Hungary how to adapt successfully under democratic rule, while the absence of such an experience in the Czech Republic and Slovakia meant that party elites were unable to adapt to democratic rule down the line.

Neither Venezuela's LCR, nor Peru's IU played such a role, as there was no dictatorship to create the incentives and constraints that would induce adaptation in the former and the type of dictatorship in the latter likewise precluded the need to adapt (cf.

López Maya 1999; Calderón and Valdeavellano 1991; Tanaka 1998). The PS,[339] PT, and FA all adapted into organized, electoral-professional parties—and the later two presently run Brazil and Uruguay's national governments[340]—while LCR and IU failed to adapt and have become irrelevant and a non-actor, respectively.

[339] It was only under dictatorship, for example, that Chile's PS finally broke out of its insular, ideologically uniform networks of movement politics in order to advocate a broad, multiparty alliance against Pinochet (Roberts 1998).

[340] Chile's PS controlled the presidency from 2000 to 2010 through the Concert of Parties for Democracy (*Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia*)

Chapter 6: Conclusion

This dissertation has shown that, paradoxically, it is helpful for leftist parties to experience challenges during their early, formative years so that they are better prepared institutionally to respond to potential changes in their external environment in the future. Inversely, "no pain, no gain:" if parties do not experience such difficulties early on, they have little need to focus their time and efforts on party program and organization and, given status quo bias and the costs of engaging in party building, will be unable to adapt in the future. In this way, a party's ability to adapt is, in large part, determined by the external challenges it faced—or did not face—during its formative years: it is the founding moments of a party that help determine its organization and developmental trajectory in future phases.

First, leftist parties whose predecessors were subjected to authoritarian repression ended up intrinsically valuing democracy, thanks not only to political learning but also to the altered make-up and origins of such parties. This ideological renovation helped parties adapt by curtailing the spectrum of possible future political stances and thus enabling ideological moderation. Second, leftist parties that had to navigate legal hurdles, put in place by outgoing authoritarian regimes looking to prevent the rise of the left, ended up institutionalizing and developing disciplined, majoritarian mechanisms to make and enforce party decisions. This institutional maturation helped parties adapt by lengthening time horizons and strengthening the pragmatic leadership vis-à-vis party radicals and rebels, keeping parties competitive and facilitating much-needed top-down

changes. Finally, leftist parties that felt compelled to hasten the armed forces' extrication from power ended up entering into pro-democratic alliances that expanded their support base to broader segments of society. This tactical moderation helped parties adapt by opening up formerly narrow parties, necessitating a broadening of political appeals.

Leftist parties that were born out of repression, were subject to bureaucratic hurdles, and were forced into action to ensure a timely transition ended up benefited later on: these diverse challenges created the incentive to take actions, build structures, and adopt strategies that would pay off handsomely in the long-term. Those parties that had it relatively "easy" were not as lucky: as there was no need to engage in these costly, albeit worthwhile, party-building endeavors early on, they never did so (since institutions solidified and radicals retained veto power). As such, they were not prepared to respond to broad exogenous changes and engage in institutional adaptation in the future. In this way, leftist parties confronted by authoritarian repression, harassment, and intransigence adapted *better* than those that emerged within the context of democracy or non-repressive authoritarianism, as the former were forced to withstand greater challenges and, by doing so, sowed the seeds of future party adaptation.

Brazil's PT, Peru's IU, and Venezuela's LCR were all leftist parties with deep ties to Marxism and were born within two years of each other (1980, 1980, and 1978, respectively). Despite having been created in the same world historical moment—thus controlling for the state of international socialism—their development trajectories were markedly different. The PT quickly abandoned non-democratic goals, slowly diversified and professionalized its organization, and eventually moderated its program (Amaral 2003; Ribeiro 2008). IU failed to moderate or professionalize; in fact, the party radicalized during the 1980s and its institutional development plateaued (Adrianzén 2012). Much the same happened for LCR: a significant portion of the party radicalized

during the 1990s, helping effect the party's institutional collapse in 1997 (Salamanca 2004). Why do we see divergence when, given these parties' initial similarities and given relative similar external contexts, one would expect convergence?

This thesis has used these cases to develop a theory explaining under what conditions some leftist parties in Latin American democracies transform from radical, weakly institutionalized parties into moderate, professional ones and, conversely, under what conditions others fail to adapt, remaining confined to their ideological ghettoes and stagnating organizationally. It has argued that a party's ability to adapt institutionally and ideologically is determined in large part by the external challenges faced during its foundation and formative years. In other words, parties emerging under repressive authoritarian rule face particular challenges and constraints that encourage them to adopt certain mechanisms and policies—which facilitate party adaptation down the line—that they would otherwise not pursue. Party adaptation does not happen spontaneously; it only happens, in the words of Harmel and Janda (1994), when there is an incentive present to help the party overcome a natural "wall of resistance." The wall may be ideational, institutional, or a combination of the two.

Does this argument travel to the rest of the universe of leftist parties in Latin America? What are the long-term consequences of party adaptation? What are the repercussions of the failed adaptation of a country's leftist party? Is there hope for the left in countries where leftist parties failed to adapt? What can we learn from this phenomenon of party change in terms of our understanding of how institutions are born, function, and die? Is adaptation reversible and, if it is, what should we expect to see in the coming years? Such questions need to be addressed before the thesis's research question can be truly answered.

This chapter concludes the thesis on Latin America's leftist party adaptation. First, it extends the argument to other cases within Latin America, notably Argentina's FREPASO and Mexico's PRD, while also providing a theoretical categorization of the different party types that emerge, given different scores on the dependent variable. Then, it returns to the debate over how the discipline understands and categorizes institutional change over time, offering a revised interpretation of critical juncture theory. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion on the bi-directionality of adaptation and the future of leftist parties in the region.

LATIN AMERICA'S LEFT PARTIES

This theory can be used to explain leftist party adaptation throughout Latin America. To various degrees, the same phenomenon has played out in the rest of the region's democracies. Table 6.1 offers more nuanced categories for the different possible combinations of values for the dependent variable, the project's case studies having been chosen only from the two main quadrants. This section demonstrates that, while they often go hand-in-hand, institutional professionalization and ideological moderation do not necessarily take place in unison; the two secondary categories (i.e., high professionalization with low moderation, and low professionalization with high moderation) admittedly are imperfect theoretical explanations of the messy empirical realities of Latin American politics. The descriptive typology characterizes each outcome based on its phenotypical resemblance to a *snapshot* of one of the life stages of a star: star, red dwarf, supernova, and black hole.

		Institutional Professionalization	
		High	Low
Ideological Moderation	High	**Star** (PT, FA, PS-PPD, PRD)	**Supernova** (FREPASO[341])
	Low	**Red Dwarf** (ID, MIR)	**Black Hole** (IU, LCR, M-19)

Figure 6.1: Leftist Party Adaptation Typology

In the upper left-hand quadrant are the "stars," the ideal celestial type: large, stable spheres of plasma. Parties within this cell should have high levels of both institutional professionalization and ideological moderation: witness Brazil's PT, Uruguay's FA, Chile's PS-PPD, and Mexico's PRD (which will be discussed later in this section). As explained in Chapters 3, 4, and 5, these parties are characterized as having 1) immediate predecessors who were subjected to authoritarian repression, 2) formative years spent struggling to abide by discriminatory legal regulations put in place by outgoing dictatorships, and 3) raisons d'être that were challenged by the authoritarian regime's obstinance in leaving power.

Given their history of having been confronted by such early challenges, these parties were compelled to do what was necessary to pave the path for future party adaptation. Since such parties boast a professional party organization and structure, coupled with a moderated policy stance, they are likely to be deeply embedded within

[341] N.B. FREPASO was born in 1994; as it never held a "radical" ideological stance, the party was placed in the "high" ideological moderation category.

society and highly relevant electorally. Indeed, Handlin and Collier (2011) show that the PT, FA, and PS each have striking advantages over the *combined* parties in their respective opposition when it comes to psychological linkages between the party and the electorate (i.e., the incidence of party identification and the level of confidence left partisans express in parties themselves). Furthermore, the PT has controlled Brazil's presidency since 2003,[342] FA has controlled Uruguay's since 2005,[343] and the PS was in power from 2000 to 2010;[344] the PRD won over 32 percent of the presidential vote in 2012, over 35 percent in 2006, and would have won the 1988 election had massive fraud not taken place[345] (PDBA).

Next, in the upper right-hand quadrant are the "supernovae," fleeting but extremely luminous phenomena. Parties within this cell should have low levels of institutional professionalization but high levels of ideological moderation: witness Argentina's FREPASO. Given their high levels of ideological moderation,[346] such parties are able to succeed electorally; however, given their low levels of institutional professionalization, such success is sure to be fleeting. According to this theory of party adaptation, such parties should have 1) immediate predecessors who were subjected to authoritarian repression, should *not* have 2) spent their formative years struggling to abide by discriminatory legal regulations put in place by outgoing military dictatorships,

342 Lula held the presidency from 2003-2010 and Dilma Rousseff, his former chief-of-staff, took over the presidency in 2011.

343 Tabaré Vázquez held the presidency from 2005-2010 and José Mujica assumed power on 2010.

344 Ricardo Lagos was president from 2000-2006 and Michelle Bachelet was in power from 2006-2010.

345 In his memoir (2004), former President Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988) admitted that the ruling PRI did engage in massive fraud to steal the election from PRD candidate Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas; however, the official count placed PRI candidate Carlos Salinas with over 50 percent of the vote, to Cárdenas's 31 percent.

346 FREPASO was never as radical as those Latin American leftist parties with more direct roots to leftist groups from the 1960s; its ideology was more anti-populist and anti-former president Carlos Menem (1989-1999) than anything else. Furthermore, given its late founding—*after* the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1990 and following the "end of history," or, the supposed universalization of Western liberal democracy (cf. Fukuyama, 1992)—FREPASO's stance vis-à-vis democracy (as well as the threat of an authoritarian backlash) was categorically different from that of the other parties in this study.

and should have 3) raisons d'être that were challenged by the armed forces' obstinance in leaving power.

FREPASO, the confederation of parties which arose in 1994, quickly rose to national prominence thanks in large part to its lack of party roots or an ideological history that could tie it down. A mere three years later the party allied itself with the Radical Civic Union (*Unión Cívica Radical*, UCR) to form the Alliance for Work, Justice, and Education (*Alianza por el Trabajo, la Justicia y la Educación*, "la Alianza"), and won the 1999 presidential election with UCR candidate Fernando de la Rúa, only to disintegrate two years later. The next subsection will discuss in detail the case of FREPASO (as well as the discrepancy between the expected and theorized outcomes).

In the lower right-hand quadrant are the "black holes," residue from a collapsed star; black holes also suck in all energy around them. Parties within this cell should have low levels of both institutional professionalization and ideological moderation: witness Peru's IU, Venezuela's LCR, and Colombia's M-19. As explained in Chapters 3, 4, and 5, these parties are characterized as having *neither* 1) immediate predecessors who were subjected to authoritarian repression, *nor* 2) formative years spent struggling to abide by discriminatory legal regulations put in place by outgoing military dictatorships, *nor* 3) raisons d'être that were challenged by the armed forces' obstinance in leaving power.

All three parties showed great potential, yet all three were unable to surpass a certain point in their developmental trajectories: given their lack of party building and strategic and tactical moderation, such parties were unable to capitalize on earlier gains and suffered fatal divisions. Furthermore, this experience complicated future efforts by newer leftist parties to capitalize on the open space in the left-hand side of the political spectrum in Peru and Venezuela,[347] as well as Colombia. In the 2000's, small new leftist

[347] The state of the lefts in Peru and Venezuela will be discussed later in this chapter.

parties have appeared in Colombia. In 2005, the Independent Democratic Pole (*Polo Democrático Independiente*, PDI)—a small young, leftist party composed of social movements, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and minor leftist parties[348]—joined with Democratic Alternative (*Alternativa Democrática*, AD) to form the Alternative Democratic Pole (*Polo Democrático Alternativo*, PDA). The party's rise was helped by a 2003 electoral reform, which encouraged smaller parties to unite, and the divisiveness of President Álvaro Uribe's (2002-2010) rightist political project.

Finally, in the lower left-hand quadrant are the "red dwarves," small, dull stars with nonetheless exceedingly long life spans. Parties within this cell should have relatively high levels of institutional professionalization, yet relatively low levels of ideological moderation: witness Ecuador's ID and Bolivia's MIR. Such parties are able to obtain national power, given the strength of their party structure; however, their lack of policy moderation limits their ability to retain electoral relevance. According the theory, such parties should *not* have 1) immediate predecessors who subjected to authoritarian repression, should have 2) spent their formative years spent struggling to abide by discriminatory legal regulations put in place by outgoing military dictatorships, and should *not* have 3) raisons d'être that were challenged by the armed forces' obstinance in leaving power; the empirical cases in this quadrant do not fit perfectly the theoretical predictions.

Ecuador's ID was born under a democratic regime in 1970, but one which had been (and would later be) interrupted repeatedly by the armed forces.[349] A military coup

[348] In 2003 the PDI's Luis Eduardo Garzón won the mayoralty of Bogotá, the second most powerful political position in the country. During his tenure (2004-2008), "Lucho" developed numerous social programs targeting the poor. The PDA held onto the city, with the election of Samuel Moreno Rojas in 2007; however, Rojas was suspended, stripped of his office, and arrested in 2011 for allegedly taking bribes (*El País* 2011).

[349] Months after ID's founding in 1970, President José María Velasco (1968-1972) assumed dictatorial powers.

two years later placed General Guillermo Rodríguez Lara in power (1972-1976); however, Rodríguez was a soft-liner and the military regime's guiding philosophy was similar to that of neighboring Peru. In this way, the ID's immediate predecessors were not repressed, nor did ID spearhead democratization. Ecuador's transition to democracy was an elite-led affair: the country's political and economic elites, which had had enough with the military's modernization efforts, collaborated with the military to reinstall democratic rule. Throughout this the ID grew slowly, albeit hampered bureaucratically by a distrustful military. In 1988, ID presidential candidate Rodrigo Borja won the election and, against the wishes of his party (a member of the Socialist International), implemented moderate economic policies during his tenure (1988-1992). Borja's actions helped moderate what should have remained a more ideologically radical party, given ID's history and this dissertation's theory. Nevertheless, shortly after Borja's term ended, the party contracted and has since become a minor force in Ecuadorean politics.

Bolivia's MIR followed a similar trajectory; however, the leftist party *did* suffer repression under the dictatorship of Hugo Banzer (1971-1978). Under Jaime Paz Zamora, the party assumed the presidency (1989-1993); however, power was obtained through a backroom deal between Paz Zamora and Banzer (since no candidate received over 50 percent of the vote, Congress was given the task to decide among the top three contenders: Paz Zamora, Banzer, and incumbent Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada). Like Borja, Paz Zamora steered an otherwise reluctant party into more moderate waters under his presidency; also like ID, the party has since lost a vast majority of its political territory within Congress and in society, and is currently a minor leftist party on the fringes of Bolivian politics (cf. Mayorga 2005). The cases of ID and MIR suggest that the forward-looking actions of pragmatist party leaders cannot compensate for an otherwise ideologue-dominated party.

The next two sub-sections take a closer look at two leftist parties in Latin America: Argentina's FREPASO and Mexico's PRD. The first is a case of partially failed adaptation: FREPASO had no incentive to sink roots into society or institutionalize, undermining its ability to become a lasting, relevant party. The second is another case of successful adaptation: while the PRD is the only "star" in Latin America not to have held national office, it is nonetheless a case of successful party adaptation. These sub-sections present a brief overview of these parties' early years to show how the presence of early challenges forced these parties along a party-building and strategic- and tactical-moderation developmental trajectories, and vice versa.

Argentina's FREPASO: A Case of Partial Failed Adaptation

FREPASO, a "supernova," is a less clear-cut case of party adaptation: the party tried to adapt so quickly that it failed to establish itself as a party.[350] Given the party's developmental trajectory—namely, a meteoric rise to prominence, followed by a hard fall, with extreme ideological moderation along the way—this project's theory of party adaptation would classify the party's founding and formative years as characterized by immediate predecessors who were subjected to repression, no legal obstacles to legalization, and participation in the country's democratization process. The party's failure to perfectly fit the theory's parameters stems in large part from FREPASO's late arrival onto the world stage. The party was founded in the mid 1990s; by that time, authoritarian rule had been shunned throughout the region and, therefore, state repression was no longer a possible political tool. Largely because of this, the party experienced no legal hurdles to overcome in legalizing or participating politically; as such, FREPASO felt little

[350] Given Argentine history between 1994 and 2001, the party never had the opportunity to take on the role of defender of democracy: the country has been democratic since 1983 and has not experienced any challenges to democratic rule.

incentive to professionalize its organization. The party remained little more than an electoral front and media phenomenon.

FREPASO arose in 1994 out of the Grand Front (*Frente Grande*), which had been founded shortly before by leftist parties and progressive members of the PJ who had renounced Menem's neoliberal reforms, Christian Democratic Party (*Partido Demócrata Cristiano*, PDC), the Intransigent Party (*Partido Intransigente*, PI), Socialist Unity (*Unidad Socialista*, which was composed of the Popular Socialist Party, *Partido Socialista Popular*, PSP, and Democratic Socialist Party, *Partido Socialista Democrático*, PSD), and sectors of the old Argentine Communist Party (*Partido Comunista de la Argentina*, PCA). The party's strength lay primarily in the urban electorate (especially in the Capital Federal, Greater Buenos Aires, and Rosario); however, it had a presence throughout the country and, at one time or another, had won representation in almost all the important provinces. This new party attracted young, educated, left-of-center,[351] statist (i.e., government intervention both in the economy and in decreasing the country's inequality.) voters; FREPASO was *the* alternative to Menem's neoliberalism (Caputo and Godio 1996). This was especially the case since UCR had shifted right following Raúl Alfonsín's presidency. By the early 1990's both of Argentina's traditional parties saw their ideological stances converge (Gibson, 1996).

A year later, José Octavio Bordón ran for president under the FREPASO platform and placed second with almost thirty percent of the valid votes. Two years later, FREPASO entered la Alianza, which performed surprisingly well in the legislative elections. Riding on this wave of success, FREPASO occupied the vice-presidential slot in la Alianza's 1999 presidential slate. The Alianza swept that year's legislative elections

[351] According to Latinobarometro data from the 1990's, the Argentine electorate was surprisingly motivated to vote based on ideology. FREPASO supporters were quite ideological: left-of-center center Argentine's were more likely to vote for FREPASO and FREPASO supporters were more likely to see themselves as left-of-center (Seligson 2003).

—winning a little less than half of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies—and won the presidency with FREPASO's Carlos "Chacho" Álvarez as vice-president on de la Rúa's ticket (Novaro and Palermo, 1998).

Yet it ended up falling just as quickly as it had risen. Profound disagreements between the conservative de la Rúa on one hand, and Chacho Álvarez and his FREPASO on the other, made for difficult governing as it became increasingly clear that UCR and FREPASO held few opinions in common, apart from their mutual opposition to Menem (Schamis 2002). Even within FREPASO there were numerous intra-party policy disagreements, due to the extreme heterogeneity within the party and the lack of an institutionalized way of making and enforcing decisions.

FREPASO did not last. In the aftermath of de la Rúa's contentious labor reform, followed by the corruption scandal in the Senate and alleged corruption within de la Rúa's own administration,[352] Álvarez resigned the vice-presidency (cf. Álvarez and Morales Solá 2001). La Alianza collapsed shortly after, when de la Rúa was forced out of office amidst Argentina's financial crisis and debilitating street riots in the capital and throughout the country; many militants went on to rejoin the Peronist party, which was then pulled to the left by Néstor Kirchner after he became president (2003-2007). Why was FREPASO unable to engage in party adaptation?

FREPASO never professionalized institutionally because it never had any incentive to engage in party-building. The party always remained a loose confederation of different parties, held together tenuously by a unified political platform and leadership. None of the party's component parts ever seemed that interested in creating the structure needed to adapt to FREPASO's ever-increasing electorate; no one wanted to lose the autonomy with which they had initially entered. In this way, FREPASO remained a force

[352] In 2012, De la Rúa went on trial for allegedly engaging in active bribery and misappropriation of public funds (*El País* 2012).

with “poor organization and territorial presence” and a “persistent lack of internal institutionalism,” one whose astonishing (albeit short-lived) success was based primarily on the dynamic qualities and strong personal abilities of Álvarez and Graciela Fernández Meijide, FREPASO senator and two-time deputy (Novaro and Palermo 1998, pp 65, 109).

FREPASO never had to grow as a party because it never suffered any early legal challenges to its formation; it was growing electorally merely by the fact that it was in the right place at the right time. Instead, FREPASOhad it too easy, in a sense, to ever have to professionalize institutionally. According to Novaro and Palermo (1998), the party's success was due principally to the fact that economic and state reforms led to the transformation of traditional parties, which resulted in the shaking up of Argentina's traditional two-party system and the opening up of a new political space on the left side of the political spectrum. In particular, following Alfonsín's alliance with Menem in the Olivos Pact[353] (*Pacto de Olivos*), UCR witnessed a mass defection of voters and militants, who saw FREPASO as the best alternative. Indeed, an analysis of Argentine vote choice shows that FREPASO’s victories stem directly from the party’s ability to fill a previously empty niche in the country’s ideological spectrum (Seligson 2003).

Such a context, however, does not bode well for long-term electoral relevance and societal insertion. A lack of institutional organization meant that FREPASO was little more than a hollow shell. A lack of formal lines of communication or agreed-upon ways to make decisions and resolve conflicts meant that the party could never agree on what it stood for. Ideological incoherence led to bitter infighting between the Front's component groups. For instance, when “Chacho” promised Argentine companies that he would not reverse privatization, some leftists, notably Fernando “Pino” Solanas, left the party in

[353] Much hated by Alfonsín's party, the UCR, this Pact granted autonomy to Buenos Aires City in exchange for a constitutional reform allowing for presidential re-election.

disgust (Novaro and Palermo 1998, p 106). Indeed, a number of media pronouncements by party leaders deeply upset party militants, who saw such policy switches as ideological opportunism (Novaro and Palermo 1998, p 115); for example, Bordón's invitation to allow Menem's ex-Minister of the Interior Gustavo Béliz into the party caused much consternation amongst FREPASO's leftists.

FREPASO did not survive because it proved unwilling and unable to professionalize institutionally. If parties have no incentive to engage in party-building, they will, more often than not, avoid doing so, given the process's high upfront costs (Kalyvas 1996) Even in terms of the party's ideological moderation, FREPASO was deficient. It was less ideologically moderate than ideologically lacking. While this ideological incoherence and extreme policy flexibility seemed to work wonders at first—this dynamic fluidity proved adept at conforming quickly to public opinion, it proved fleeting since the party never coalesced into representing a certain ideology or worldview. Rather, FREPASO represented a distinct moment of popular frustration over a specific problem: Menem. Once this issue had been dispelled, there was no more need for the party among the Argentine electorate (cf. Torre 2003).

Mexico's PRD: Another Case of Successful Adaptation

PRD, like the PT, is categorized as a "star:" it is a case of successful party adaptation. Despite the questionable actions of its former party president, the PRD has professionalized institutionally and moderated ideologically. Indeed, the party 1) was *directly* repressed by the PRI, 2) experienced significant bureaucratic hurdles to institutionalizing, and 3) was compelled to participate in Mexico's process of

democratization. The rest of this subsection deals with the PRD's birth and developmental trajectory.

The PRD began as the National Democratic Front (Frente Democrático Nacional, FDN), an electoral vehicle for the 1988 elections. It was a fusion party of pro-statist defectors from the PRI along with preexisting social movements and leftist parties, particularly the Socialist Mexican Party (*Partido Mexicano Socialista*, PMS), which was an agglutination of the Unified Socialist Party of Mexico (*Partido Socialista Unificado de México*, PSUM), the Mexican Workers' Party (*Partido Mexicano de los Trabajadores*, PMT), the Revolutionary Patriotic Party (*Partido Patriótico Revolucionario*, PPR), the Revolutionary Movement of the People (*Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo*, MRP), and the Union of the Communist Left (*Unión de la Izquierda Comunista*, UIC). It was founded in 1989 upon the strong showing of PRI-defector Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas's presidential campaign.[354]

Undeterred by its 1988 loss, the party gradually grew institutionally and electorally throughout the 1990s, winning victories at the municipal, state, and national level. The PRD achieved a breakthrough in 1997, when Cárdenas won the Mexico City government—which the party has held onto ever since, and which has since become the party's principal electoral stronghold—and legislative candidates won over a quarter of the vote: the PRD's share of senators rose from 8 to 16 (out of 128) and its share of deputies rose from 71 to 125 (out of 500), making it the second largest party in the Chamber of Deputies (and the third largest in the Senate). The party lost the presidential vote in 2006 by approximately 0.5 percent or 300,000 votes, and placed a respectable

[354] As mentioned earlier, according to former President de la Madrid (2004), the 1988 election was marred by fraud. Early electoral returns had Cárdenas leading the race so the PRI shut off the computerized vote tabulation system at the Federal Electoral Institute (*Instituto Federal Electoral,* IFE). Five days later, when the vote count was finally announced, the system showed PRI's Salinas to have won, with over 50 percent of the vote (Anaya 2008).

second in the 2012 presidential election (PDBA). Organizationally and structurally, the party boasts a strong base (relative to most leftist parties) and has handily survived the defection of its most famous and charismatic leader, Andrés Manuel López Obrador ("AMLO," for short), former governor of Mexico City and two-time PRD presidential candidate.

The PRD was born a leftist party, amidst the gradual strategic moderation of the Mexican left since 1977. This moderation had been in partial response to targeted repression of the left by the "perfect dictatorship:" the Mexican state alternatively harassed, sidelined, co-opted, and repressed the left. In this manner, the political learning that took place with the PT's predecessors in Brazil likewise took place in Mexico, too. The PRD was born with radical leftist views. In terms of policy ideology, Cárdenas described his 1988 presidential project as a "revolutionary movement in favor of the poor and dispossessed" (Borjas Benavente 2003, p 215). Identifiers with the FDN, the PRD's immediate predecessor, were consistently in favor of state-led development, as opposed to market reform and trade liberalization (Greene 2007, pp 177, 216).

However, due to earlier authoritarian repression, its members had, for the most part, moderated strategically and accepted the electoral route as the sole legitimate route to power. Indeed, the reason why the minor leftist parties opted to give up their party identity and independent structure was because they knew that Cárdenas was a charismatic and well-respected candidate capable of attracting the vote of a large sector of the population, thus helping them obtain power (Domínguez and McCann 1995).[355]

Furthermore, as was the case for the Brazilian left in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Mexican left began to realize in the 1980s that the PRI's stranglehold on power

[355] Cárdenas was also the son of Lázaro Cardenas del Río (1934-1940), one of Mexico's most well-regarded presidents; his familial roots—he often invoked his father and claimed that he was an extension of his father's legacy (Borjas Benavente 2003, p 219)--provided him with traditional authority as well (cf. Weber 1964).

was loosening and democracy inevitable. In 1977, PRI President José López Portillo (1976-1982) passed political reforms that facilitated the legalization of numerous leftist parties (cf. Middlebrook 1986). Opening up on the part of the PRI meant that leftist parties were more and more able to compete electorally. This knowledge that the dictatorship was on its way out helped ensure that leftists did not radicalize, as is often the case when opposition politicians are faced with repression and see no plausible end in sight.[356]

Despite the political opening up, repression continued and even ended up directly persecuting the PRD (whereas the PT was never the target of direct repression). Shortly after the PRD's founding, and in response to electoral inroads by it and the PAN, President Carlos Salinas (1988-1994) and local PRI caciques led a crusade against the PRD and began to target its PRD politicians and militants for repression.[357] Repression involved anything from harassment—such as shutting off access to urban services, making threats, and prison sentences based on trumped up charges (Greene 2007, p 95)—to assassination. Between 1988 and 1996, the PRI killed an estimated 250-400 PRD activists, and imprisoned many thousands more, particularly in Southern Mexico. The first assassinations were two high-ranking members of Cárdenas's presidential opposition front, Francisco Xavier Ovando and his aide Román Gil Hernández, four days before the 1988 presidential election; Ovando had built a system to oversee the electoral results and guard against election fraud (Schatz 2011, p 51). Schatz (2011) provides a detailed

[356] Greene's (2007) argument on how repression radicalizes opposition parties states exactly this. His argument explains why Mexico's rightist PAN radicalized instead of moderated: it was born in 1939, not 1989. Back then, electoral success was highly unlikely and repression was expected; because of this, *panistas* hunkered down and adopted a "bunker" mentality to protect themselves, only to see this defense mechanism constrain them from moderating down the line. Indeed, the PAN suffered through decades of unfair rule at the hands of the PRI and, as such, remained radically out of step with the average Mexican voter. However, because the PRD came about under different circumstances—namely, under an authoritarian regime that was *opening up*—it reacted differently than the PAN.

[357] *Panistas* were targeted far less than *perredistas*. *Panistas* who were assassinated or "died under suspicious circumstances" include Judith Barrio, the daughter of then PAN candidate for governor Francisco Barrio, and Manuel Clouthier, PAN leader and presidential candidate (Schatz 2011, p 35-37)

analysis of the many cases of violence and assassination committed against the PRD (see also CHR 1994).

If this theory is correct, such repression should have forced the PRD to moderate. While the party was always relatively moderate strategically, state repression seemed to have forced the PRD to moderate tactically, as well. Indeed, the PRD challenged the 1988 fraud through the existing, legal procedures. It took its battle to formal institutions that the PRI controlled, namely the Federal Electoral Commission (*Comisión Federal de Electores*, CFE; IFE's predecessor) and the electoral courts (Bruhn 1997, p 147). Together with pressure from the PAN, PRD's efforts paid off in helping push through and legitimize the electoral reform of 1996, requiring non-PRI affiliated citizens to administer elections under the newly created, autonomous IFE, and ensuring that elections could no longer be thrown, as they had in the past. The PAN and PRD succeeded in restructuring the IFE such that its General Council would be manned by nonpartisan electoral councilors, making IFE free from party and government pressure. Furthermore, electoral law was placed under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (*Supremo Tribunal Federal*, STF), with the Federal Electoral Court (*Tribunal Electoral del Poder Judicial de la Federación*, TEPJF) restructured and its magistrates nominated by the STF (Klesner 1997; Córdova and Ugarte 2008).

Supporting this reform, which was so crucial to ensuring Mexico's move to truly free and fair elections, was a key example of pushing for democratization. According to a 1996 poll, among those respondents who knew about the electoral reform, almost 43 percent believed that the PRD was the party *leading* the negotiations (Oficina de la Presidencia 1996). The PRD acknowledged that, in agreeing to support the electoral reform, it would be committing itself to the electoral arena and closing off any possibility

of aligning themselves with the EZLN[358] and radical, non-democratic social groups (Magaloni 2006).

However, the presidential election defeat of AMLO in 2006 (and, to a lesser extent, in 2012) called into question the party's tactical moderation. IFE determined that the 2006 race was too close to call until all votes were counted. Once all votes were in, the PAN candidate, Felipe Calderón, who was ahead by one half of a percentage point, was declared the winner. In response, losing PRD candidate AMLO challenged the electoral results and went on to lead massive marches and protests throughout the capital, particularly at the Zócalo, Mexico City's main square. In response to these extra-parliamentary actions, the TEPJF ordered the recount of those polling stations deemed to have irregularities; the Court reaffirmed the results and declared Calderón the winner. While nominally antidemocratic, such actions say more about the PRD's presidential candidate (and ex-party leader) than the party; indeed, both AMLO and Cárdenas were arguably more radical than their party. AMLO has since moderated tactically, however. Following the 2012 election, the defeated PRD candidate lodged a formal complaint to invalidate the elections with the TEPJF; the Court looked into his request, but later rejected allegations of fraud (*El Universal* 2012).

Following Cárdenas's poor showing in 1994—he garnered only 16.59 percent of the vote—pragmatic leaders in the party positioned to sideline him and other radical ideologues. Responding to polls that showed that Cárdenas was too out of step with the average Mexican voter, such as a 1994 poll showing that 18 percent of the electorate thought that Cárdenas was too "radical" or "demagogic" (Oficina de la Presidencia 1994), then party president, Porfirio Muñoz Ledo (1993-1996), extended much of his political capital pushing the PRD to spearhead what became the 1996 electoral reform as a way of

[358] In 1994, the Zapatistas began their guerrilla war against the Mexican state, with the objective of toppling President Salinas and instituting a radical, participatory democratic regime.

professionalizing the PRD and sidelining the party's less democratic elements (Morales Paulín, 1997). The PRD's Third National Congress, in 1995, witnessed a public sparring between Muñoz Ledo and Cárdenas, with the former winning the upper hand in terms of the party's future ideological and institutional outlook. This achievement manifested itself via public opinion surveys and electoral results as a boon for the party's credibility and public image (cf. Oficina de la Presidencia 1997; IDEMERC Louis Harris 1994). However, the rise to prominence of AMLO, who became Mexico City's second elected mayor[359] in 2000, brought to the party's forefront another relatively radical leader.

In terms of party-building, while the PRD was able to legalize relatively easily,[360] especially given the political reforms of 1977, the PRI regime did erect obstacles aimed at hampering the PRD's growth. Even placing repression aside, the PRD did not have it easy. While its predecessor parties and organizations helped give the PRD a jump start in terms of party-building (Carr 1996, pp 308-310), they had weakly consolidated bases, few activists and resources, little organizational structure, and virtually no national presence (Borjas Benavente 2003, pp 187-195; Anaya 2008). To make matters worse, Salinas concentrated efforts to erode what little traditional bases of support the PRD had inherited from its leftist component parties[361] through targeted social programs and a public relations campaign that portrayed the party as violent and unreliable. Indeed, Dresser (1991) argues that the National Solidarity Program (*Programa Nacional de Solidaridad*, PRONASOL), Mexico's umbrella organization developed to improve health, education, and employment for those living in extreme poverty, was designed as a "social

[359] Another aspect to the 1996 electoral reform was the ability to directly elect a mayor for the Federal District, a position that was previously appointed by the incumbent president (Córdova and Ugarte 2008).

[360] The FDN gave up in its attempt to organize itself into a party via the official registration process (i.e., holding state assemblies, etc.) and decided to accept the PMS's offer of transferring its registry to create the new, jointly constructed PRD (Borjas Benavente 2003, p 289).

[361] To be fair, Cárdenas did have his own personal support base in the State of Michoacán, where he served as senator (1974-1980) and governor (1980-1986).

tranquilizer," a political strategy to shore up Salinas's administration and the PRI's hold over power by "undermining the strength of left-wing opposition forces by establishing ties with and commitments to popular movements" (pp 1-2).

Immediately after legalizing, the PRD was thus forced to embark on the tedious process of institutionalization, similar to what happened to the PT. An organization of activists was soon constructed, ties with civil society (especially with those popular movements that had supported Cárdenas in 1988) were strengthened, and a modern, bureaucratic party structure and organization was built (Bruhn 1997, p 168). This process continued wholeheartedly throughout the 1990s. This professionalization drive was, in part, a result of the party's devastating loss in the 1994 presidential election. According to then PRD president Muñoz Ledo, "unless the PRD became a stable, electoral-professional, and trustworthy party" it would never be able to garner significant support from the electorate to win national elections (quoted in Borjas Benavente 2003, p 591). This effort continued under AMLO's party presidency; he pushed for tactical pragmatism and, to a lesser extent, party professionalization.

Today, the PRD is a moderate, professional party. It holds over 14 percent of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies, as well as almost twenty percent of the Senate. It is a democratic leftist party, with a strong organizational base. According to Bruhn (2012), 78.4 percent of all the PRD's expenditures are characterized as "ordinary, permanent," which covers salaries and benefits for employees, as well as building and utilities and which she describes as the category that "comes closest to measuring funding for party *organization*" (p 27; emphasis added). Furthermore, in comparison to Mexico's other three parties, the PRD "was the most bureaucratized party," given the high percentage (40) of its income spent on salaries (Bruhn 2012, p 28); the 1996 electoral reform had also revamped the country's party financing scheme, which became essentially public and

established mechanisms to control and monitor the origin and destination of resources (Córdova and Ugarte 2008). The PRD nonetheless opted to divert much of its resources —more than Mexico's two other major parties—to party organization and other long-term party building measures (Bruhn 2012). In this way, the PRD, which suffered so many early challenges, successfully engaged in party adaptation.

BROADER THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS: CRITICAL JUNCTURE, YET GRADUAL CHANGE

Institutions are historical products of political conflicts and choices (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992). They provide links between unsettled moments of great transformation —such as the birth and formative years of a political party—and ordinary times (Katznelson and Weingast, 2005). As such, they are sticky, remaining in place long after their original objective or usefulness has passed. In this way, the "weight of the past" often impedes one's ability to compete in a new or different system. However, this same "weight" can also be liberating; the results of earlier political conflicts can be retrofitted and used for different purposes down the line. For example, institutions adopted by parties for the purpose of confronting early challenges may also help parties engage in the difficult task of ideological and institutional adaptation at some future date. In this way, this project has shown that early pain did indeed cause later gain.

Leftist parties that were subjected to the machinations and whims of authoritarian regimes were compelled to engage in certain actions and adopt certain policies for the sake of their own protection, future, and very survival. Unbeknownst to these parties—and, for sure, to those military rulers who did the repressing, cooked up the unfair policies, and refused to return to the barracks—their responses to external challenges in turn facilitated ideological moderation and institutional professionalization. This thus

prepared such parties better than those that were never subjected to early challenges for party adaptation when the Latin American electorate began rewarded professional, moderate parties in the late 1990s and early 2000s.

What is so interesting is the *delayed* consequence of these early challenges: repression, legal obstacles, and participation in democratization prepared leftist parties for later adaptation by germinating the seeds for ideological moderation and institutional professionalization if and when the need should arise. During their formative years these parties adopted the mechanisms, structures, and policies necessary for future adaptation; however, institutional professionalization and ideological moderation only came about years later, after external stimuli created the incentive for adaptation. For instance, the PT immediately moderated strategically, but it took years to moderate tactically, and a decade to moderate its policies; institutional professionalization likewise was a slow, gradual process. Such a phenomenon, however, challenges the established wisdom in the discipline that understands political change as the result *either* of continual, incremental change *or* sudden change following a critical juncture—namely, the transition from military rule.

This party adaptation argument is thus one of a critical juncture that predicts a much-delayed, gradual effect. It synthesizes and integrates the two competing schools of historical institutionalism: traditional, critical juncture theory—i.e., short bursts of change followed by long stretches of continuity (Collier and Collier 1991; Katznelson 2003)—and the more revisionist historical institutionalism that advocates a gradual change argument (e.g. Sewell 1996). In this way, an unorthodox critical juncture theory actually predicts gradual change. Incremental institutional change can thus, nonetheless, result in transformative consequences over time (cf. Streeck and Thelen 2005); however, the catalyst for such glacial change was an earlier critical juncture. In this way, institutional

change is a complex phenomenon that does not conform to the stark division of transformational-change-followed-by-stasis versus continual-incremental-change currently established in the literature.

Beginning with Lipset and Rokkan, many party theorists have come to see parties as "frozen" residues, or "crystallizations" of previous conflicts, characterized by considerable autonomy and the inertial strength to resist shifts in the broader socio-political environment (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Likewise, many see a party's historical origins as deterministically shaping its developmental trajectory (cf. Greene 2007), an anchor of stability and a contributor to status-quo bias. However, this dissertation has demonstrated that a party's historical origins can also, paradoxically, serve as the mechanism for sweeping *change* down the line: institutional features adopted by leftist parties in the face of early challenges had unintended, albeit positive, consequences that prepared these parties for later ideological and organizational transformations (i.e., the *opposite* of institutional inertia). In this way, particular institutional designs can offer opportunities for unforeseen venues of political contestation and unpredicted political outcomes.

Political challenges during a party's formative years and the institutional responses they engendered help shape that party's long-term developmental trajectory. But the "weight" of one's past is not necessarily burdensome; it can also be grounding and positive. The past does not necessarily make one resilient to change (since certain party structures and policies technically remained in place past their original purpose). Rather, institutional legacies, paradoxically, can also ensure that leftist parties transformed successfully into moderate, professional parties.

FINAL THOUGHTS

While political parties matter, non-party entities remain important within Latin American politics. Indeed, the failure of LCR and IU to consolidate themselves as professional, moderate leftist parties still reverberates in the Venezuelan and Peruvian political realms, respectively, to this day. In both countries, the left largely exists in non-party form. Such developments are harrowing for the future of democratic politics in both countries.

Life Outside Parties?

The fact that a leftist party does not engage in party adaptation does not preclude the rise to power of leftist leaders. Indeed, Chávez's firebrand discourse was loaded with leftist rhetoric, and his political project of "21st Century Socialism" came, at least nominally, from the leftist camp. However, as the former president became more and more of a one-man-government at the expense of democratic institutions, as the regime became more militaristic, as the president's cronies became business magnates ("Boligarchs"), as crime and violence surged, and as rampant inflation has harmed the country's lower classes, many leftists have rethought their former allegiance and severed ties with the regime—especially with the recent passing of Chávez. PPT, PCV, MAS, and For Social Democracy (*Por la Democracia Social*, PODEMOS) all broke with Chávez's political project, and many of his staunchest critics, such as Petkoff, are historical leftist figures. Medina, for his part, also broke with Chávez; he ran, unsuccessfully, in the 2012 presidential primary of the unified opposition, the MUD.

In large part thanks to Chávez's charisma, electoral strength, and political machinations, the Venezuelan left barely exists outside of Chávez and his Unified Socialist Party of Venezuela (*Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela*, PSUV). The

opposition has become more unified than ever, but the prospect of a strong leftist party emerging is unlikely; far more likely is the rise of a centrist or center-right party, headed by 2012 MUD presidential candidate and Governor of Miranda Henrique Capriles. Capriles will compete against Chávez's hand-picked successor, Nicolás Maduro of the PSUV, in presidential elections on 14 April 2013.

In Peru, President Ollanta Humala (2011-present) likewise governs from the center-left; however, he is more nationalist-pragmatic than anything else. Humala walks the walk and talks the talk in terms of social inclusion and battling poverty through new social programs; furthermore, he initially brought in numerous leftists to the ranks of his overall-diverse advisory groups and cabinet, including Sinesio López, Carlos Tapia, Nicolás Lynch, Alberto Adrianzén, and Aida García Naranjo. The PCP and Red Fatherland both supported Humala and he also initially counted upon the support of five leftist congressmen, including Díez Canseco; however, they all broke with the president in July of 2012. Indeed, after realizing that the Humala government would be marked more by continuity[362] than by radical change (cf. Vergara 2012), many leftists have severed political ties with the president.

Despite supporting him and playing a minor role in his government (or, perhaps, *because* they did so), the left is "without a home of its own....Today, the left in Peru is more of a sentiment than a political option...it is the sum of individuals and small organizations that do not approach the idea of parties" (León Moya 2012). In many ways, Peru's left is still suffering from the failure of IU. Dargent (2012) argues that three factors are greatly diminishing the possible rise of a leftist party in Peru: the existence of caudillos unwilling to subordinate themselves to national organizations; a lack of

[362] Humala has supported orthodox economic policies and has taken a hardline stance against protesters looking to suspend mining projects over the ensuing environmental damage and water pollution that results (Dargent and Muñoz 2012).

resources, especially given the weakness of unions and agrarian federations, and; a political program broad but strong enough to accommodate environmental issues (a growing concern among Peru's left), as well as others, such that the party has enough support to win a presidential election.

While the ambiguity surrounding the left's stance on armed struggle has long since dissolved, its failure to professionalize and moderate is in part to blame for the small but growing support for the Movement for Amnesty and Fundamental Laws (*Movimiento por Amnistía y Derechos Fundamentales*, MOVADEF), especially among student groups, but also in poor neighborhoods and labor unions. Considered by some the political arm of Shining Path (which still operates today albeit as a fraction of its former self and more in the form of an illicit drug enterprise than a Maoist guerrilla insurgency), MOVADEF tried to create a political party in 2011 with the objective of amnestying all crimes committed during the war, as well as the release of its jailed members, especially its founder, Abimael Guzmán or "Chairman Gonzalo."

The JNE rejected MOVADEF's request on the grounds that any group that wants to register itself has to demonstrate that it does not engage in seditious acts; the group's founding document "does not demarcate in a clear and concrete manner the terrorist and barbaric acts committed by Shining Path in the 1980s and 1990s" (*La República* 2012). In spite of this, however, the group is minuscule. And, despite its sensationalization in the media (cf. Ramírez Zapata 2013), MOVADEF most likely does *not* represent any threat to Peruvian democracy: the country has changed (cf. Gamarra 2012). What threat there is is that the left remains without a party and the electorate remains without a viable, democratic option. The result is a feckless left, not anchored down to any particular ideology or program, and characterized by personalist, go-it-alone leaders who represent no one given their frequent "flipflopping."

Leftist Parties in the 21st Century

Nonetheless, Latin America's leftist parties have come a long way from their past of bombing buildings and kidnapping ambassadors. Many of the region's leftist parties are now professional and moderate, boasting of strong and flexible organizations and defined by pragmatic ideologies. Thanks not only to the actions of leftist parties in power —i.e., bringing the military under civilian control, decentralizing government services, promoting transparency, reducing poverty and inequality, and implementing fiscally sound social programs (cf. Weyland, Madrid, and Hunter 2010)—but also to the very presence of a legal, democratic option on the left, the region's democratic institutions are stronger and more consolidated. Latin Americans of all ideological strains and partisan proclivities are the beneficiaries of this.

Given the nature of party adaptation, successfully adapted leftist parties should be able to handle subsequent ideological shifts among the electorate. One example of this is the PRD's dramatic shift to the left in terms of social policy (i.e., support for abortion rights and gay marriage) since 2006. Indeed, policy adaptation is actually *bi-directional*: were the left's electoral base to radicalize in the foreseeable future, those parties that replaced deterministic ideological stances for more malleable, pragmatic approaches should be able to respond in kind and re-radicalize.[363] Ideological moderation, in the end, has always been less about actual policy moderation than adopting a more flexible approach to politics, one that seeks to follow and represent public opinion rather than guide it and serve as society's self-appointed, vanguard delegates. In this way, we should

[363] In terms of policy moderation. A reversal of strategic and tactical moderation is highly unlikely, given these parties' struggles to participate in the representative democratic arena and the harrowing experience of their institutional predecessors in the hands of non-democratic regimes in the 1960s and 1970s.

not be surprised to see adapted leftist parties swing back to the left, if and when the electorate were to reward it.

Appendix A: Interviews

Abreu, Ricardo. PC do B Secretary of International Relations. São Paulo, Brazil: 26 May 2011.

Affonso, Almino Álvarez. Former MDB politician and PMDB founder. São Paulo, Brazil: 30 November 2010.

Albornoz, José. LCR founder, former leader of Pro-Catia, and former PPT General-Secretary. Caracas, Venezuela: 9 November 2011 and 8 March 2012.

Ames Cobián, Rolando. Former IU senator and member of IU's National Directive Committee. Lima, Peru: 14 July 2011.

Arcary, Valério. PT founder, former high-ranking member, and current PSTU leader. São Paulo, Brazil: 20 August 2010.

Azevedo, Clovis Bueno de. Civil servant, intellectual, and chief of staff in the Secretary of Administration under the PT's São Paulo mayors Luiza Erundina (1989-1992) and Marta Suplicy (2001-2004). São Paulo, Brazil: 23 July 2010.

Azevedo, Ricardo de. Former AP guerrilla, PT founder, and chief of staff for the PT, 2008-2010. São Paulo, Brazil: 3 February 2011.

"Babá," João Batista Oliveira de Araújo. Twice federal deputy for the PT; founded PSOL after being expelled from the PT. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: 11 April 2011.

Balbi, Carmen Rosa. Former Revolutionary Vanguard militant. Lima, Peru: 13 July 2011.

Bauza Rodríguez, Héctor. Former guerrilla, MAS founder, and former national leader. Caracas, Venezuela: 16 February 2012.

Béjar Rivera, Héctor. Former guerrilla and leftist intellectual. Lima, Peru: 25 July 2011.

Benítez, Eleuerio "Tello." LCR founder and currentnational leader. Caracas, Venezuela: 20 October 2011.

Bernales Ballesteros, Enrique. Former IU senator, member of IU's National Directive Committee, and secretary general of PSR. Lima, Peru: 14 July 2011.

Berzoini, Ricardo. Four-time federal deputy, two-time minister under President Lula, and PT president, 2005-2006 and 2007-2010. Brasília, Brazil: 8 November 2010.

Blanco Galdos, Hugo. Former guerrilla, presidential candidate, and high-ranking IU militant. Lima, Peru: 10 August 2011.

Briceño, Yajaira. Former Coordinator for Municipal Planning under LCR mayor of Caroní Clemente Scotto. Caracas, Venezuela: 8 November 2011.

Buarque, Cristovam. Former PT governor and Minister of Education, current PDT senator. Brasília, Brazil: 9 November 2010.

Buonicore, Augusto. PC do B national leader. São Pauo, Brazil: 12 May 2011.

Calzadilla, Eliezer. LCR national leader. Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela: 24 November 2011.

Caro Cárdenas, Ricardo. Principal researcher of leftist parties for Peru's Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Lima, Peru: 4 July 2011.

Carvalho, Carlos Eduardo Ferreira de. Coordinator of Lula's 1989 Government Program. São Paulo, Brazil: 10 August 2010.

Cotler Dolberg, Julio. Peruvian intellectual. Lima, Peru: 25 July 2011.

Couto, Clúadio Gonçalvez. Brazilian intellectual and assessor for Plínio de Arruda Sampaio's 1990 campaign for governor of São Paulo. São Paulo, Brazil: 30 May 2011.

Cruz, Geraldo. PT founder, two-time mayor of Embu, São Paulo, and CEB activist. São Paulo, Brazil: 5 May 2011.

Díez Canseco Cisneros, Javier. Former IU senator and member of IU's National Directive Committee. Lima, Peru: 2 August 2011.

Dulci, Luiz. Former PT general-secretary and chief minister, general secretariat of the presidency, under Lula. Brasília, Brazil: 4 October 2010.

Dutra, Olívio de Oliveira. PT founder, former mayor of Porto Alegre (1989-1992), and former governor of Rio Grande do Sul (1999-2002). Porto Alegre, Brazil: 24 March 2011.

Erundina de Souza, Luiza. PT founder, former mayor of São Paulo (1989-1992), and four-time PSB federal deputy (1998-). São Paulo, Brazil: 4 February 2011.

Esteves Ostolaza, Carlos. Former high-ranking PCP leader and member of IU's National Directive Committee. Lima, Peru: 25 July 2011.

Falcão, Rui. Former VAR-Palmares guerrilla, PT founder, and party president (1994). São Paulo, Brazil: 17 February 2011.

Fernández, José María “Chema.” LCR national leader. Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela: 21 November 2011.

Fontana, Mariuca. PT founder; expelled in 1992 with the CS. São Paulo, Brazil: 10 May 2011.

Genoino Guimarães Neto, José. Former PC do B guerrilla, PT founder, and former party president (2002-2005). São Paulo, Brazil: 2 February 2011.

Genro, Luciana. PT federal deputy; expelled in 2003 and founded PSOL. Porto Alegre, Brazil: 24 March 2011.

De Grazia Veltri, Amérigo. LCR national leader and four-time national deputy. Caracas, Venezuela: 31 January 2012 and 7 March 2012.

Guerra Ramos, Rafael. MAS founder and former National Secretary of Organization. Caracas, Venezuela: 27 February 2012.

Guzmán, Franklin. Former PCV militant, MAS founder, and former MAS Secretary of Propaganda. Caracas, Venezuela: 14 February 2012.

Helena, Heloísa. Former PT senator; expelled from the party and founded PSOL. Maceió, Brazil: 12 January 2011.

Hernandez, Gustavo. Former LCR national leader, current PPT national leader. Caracas, Venezuela: 26 October 2011.

Indacochea, Carlos Manuel. Peruvian military specialist. Washington, DC: 6 September 2011.

Jorge Martins Alves Sobrinho, Eduardo. PT founder and several term PT deputy. São Paulo, Brazil: 23 August 2010.

Lamounier, Bolívar. Brazilian intellectual and founder of the center-left PSDB. São Paulo, Brazil: 11 August 2010.

Lassance, Antônio. Special advisor, personal cabinet of the President of the Republic. Brasília, Brazil: 5 October 2010.

Lira, José. LCR founder and national leader. Caracas, Venezuela: 5 December 2011 and 22 February 2012.

López Maya, Margarita. Venezuelan left specialist and former LCR intellectual. Caracas, Venezuela: 11 October 2011.

Luna Vargas, Andrés Corcino. Former IU senator and president of Peasant Confederation of Peru (CCP). Lima, Peru: 19 July 2011.

Lynch Gamero, Nicolás. IU intellectual. Lima, Peru: 1 August 2011.

Márquez, Pompeyo. Former PCV Secretary-General, MAS founder and former MAS Secretary-General. Caracas, Venezuela: 31 January 2012.

Martínez, Alirio. General Director under Aristobulo Isturíz's mayorship of Caracas. Caracas, Venezuela: 1 November 2011.

Matheus, Lucas. LCR founder and current national leader. Caracas, Venezuela: 5 December 2011.

Medina, Ilenia. Former LCR leader and current PPT leader. Caracas, Venezuela. 6 October 2011.

Medina, Luis. LCR national leader. Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela: 23 November 2011.

Medina, Pablo. LCR founder, former General-Secretary, former Vice-President of the National Parliament, and PPT founder. Caracas, Venezuela: 7 October 2011 and 28 February 2012.

Medina, Pastora. Former mayor (1996-2000) of Ciudad Guayana (Municipality of Choroní) and multi-term national deputy. Caracas, Venezuela: 2 November 2011.

Mendes de Almeida, Candido. PT intellectual. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: 13 April 2011.

Moisés, José Álvaro. PT founder and leftist intellectual. São Paulo, Brazil: 17 August 2010.

Mujica, Felipe. MAS founder and current national leader. Caracas, Venezuela: 9 March 2012.

Mujica, Pedro. MAS founder and former national leader. Caracas, Venezuela: 27 February 2012.

Murrugarra Florian, Edmundo. Former IU senator, founder of VR, and member of IU's National Directive Committee. Lima, Peru: 18 July 2011.

de Oliveira, Francisco "Chico." PT founder and former party intellectual. São Paulo, Brazil: 3 March 2011.

Osorio. Ana Elisa. Health Minister for Ciudad Guayana under Scotto and Health Minister for the State of Bolívar under Velásquez. Caracas, Venezuela: 24 February 2012.

Panfichi Huamán, Aldo. Press Secretary for Barrantes' Mayoral Campaign. Lima, Peru: 15 July 2011.

D'Paola, Victor Hugo. MAS founder and former national leader. Caracas, Venezuela: 5 March 2012.

Passoni, Irma. MDB state deputy, PT founder, and former PT secretary-general. São Paulo, Brazil: 21 February 2011.

Pease García, Henry. Former IU senator, vice-mayor of Lima, and high ranking IU official. Lima, Peru: 13 July 2011.

Pedráglio, Santiago. Former member of IU's National Directive Committee and undersecretary general of PUM. Lima, Peru: 13 July 2011.

Pereira, Athos. PT founder and chief of staff, Leadership of the PT in the Chamber of Deputies. Brasília, Brazil: 20 September 2010.

Petkoff, Teodoro. Former guerrilla, founder of MAS, and former MAS President. Caracas, Venezuela: 19 October 2011.

Pimenta, Rui Costa. PT founder; expelled and founded PCO. São Paulo, Brazil: 26 August 2010.

Pimentel, Fernando Damata. Former guerrilla, PT founder, and mayor of Belo Horizonte (2002-2008). Belo Horizonte, Brazil: 5 November 2010.

Pomar, Valter Ventura da Rocha. High-ranking PT militant. São Paulo, Brazil: 11 July 2010.

Pomar, Wladimir. PT founder and member of the CEN (1984-1990). São Paulo, Brazil: 26 May 2011.

Pont, Raul. PT founder, former mayor of Porto Alegre (1997-2000) and high-ranking party official. Porto Alegre, Brazil: 24 March 2011.

Ramírez, César. LCR national leader. Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela: 22 November 2011.

Rénique, José Luis. Academic specialist on Peruvian intellectuals. New York: 1 September 2011.

Rodrigues, Edmilson Brito. PT founder and former mayor of Belém (1997-2004). Belém, Brazil: 13 October 2010.

Rodríguez Bauza, Héctor. MAS founder and former national leader. Caracas, Venezuela: 16 February 2012.

Salamanca, Luis. Venezuelan labor specialist and former LCR intellectual. Caracas, Venezuela: 21 September 2011.

Sampaio, Arlete. PT founder and vice-governor of Brasília (1995-1998). Brasília, Brazil: 18 October 2010.

Sampaio, Plínio de Arruda. PT founder and three-term federal deputy. São Paulo, Brazil: 29 November 2010.

Sanborn, Cynthia. Peruvian leftist specialist. Lima, Peru: 12 July 2011.

Schmidt, Davi. High-ranking PT militant and advisor at the Secretariat for Political and Institutional Studies of the Presidency. Brasília, Brazil: 17 September 2010.

Scotto, Clemente. LCR founder and three-term mayor (1989-1995, 2004-2008) of Ciudad Guayana (Caroní Municipality). Caracas, Venezuela: 8 November 2011.

Sell, Adeli. PT founder and high-ranking party cadre. Porto Alegre, Brazil: 22 March 2011.

da Silva, Clovis Ilgenfritz. PT founder, former federal deputy, and secretary of planning under Rio Grande do Sul Governor Dutra. Porto Alegre, Brazil: 22 March 2011.

Sokol, Markus. Former guerrilla, PT founder, and high-ranking party cadre. São Paulo, Brazil: 12 August 2010.

Soto, Adón. LCR militant and two-time national deputy. Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela: 23 November 2011.

Tuesta Soldevilla, Fernando. Lima, Peru: 8 July 2011.

Uzcátegui, Rafael. Ex-guerrilla, former LCR national leader, current PPT leader. Caracas, Venezuela: 9 and 10 October 2011.

Velásquez, Andrés. LCR founder, president, two term governor of Bolívar (1989-1995), and three-time presidential candidate. Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela: 24 November 2011.

Venturi, Gustavo. PT pollster and campaign consultant. São Paulo, Brazil: 13 August 2010.

Vergara Paniagua, Alberto. Peruvian intellectual. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 16 November 2012.

Weffort, Francisco. PT founder, former secretary-general, and party intellectual. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: 15 July 2010.

Yajure, Edgar. LCR founder, former national leader, and former leader of PRAG. Caracas, Venezuela: 26 October 2011.

Zapata Velasco, Antonio. Former PUM leader and lieutenant to Hugo Blanco. Lima, Peru: 1 August 2011.

Appendix B: *Manual de Construção dos Diretórios* (PT 1980)



MANUAL DE CONSTRUÇÃO DOS DIRETÓRIOS DO PT

I – CONSTRUÇÃO E REGISTRO DEFINITIVO DO PARTIDO DOS TRABALHADORES



1 – O PT está sendo construído a partir das bases. Está presente na vida sindical, nos movimentos de bairros, nas fábricas, no campo, nas escolas, nas universidades, na capital e no interior. A multiplicação dos núcleos de base continua a ser necessária para organizar os trabalhadores em toda a parte. A atividade dos núcleos, com sua presença nos movimentos populares e com a mobilização política da população, é uma característica do PT, que não pretende ser um Partido apenas eleitoral. Ao mesmo tempo o PT está promovendo a articulação política dos diversos setores populares das várias regiões do país para que a voz dos trabalhadores possa ser ouvida.

2 – Para que os trabalhadores possam ter o PT como instrumento de expressão e de representação no plano político é indispensável e urgente o seu registro definitivo. Os primeiros passos foram dados com a aprovação democrática do Manifesto, do Programa e dos Estatutos, eleição de Comissões Diretoras Estaduais Provisórias, Comissão Diretora Nacional Provisória e Comissões Diretoras Municipais Provisórias. E encaminhado o pedido de registro com documentação exigida pela lei ao TRIBUNAL SUPERIOR ELEITORAL obteve aprovação por unanimidade de votos dos Ministros, sem qualquer restrição.

3 – Obtido deferimento do registro provisório já está correndo o prazo para formação de Diretórios e obtenção do registro definitivo. Mas para tanto é necessário preparar corretamente toda a documentação exigida pela legislação eleitoral. São centenas de dispositivos da LEI DE REORGANIZAÇÃO DOS PARTIDOS POLÍTICOS, da LEI ORGÂNICA DOS PARTIDOS POLÍTICOS ANTERIOR (dispositivos não revogados), RESOLUÇÕES E REGULAMENTOS DO TRIBUNAL ELEITORAL e DOS TRIBUNAIS REGIONAIS ELEITORAIS, que devem ser rigorosamente cumpridos. Assim os companheiros devem procurar conhecê-los.

4 – Este manual é uma tentativa de apresentar de maneira mais simples e direta as questões mais importantes e as dúvidas mais freqüentes. Todavia, se dúvida ainda existir, o companheiro ou a companheira deve, então, procurar a sede regional do PT, ou o Gabinete da Liderança do PT na Assembléia Legislativa ou ainda os Gabinetes dos deputados que compõem a bancada do PT.

5. A obtenção do registro definitivo depende:
a - do funcionamento das Comissões Provisórias;
b - da filiação dos eleitores ao PT, nos municípios e nas capitais até o dia 5 de junho de 1981 (último prazo para a entrega das fichas de filiação dos Juizes Eleitorais.
c - da preparação das convenções;
d - da realização das Convenções Municipais para aprovação do Manifesto do Programa e do Estatuto do partido e eleiçao dos diretórios (data: 21-06-1981);
e - da realização das Convenções Regionais (data: 16-08-1981);
f - da realização da Convenção Nacional (data: 06-09-1981);
g - da autorização do funcionamento pelo Tribunal Superior Eleitoral.

6. TODAS ESSAS PROVIDÊNCIAS DEVEM SER TOMADAS ATÉ O DIA 1.º DE DEZEMBRO DE 1981, sob pena de ficar anulado o Registro Provisório.



III. FUNCIONAMENTO DAS COMISSÕES DIRETORAS PROVISÓRIAS DOS MUNICÍPIOS E DAS CAPITAIS

7. Na cidade de São Paulo, as Comissões Diretoras Zonais Provisórias e as Comissões Diretoras Distritais Provisórias, deixarão de existir nesta fase de registro definitivo. Portanto, tudo o que for dito sobre as Comissões Diretoras Municipais Provisórias (CDMP), **aplica-se também às Comissões da capital**, onde é indispensável a construção dos diretórios por unidades administrativas, que são em número de 56 (cinqüenta e seis).

8. As Comissões Diretoras Zonais das demais capitais equivalem às Comissões Diretoras Municipais Provisórias. Portanto, aqui também tudo o que for dito a respeito das Comissões Municipais aplica-se às Comissões Zonais, que contam como um município para efeito de registro do partido.





II – FUNCIONAMENTO DAS COMISSÕES DIRETORAS MUNICIPAIS PROVISÓRIAS

9 – ESCOLHA DA COMISSÃO EXECUTIVA: A Comissão Diretora Municipal Provisória deve eleger entre os seus membros uma Comissão Executiva, comunicando a sua composição ao Juiz Eleitoral e à Comissão Diretora Regional Provisória.

A CDMP deve ter um Presidente, um Secretário e um Tesoureiro. Para a comissão executiva não podem ser escolhidos Prefeitos, Vice-Prefeitos, Presidente ou Vice-Presidente da República, Governadores, Secretários de Estados, Ministros.

Esta eleição deve ser feita no prazo máximo de 30 dias contados da publicação no Diário Oficial do Estado da constituição da Comissão Diretora

10 – INDICAÇÃO DOS DELEGADOS PERANTE O JUIZO ELEITORAL: A Comissão Diretora Municipal Provisória deverá também indicar até 5 delegados provisórios para representá-la junto ao Juiz Eleitoral do Município.



11 – **Como anotar os nomes dos componentes da Comissão Executiva e dos delegados no Juizo Eleitoral** – *Para que seja possível a anotação da composição da Comissão Executiva e dos nomes dos delegados no Juizo Eleitoral do município ou distrito, a CDMP deverá começar comprando um livro de atas de 100 folhas numeradas tipograficamente. Na primeira folha do livro (que não é a de número 1 (um) e sim a folha em branco que vem antes da primeira folha pautada) deverá ser escrito o "***Termo de Abertura***" do livro (ver modelo anexo 1).*

Após ter escrito este termo de abertura, que deverá ser assinado pelo presidente eleito, ele mesmo, ou seja, o presidente, deverá rubricar todas as folhas do livro. A rubrica deve ser feita na margem direita das folhas e deve ser igual à que ele colocou no termo de abertura, depois das palavras "de meu uso".

*Nas costas da última folha com linhas, deverá ser colocado, no centro da folha, o "***Termo de Encerramento***". (ver modelo anexo 1).*

Atenção: *a* **data** *do termo de abertura, do termo de encerramento e da ata que elege a diretoria (Presidente, Secretário e Tesoureiro) e credencia os Delegados deverá ser a* **mesma.** *Essa data precisa ser posterior à publicação do nome dos componentes da CDMP no Diário Oficial. Por esse motivo, os companheiros, para adiantar o trabalho, podem fazer a reunião, escrever no livro os termos de abertura e encerramento e a ata da eleiçao,* **deixando sempre a data em branco.** *A data que deverá ser colocada será fornecida para cada município pela sede regional do PT (Em caso de dúvida, peça informação à sede regional do PT ou à Liderança).*

Na folha de número 1 do livro de atas deverá ser escrita a Ata de Reunião da Comissão Diretora Municipal Provisória. Se você cometeu algum erro, faça uma vírgula, escreva a palavra **digo,** *acrescente mais uma vírgula, ponha as palavras certas e continue. Por exemplo: . . . Euzébio Matoso,* **digo,** *Maria das Graças. . . .*

Esta ata não poderá conter rasuras nem emendas e deverá ser escrita de forma contínua, sem espaços em branco e sem parágrafos. Ela deve ser assinada por todos os membros da Comissão Municipal Provisória. (ver modelo anexo 2 e 3).

A comissão Diretora Municipal Provisória deverá ainda comunicar através de requerimento (ver modêlo anexo 4) ao Juiz Eleitoral e à Comissão Diretora Regional Provisória os nomes dos eleitos para a Comissão Executiva Municipal e os nomes dos Delegados no Município.

12 – ATRIBUIÇÕES DA COMISSÃO DIRETORA MUNICIPAL PROVISÓRIA: Até a realização das Convenções que elegerão os primeiros Diretórios Municipais, compete a Comissão Diretora Municipal Provisória:

a - dirigir o Partido no Município (no Distrito e na Zona);
b - receber as fichas de filiação e aprovar a filiação;
c - encaminhar as fichas de filiação ao Juízo Eleitoral;
d - convocar e organizar a primeira Convenção Municipal.



PARTIDO dos traBALhADORes



13. a - **A luta pela filiação deve ser a luta pela nucleação.** *A Comissão Nacional entende que a filiação deve visar fundamentalmente o reforço do processo de nucleação.*

b - *Como estabelece o Estatuto do PT, a filiação deve ser realizada* **prioritáriamente** *pelos núcleos. Nos casos em que essa prioridade não puder ser cumprida, cabe aos outros órgãos do partido encaminhar o processo de filiação.*

c - *A Comissão Nacional recomenda às Comissões Regionais que promovam, através de circulares próprias, a participação mais democrática possível dos núcleos, assim como de cada militante dentro dos núcleos, no processo de filiação.*

d - *A Comissão Nacional entende que a filiação não deve limitar-se apenas ao aliciamento individual de novos filiados. Entende que a filiação deve ser realizada sobretudo, como um processo coletivo apoiado sempre que possível no desenvolvimento das lutas concretas dos trabalhadores em cada localidade.*

e - *Como estabelece o Estatuto do Partido o ingresso de cada novo filiado deve significar que ele conhece e aceita o Programa e o Estatuto do partido.*

f - *Os princípios do partido requerem uma clara compreensão da necessidade de se obter o Registro Definitivo sem o qual ele não pode ter assegurada a sua existência legal.*

- Quem pode se filiar: *qualquer eleitor, no gozo de seus direitos políticos, que declare estar de acordo com os Estatutos e o Programa do PT, pode filiar-se ao Partido. Também os jovens de mais de dezesseis e menos de dezoito anos* **podem filiar-se.** *Entretanto, por não serem eleitores,* **os menores** *de dezoito anos não votam na convenção* **e não** *são computados no número mínimo de filiados necessário à constituição do Diretório.*

Glossary

AD: Democratic Action (*Acción Democrática*). Venezuela.

AD: Democratic Alternative (*Alternativa Democrática*). Colombia.

AI-1: Institutional Act No. 1 (*Ato Institucional N° 1*). Brazil

AI-2: Institutional Act No 2 (*Ato Institucional N° 2*). Brazil.

AI-5: Institutional Act No. 5 (*Ato Institucional N° 5*). Brazil

ALN: National Liberation Action (*Ação Libertadora Nacional*). Brazil.

AP: Popular Action (*Ação Popular*). Brazil.

AP: Popular Action (*Acción Popular*). Peru.

APRA: American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (*Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana*). Peru

APS: Socialist Popular Action (*Ação Popular Socialista*). Brazil.

APS: Socialist Political Action (*Acción Política Socialista*). Peru.

ARENA: National Renewal Alliance Party (*Aliança Renovadora Nacional*). Brazil.

ARI: Revolutionary Alliance of the Left (*Alianza Revolucionaria de Izquierda*). Peru.

ARS: Socialist Revolutionary Action (*Acción Revolucionaria Socialista*). Peru.

AS: Socialist Accord (*Acuerdo Socialista*). Peru.

CC: Central Committee (*Comitê Central*). Brazil.

CCP: Peasant Confederation of Peru (*Confederación Campesina del Perú*). Peru.

CDN: National Directive Committee [of IU] (*Comité Directivo Nacional*). Peru.

CDMP: Provisional Municipal Executive Committee (*Comissão Diretora Municipal Provisória*). Brazil.

CDNP: Provisional National Executive Committee (*Comissão Diretora Nacional Provisória*). Brazil.

CDRP: Provisional Regional Executive Committee (*Comissão Diretora Regional Provisória*). Brazil.

CEN: National Executive Committee [of LCR] (*Comité Ejecutivo Nacional*). Venezuela.

CEN: National Executive Committee [of the PT] (*Comissão Executiva Nacional*). Brazil.

CFE: Federal Electoral Commission (*Comisión Federal de Electores*, CFE); replaced by the Federal Electoral Institute (*Instituto Federal Electoral*, IFE). Mexico.

CGTP: General Confederation of Labor (*Confederación General del Trabajo del Perú*). Peru.

CNE: (see also CSE) National Electoral Council (*Consejo Nacional Electoral*). Venezuela.

CO: Worker's Cause (*Causa Operária*). Brazil.

COFAVIC: Committee of the Relatives of the Victims (*El Comité de Familiares de las Víctimas*). Venezuela.

COLINA: National Liberation Command (*Comando de Libertação Nacional*). Brazil.

COPEI: Independent Electoral Political Organization Committee (*Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente*). Venezuela.

COPRE: Presidential Commission for the Reform of the State (*Comisión Presidencial para la Reforma del Estado*). Venezuela.

COSO: Socialist Convergence (*Convergencia Socialista*). Peru.

CS: Socialist Convergence (*Convergência Socialista*). Brazil.

CSE: Supreme Electoral Council (*Consejo Supremo Electoral*); replaced by the National Electoral Council (*Consejo Nacional Electoral*, CNE). Venezuela.

CVG: Venezuelan Corporation of Guayana (C*orporación Venezolana de Guayana*). Venezuela.

CVR: Truth and Reconciliation Commission (*Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación*). Peru.

ELN: Army of National Liberation (*Ejército de Liberación Nacional*). Peru.

EP: Progressive Encounter (*Encuentro Progresista*). Uruguay.

EU: European Union.

EZLN: Zapatista Army of National Liberation (*Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional*). Mexico.

FA: Broad Front (*Frente Amplio*). Uruguay.

FALN. Armed Forces of National Liberation (*Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional*). Venezuela

FMLN: Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (*Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional*). El Salvador.

FNTC: National Front of Workers and Peasants (*Frente Nacional de Trabajadores y Campesinos*). Peru.

FOCEP: Worker, Peasant, Student, and Popular Front (*Frente Obrero Campesino Estudiantil y Popular). Peru.*

FREPASO: Front for a Country in Solidarity (*Frente por un País Solidario*). Argentina.

FSLN: Sandinista National Liberation Front (*Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional*). Nicaragua.

ID: Democratic Left (*Izquierda Democrática*). Ecuador.

IFE: (see also CFE) Federal Electoral Institute (*Instituto Federal Electoral*). Mexico.

IMF: International Monetary Fund.

IS: Socialist Left (*Izquierda Socialista*). Peru.

IU: United Left (*Izquierda Unida*). Peru.

JCV: Communist Youth of Venezuela (*Juventud Comunista de Venezuela*). Venezuela.

JNE: National Panel of Elections (*Jurado Nacional de Elecciones*). Peru.

LCR: The Radical Cause (*La Causa Radical; La Causa Я*). Venezuela.

M-19: The 19th of April Movement (*Movimiento 19 de Abril*). Colombia.

MAS: Movement for Socialism (*Movimiento al Socialismo*). Venezuela.

MBR-200: Bolivarian Republic Movement 200 (*Movimiento Bolivariano Republicano 200*). Venezuela.

MDB: Brazilian Democratic Movement (*Movimento Democrático Brasileiro*). Brazil.

MIR: Movement of the Revolutionary Left (*Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria*). Bolivia.

MIR: Movement of the Revolutionary Left (*Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria*). Peru.

MIR: Leftist Revolutionary Movement (*Movimiento Izquierda Revolucionario*). Venezuela.

MOVADEF: Movement for Amnesty and Fundamental Laws (*Movimiento por Amnistía y Derechos Fundamentales*). Peru.

MR-8: Revolutionary Movement – October 8 (*Movimento Revolucionário 8 de Outubro*). Brazil.

MRP: Revolutionary Movement of the People (*Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo*). Mexico.

MRTA: Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (*Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru*). Peru.

MUD: Democratic Unity Roundtable (*Mesa de la Unidad Democrática*). Venezuela.

MVR: Fifth Republic Movement (*Movimiento Quinta República*). Venezuela.

NGO: Non-governmental organization.

NOP: Nucleus of Public Opinion (*Núcleo de Opinião Pública*). Brazil.

OPEC: Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries.

PAN: National Action Party (*Partido Acción Nacional*). Mexico.

PCA: Argentine Communist Party (*Partido Comunista de la Argentina*). Argentina.

PCB: Brazilian Communist Party (*Partido Comunista Brasileiro*). Brazil.

PCBR: Revolutionary Brazilian Communist Party (*Partido Comunista Brasileiro Revolucionário*). Brazil.

PC do B: Communist Party of Brazil (*Partido Comunista do Brasil*). Brazil.

PCO: Worker's Cause Party (*Partido da Causa Operária*). Brazil.

PCP: Peruvian Communist Party (*Partido Comunista Peruano*). Peru.

PCP-BR: Communist Party of Peru – Red Flag (*Partido Comunista del Perú - Bandera Roja*). Peru.

PCP-PR: Communist Party of Peru—Red Fatherland (*Partido Comunista del Perú–Patria Roja*). Peru.

PCP-SL (see also, SL): Communist Party of Peru—Shining Path (*Partido Comunista del Perú—Sendero Luminoso*). Peru.

PCR: Revolutionary Communist Party (*Partido Comunista Revolucionario*). Peru.

PCV: Communist Party of Venezuela (*Partido Comunista de Venezuela*). Venezuela.

PDA: Alternative Democratic Pole (*Polo Democrático Alternativo*). Colombia.

PDC: Christian Democratic Party (*Partido Demócrata Cristiano*). Chile.

PDC: Christian Democratic Party (*Partido Demócrata Cristiano*). Argentina.

PDI: Independent Democratic Pole (*Polo Democrático Independiente*). Colombia.

PDS: Social Democratic Party (*Partido Democrático Social*). Brazil.

PDT: Democratic Labor Party (*Partido Democrático Trabalhista*). Brazil.

PED: Process of Direct Elections (*Processo de Eleições Diretas*). Brazil

PFL: Liberal Front Party (*Partido da Frente Liberal*). Brazil.

PI: Intransigent Party (*Partido Intransigente*). Argentina.

PJ: Peronist Party (*Partido Justicialista*). Argentina.

PL: Liberal Party (*Partido Liberal*). Brazil.

PMDB: Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (*Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro*). Brazil.

PMS: Socialist Mexican Party (*Partido Mexicano Socialista*). Mexico.

PMT: Mexican Workers' Party (*Partido Mexicano de los Trabajadores*). Mexico.

PODEMOS: For Social Democracy (*Por la Democracia Social*). Venezuela.

PP: Patriotic Pole (*Polo Patriótico*). Venezuela.

PP: Popular Party (*Partido Popular*). Brazil.

PPR: Revolutionary Patriotic Party (*Partido Patriótico Revolucionario*). Mexico.

PPS: Popular Power and Socialism (*Poder Popular e Socialismo*). Brazil.

PPT: Fatherland for All (*Patria Para Todos*). Venezuela.

PRD: Party of the Democratic Revolution (*Partido de la Revolución Democrática*). Mexico.

PRI: Institutional Revolutionary Party (*Partido Revolucionario Institucional*). Mexico.

PRONASOL: National Solidarity Program (*Programa Nacional de Solidaridad*). Mexico.

PS: Socialist Party (*Partido Socialista*). Chile.

PSD: Democratic Socialist Party (*Partido Socialista Democrático*). Argentina.

PSDB: Party of the Brazilian Social Democracy (*Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira*). Brazil.

PSP: Popular Socialist Party (*Partido Socialista Popular*). Argentina.

PSOE: Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (*Partido Socialista Obrero Español*). Spain.

PSOL: Socialism and Freedom Party (*Partido Socialismo e Liberadade*). Brazil.

PSR: Revolutionary Socialist Party (*Partido Socialista Revolucionario*). Peru.

PSUM: Unified Socialist Party of Mexico (*Partido Socialista Unificado de México*). Mexico.

PSUV: United Socialist Party of Venezuela (*Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela*). Venezuela.

PSTU: United Socialist Workers' Party (*Partido Socialista dos Trabalhadores Unificado*). Brazil.

PT: Workers' Party (*Partido dos Trabalhadores*). Brazil.

PTB: Brazilian Labor Party (*Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro*). Brazil.

PUM: Mariateguist Unified Party (*Partido Unificado Mariateguista*). Peru.

Sidor: Iron and Steel Works of Orinoco (*Siderúrgica de Orinoco C.A.*). Venezuela.

SIN: National Intelligence Service (*Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional*). Peru.

SINAMOS: National Support System for Social Mobilization (*Sistema Nacional de Apoyo a la Movilización Social*). Peru.

SL (see also, PCP-SL): Shining Path (*Sendero Luminoso*). Peru.

SNI: National Information Service (*Serviço Nacional de Informações*). Brazil

STF: Supreme Court (*Supremo Tribunal Federal*). Mexico.

SUTIS: Single Union of the Iron and Steel Works of Orinoco (*Sindicato Único de la Siderúrgica del Orinoco*). Venezuela.

TEPJF: Federal Electoral Court (*Tribunal Electoral del Poder Judicial de la Federación*). Mexico.

TSE: Superior Electoral Court (*Tribunal Superior Eleitoral*). Brazil.

UCR: Radical Civic Union. (*Unión Cívica Radical*). Argentina.

UCV: Central University of Venezuela (*Universidad Central de Venezuela*). Venezuela.

UDP: Popular Democratic Unity (*Unidad Democrático Popular*). Peru.

UI: Left Unity (*Unidad Izquierda*). Peru.

UIC: Union of the Communist Left (*Unión de la Izquierda Comunista*). Mexico.

UNIR: Revolutionary Left Union (*Unión de Izquierda Revolucionaria*). Peru.

URD: Democratic Republican Union (*Unión Republicana Democrática*). Venezuela.

URNG: Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (*Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca*). Guatemala.

USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

VAR Palmares. Palmares Armed Revolutionary Vanguard (*Vanguarda Armada Revolucionária Palmares*). Brazil.

VR: Revolutionary Vanguard (*Vanguardia Revolucionaria*). Peru.

VS: Socialist Side (*Vertente Socialista*). Brazil.

WTO: World Trade Organization.

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